Sunday, 24 June 2018

On The "Coupling" Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning

Martin & Rose (2007: 70):
Of these dimensions, valuation is especially tied up with field, since the criteria for valuing a text/process are for the most part institutionally specific. But beyond this, since both judgement and appreciation are in a sense institutionalisations of feeling, all of the dimensions involved will prove sensitive to field. An example of this coupling of ideational and interpersonal meaning is presented in Table 2.11 for appreciations of research in the field of linguistics.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the appraised with the system of appraisal (appreciation).  It is the appreciated that varies according to the field being realised in language-as-register, not the means of appreciating.  This is shown by the fact that the terms of appreciation in Table 2.11 are not limited to a specialised field like linguistics, and by the fact that the positive and negative values of the terms are also not limited to a specialised field like linguistics.

[2] The reason the authors link 'institutionalisation' to 'field' is because Martin (1992: 180-1, 292, 527, 536) mistakenly identifies 'institution' with only the ideational dimension of context (misconstrued as register).  In SFL theory, on the other hand, 'institution' is 'situation type' viewed from the potential pole of the cline of instantiation, such that institution variation is realised by register variation.


[3] The notion of "this coupling of ideational and interpersonal meaning" — ideational context and interpersonal semantics — betrays the authors' misunderstanding of strata and metafunctions as interacting modules of meaning (Martin 1992: 390); see, for example Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules. 

Sunday, 17 June 2018

On Appreciation As The Evaluation Of Products And Performances

Martin & Rose (2007: 69-70):
Appreciation can be thought of as the institutionalisation of feeling, in the context of propositions (norms about how products and performances are valued). Like affect and judgement it has a positive and negative dimension corresponding to positive and negative evaluations of texts and processes (and natural phenomena). The system is organised around three variables: reaction, composition and valuation.  Reaction has to do with attention (reaction: impact) and the emotional impact it has on us with the degree to which the text/process in question captures our attention (reaction: impact) and the emotional impact it has on us (reaction: quality).  Composition has to do with our perceptions of proportionality (composition: balance) and detail (composition: complexity) in a text/process. Valuation has to do with our assessment of the social significance of the text/process.

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose limit appreciation to the assessment of 'products and performances', and 'texts and processes (and natural phenomena)', leading some to conclude that appreciation does not apply to humans or human behaviour, despite the fact that humans and behaviours can be assessed as
  • 'surprising' (reaction: impact),
  • 'dull' (reaction: quality),
  • 'sloppy' (composition: balance),
  • 'complicated' (composition: complexity) and 
  • 'shallow' (valuation).

Sunday, 10 June 2018

Confusing Orientation Distinctions With Judgement Distinctions

Martin & Rose (2007: 68-9):
The kinds of judgement speakers take up is very sensitive to their institutional position. For example only journalists with responsibility for writing editorials and other comment have a full range of judgmental resources at their disposal; reporters writing hard news that is meant to sound objective have to avoid explicit judgements completely (Iedema et al 1994; Martin and White 2005). The distinction between social esteem and social sanction in other words has important implications for the subjective or objective flavour of an appraiser's stance.

Blogger Comments:

This simply confuses two distinct dimensions of orientation:
  • subjective vs objective, and
  • explicit vs implicit
with the judgement distinction between social esteem and social sanction.

To be clear, none of the following three oppositions between social esteem and social sanction enacts the distinction between subjective and objective orientation:
  • Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs Trump is dishonest (social sanction)
  • I think Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs I think Trump is dishonest (social sanction)
  • It is widely acknowledged that Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs It is widely acknowledged that Trump is dishonest (social sanction).

Sunday, 3 June 2018

Major Inconsistencies In The Martin & Rose Interpretation Of Judgement

Martin & Rose (2007: 68):
Each of these varieties of judgements are exemplified in Table 2.9. For each set, examples are given that express various types of judgement (e.g. lucky, normal, fashionable), and different degrees of intensity within each type (e.g. lucky, fortunate, charmed).


Blogger Comments:

[1] Many of the distinctions in Table 2.9 that are used to classify types of judgement do not survive close scrutiny.

As already mentioned, the opposition between 'admire/criticise' and 'praise/condemn' does not characterise the opposition between social esteem and social sanction.  For example, assessing someone as cowardly (esteem) is as much a condemnation (sanction) as a criticism (esteem).

The opposition between 'venial' (pardonable) and 'moral', also, does not characterise the opposition between social esteem and social sanction, nor is it a valid opposition.  On the first point, for example, what makes 'brave' (esteem) pardonable, rather than moral (sanction)?  On the second point, the distinction between 'venial' (pardonable) and 'moral' is not a mutually exclusive opposition within a superordinate category, and 'venial' is irrelevant for positive values of esteem, since they are not transgressions of a moral code.

Within social esteem, as already mentioned, the term 'normality' — the state of being usual, typical, or expected — is problematic because it represents a midpoint on any scale of variation rather than a scale itself, and so the authors' (conservative) presumption that normal is positive and abnormal is negative is itself invalid; cf. SNAFU.

The glossing of 'normality' as 'fate' — the course of someone's life, or the outcome of a situation for someone or something, seen as outside their control — is inconsistent in terms of the meanings of the two words, and invalid for 'normality' categories that are not outside someone's control, such as 'fashionable' and 'avant garde'. 

Moreover, the examples provided demonstrate that this category is a set of leftover subtypes that don't fit either of the other two categories, 'capacity' or 'tenacity', since it subsumes various different types of scalar values, as shown by the oppositions of 'lucky/unlucky' and 'fashionable/(unfashionable)' — with 'fashionable' presumed to be a positive judgement; cf. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont.

Within social sanction, the glossing of 'propriety' as 'ethics' is problematic, because 'ethics' is a superordinate term — like the gloss of social sanction: 'moral' — that subsumes its hyponym 'veracity'.  That is, the opposition between 'truth' (veracity) and 'ethics' (propriety) is a false dichotomy, since it presents two different levels of a hyponymic taxonomy as an opposition at the same level.

[2] Again, the system of GRADUATION ('degrees of intensity') is confused here with a system of ATTITUDE — this time with JUDGEMENT, rather than AFFECT.

Sunday, 27 May 2018

On Judgement: Esteem, Sanction & Normality

Martin & Rose (2007: 67-8):
Judgement can be thought of as the institutionalisation of feeling, in the context of proposals (norms about how people should and shouldn’t behave). Like affect, it has a positive and negative dimension corresponding to positive and negative judgements about behaviour. Media research reported in Iedema et al. (1994) has suggested dividing judgements into two major groups, social esteem and social sanction. Social esteem involves admiration and criticism, typically without legal implications; if you have difficulties in this area you may need a therapist. Social sanction on the other hand involves praise, and condemnation, often with legal implications; if you have problems in this area you may need a lawyer. Judgements of esteem have to do with normality (how unusual someone is), capacity (how capable they are) and tenacity (how resolute they are); judgements of sanction have to do with veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Contrary to the claim, the opposition 'admiration and criticism' versus 'praise and condemnation' does not characterise the distinction between social esteem and social sanction.  For example, a person can be
  • praised for their cleverness (esteem, not sanction),
  • condemned for their cowardice (esteem, not sanction),
  • admired for their honesty (sanction, not esteem), or
  • criticised for their immorality (sanction, not esteem).

[2] The term 'normality' is problematic in this context, because, unlike the terms 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety', it does not refer to a scale of gradable values, but to a midpoint on all scales.  That is, it is not only possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety' (judgement), but it is also possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'reaction', 'composition' and 'valuation' (appreciation).  This is likely to result in confusion, even between judgement and appreciation, in text analysis.

The assessment of 'normality' itself, as positive or negative, is another matter.

Sunday, 20 May 2018

Confusing Affect And Graduation

Martin & Rose (2007: 66-7):
Feelings can be experienced as emotional dispositions, such as sad or happy, or they may appear as surges of behaviour, such as crying and laughing. Each group of emotions is set out in Table 2.8, including examples of both dispositions and surges. Each group includes both positive and negative feelings, with examples that express three degrees of intensity. 



















Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the use of emotion to appraise — interpersonal enactments — not with emotion as a construal of experience.  The distinction is one of metafunction.

[2] This again confuses the system of GRADUATION ('intensity') with what is purported to be a system of ATTITUDE.

Sunday, 13 May 2018

Misconstruing Ascriptions Of Emotion As Appraisals By Reference To Emotion

Martin & Rose (2007: 65-6):
(6) Finally we can group emotions into three major sets having to do with un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. For example:
in/security             the boy was anxious/confident
dis/satisfaction      the boy was fed up/absorbed
un/happiness         the boy was sad/happy

Blogger Comments:

This again confuses the construal of emotions with appraisal by reference to emotions (affect).  None of the three propositions exemplifies affect, since none enacts an appraisal by reference to emotion.  Neither the boy nor the author is making an appraisal.  The author is merely attributing qualities of emotion to the boy.  Genuine examples would be:
in/security                 the boy was anxious/confident about the result
dis/satisfaction          the boy was fed up with/absorbed in the computer game
un/happiness             the boy was sad/happy that his teacher had died

Sunday, 6 May 2018

Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Behavioural Surges Of Mental Desideration

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):
(5) Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather than realis).
realis      the boy liked the present
irrealis   the boy wanted the present 
Irrealis affect seems always to be directed at some external agency, and so can be outlined as in Table 2.7 (setting aside parameter 3 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the distinction between emotive (liked) and desiderative (wanted) mental processes.  (The ir/realis distinction is not an interpersonal distinction.)

[2] This is manifestly untrue in terms of both agency, as demonstrated by the authors' own example: the boy wanted the present, and externality, as demonstrated by the boy wanted to feel safe.

[3] There are two main theoretical inconsistencies in Table 2.7.

In presenting behavioural processes manifesting emotion (tremble, shudder, cower) as behavioural surges of desideration (fear), and qualities of emotion as dispositions of desideration, it confuses 'fear' as emotion with 'fear' as desideration.

In presenting verbal processes (suggest, request, implore) as behavioural surges of desideration (desire), it confuses verbal processes with mental processes.  To be clear, affect is the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.

Sunday, 29 April 2018

Confusing Graduation With Attitude

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):
(4) How are the feelings graded: towards the lower valued end of a scale of intensity, towards the higher valued end or somewhere in between? We don’t wish at this stage to imply that low, median and high are discrete values (as with modality, cf. Halliday 1994: 358-9), but expect that most emotions offer lexicalisations that grade along an evenly-clined scale.
low             the boy liked the present
'median'      the boy loved the present
high            the boy adored the present

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this scale is concerned with GRADUATION, a system that is distinct from — parallel with — the system of ATTITUDE.  Here Martin & Rose present it as the fourth means of classifying affect (ATTITUDE).

Sunday, 22 April 2018

Misconstruing The Construal Of Emotion As 'Undirected' Affect

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):
(3) Are the feelings construed as directed at or reacting to some specific external agency (typically conscious) or as a general ongoing mood for which one might pose the question ‘Why are you feeling that way?’ and get the answer ‘I’m not sure.’ 
reaction to other       the boy liked the teacher/the teacher pleased the boy
undirected mood      the boy was happy

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  Agency is not a necessary feature of the appraised, as demonstrated by the boy liked the teacher.

[2] This is manifestly untrue.   'Conscious' is at least as typically not a feature of the appraised, as demonstrated by instances of the following types:
  • the boy loved chocolate [unconscious thing]
  • the boy enjoyed riding his bike [act]
  • the boy liked the fact that his team had won [fact]

[3] This once again confuses the ideational construal of emotion — as Process or qualitative Attribute — with affect: the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.  The confusion is thus in terms of metafunction.

Sunday, 15 April 2018

Confusing Ideational Construals With Interpersonal Enactments

Martin & Rose (2007: 64):
(1) Are the feelings popularly construed by the culture as positive (good vibes that are enjoyable to experience) or negative ones (bad vibes that are better avoided)? We are not concerned here with the value that a particular psychological framework might place on one or another emotion (cf. It’s probably productive that you’re feeling sad because it’s a sign that...’).
positive affect           the boy was happy
negative affect          the boy was sad

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the appraisal of emotions by a culture with appraisal by reference to emotions (affect).

[2] Neither proposition enacts an appraisal by emotion (affect).  Neither the boy nor the author is making an appraisal.  The author is merely attributing qualities of emotion to the boy.  Genuine examples of positive and negative affect would be:
positive affect           the boy was happy that his teacher had been arrested
negative affect          the boy was sad that the death penalty had been abolished
In each instance the boy appraises a fact by reference to an emotion.

Sunday, 8 April 2018

On Martin's "Communion With Nelson Mandela In So Many Respects"

Martin & Rose (2007: 61-3):
We’ll close this section with an example of stance shifting from one of Jim’s papers where he tried to figure out what he found so moving about the final couple of pages of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography Long Walk to Freedom (a text we’ll return to in Chapter 7). …
By the end of this study however he was still feeling a little mystified about why the text he was analysing was so moving. His communion with Mandela, at such a distance in so many respects, seemed to transcend the sum of the analyses he had undertaken, however focused he tried to make them on what was going on.  In exasperation, he decided to shift stance and wrote:
… In a sense then, Mandela is promoting socialism in the name of freedom; … We need, in other words, more positive discourse analysis (PDA?) alongside our critique; and this means dealing with texts we admire, alongside those we dislike and try to expose (Wodak 1996). (Martin 1999a: 51-2)
… [Jim] evaluates the text as graceful, he’s charmed by it, he admires it and of course the man who wrote it. … Allowing himself a reaction got him thinking about how Mandela finesses his radical politics, disarming people [a]round the world into communities of admiring fans. And it allowed Jim to make a further point about the importance of focusing on heartening discourses of this kind instead of being so depressingly critical all the time by focusing solely on hegemony and all that’s wrong with the world. … These guys are heroes; let’s see how they move the world along’. … 
Just as we’ve been changing voices here; we’ll pull back now, in case our scholarly credentials are wearing a little thin.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Since this section is neither an exposition of Appraisal theory, nor an application of Appraisal theory to text analysis, it is useful to consider the function it serves.

[2] Here Martin & Rose are informing the reader that one of them, Jim Martin, has much in common with Nelson Mandela — in terms of shared mental or spiritual experience.  (The word 'communion' means the sharing or exchanging of intimate thoughts and feelings, especially on a mental or spiritual level, or shared participation in a mental or spiritual experience.)

For a reality check, see Jim Martin "Honouring" The Late Ruqaiya Hasan.

For an insightful portrait of the 'academic revolutionary', enjoy Rumpole And The Right To Silence by John Mortimer.

[3] A critique is a detailed analysis and assessment of something, especially a literary, philosophical, or political theory. It is 'critical' in the sense of critical thinking, as expressing or involving an analysis of the merits and faults of a work. Martin, however, relates 'critique' to the other, less scholarly meaning of 'critical' as simply expressing adverse or disapproving comments or judgements.

[4] This would appear to be the objective of Mandela's soul-mate as well. The choice of the word 'disarm' — deprive of the power to hurt — betrays the authors' interest in the power relation between the hero and his fans.

[5] Martin's focus on heroes (and on positive "critiques", and on communities of admiring fans) can be explained by his ideological orientation as a disciplinarian, rather than a libertarian.  Bertrand Russell explains the distinction in his History Of Western Philosophy (pp 21-2):
Throughout this long development, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them. With this difference, others have been associated. 
The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically. They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred. They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.
The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion. 
This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

[6] As should be clear from this clause, and the authors' likening of Jim Martin to Nelson Mandela, this section of Martin & Rose's text is merely an exercise in managing the readers' perception of the authors.

If this critique of Martin & Rose (2007) has taken a bizarre and personal turn at this point, it is because the text under discussion has itself taken a bizarre and personal turn at this point.  See also Rose as a semiotic reincarnation of Benjamin Whorf.

Sunday, 1 April 2018

Misconstruing Logogenetic Patterns Of Instantiation As Prosodic Structure

Martin & Rose (2007: 59-60):
Appraisal resources are used to establish the tone or mood of a passage of discourse, as choices resonate with one another from one moment to another as a text unfolds. The pattern of choices is thus ‘prosodic’. They form a prosody of attitude running through the text that swells and diminishes, in the manner of a musical prosody. The prosodic pattern of appraisal choices constructs the ‘stance’ or ‘voice’ of the appraiser, and this stance or voice defines the kind of community that is being set up around shared values.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading.  To be clear, the use of the terms 'tone' and 'mood' by Martin & Rose here is quite distinct from the technical terms 'tone' and 'mood' in SFL theory.  Theoretically, tone is an interpersonal system at the rank of tone group on the stratum of phonology, and mood is an interpersonal system at the rank of clause on the stratum of lexicogrammar.  Choices in the system of mood are realised in choices in the system of tone.  Martin & Rose have not theorised how choices in the system of appraisal (semantics) are realised in the realisation of mood (grammar) in tone (phonology).

[2] Here Martin & Rose confuse logogenetic patterns of instantiation ('patterns of choices') with a type of structure ('prosodic').  The confusion is primarily one of axis: paradigmatic choices are confused with syntagmatic structure.

[3] Here Martin & Rose confuse the prosodic structure type favoured by the interpersonal metafunction with the culminative structure type ('swells and diminishes') favoured by the textual metafunction; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 84-5).  The confusion of structure type is thus one of metafunction.

[4] Here Martin & Rose employ the logical fallacy known as false analogy, as demonstrated by the meaning of the term 'musical prosody':

Sunday, 25 March 2018

On The Three Main Appraisal Systems

Martin & Rose (2007: 59):
Summing up, then, what we have are three main appraisal systems: attitude, amplification and source. Attitude comprises affect, judgement and appreciation: our three major regions of feeling. Amplification covers grading, including force and focus; force involves the choice to raise or lower the intensity of gradable items, focus the option of sharpening or softening an experiential boundary.  Engagement covers resources that introduce additional voices into a discourse, via projection, modalisation or concession; the key choice here is one voice (monogloss) or more than one voice (heterogloss). …


Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, the three most general appraisal systems are ATTITUDE, GRADUATION and ENGAGEMENT, as acknowledged elsewhere in this second edition.

[2] The characterisation of attitude as 'feeling' has led to the confusions identified in earlier posts, such as the metafuctional confusion of construing emotion (experiential metafunction) with appraising through emotion (interpersonal metafunction).

[3] This confuses the appraisal with the appraised.  FORCE is concerned with the intensity of the appraisal being enacted.

[4] This confuses the appraisal with the appraised.  FOCUS is concerned with the sharpening or softening of the appraisal being enacted.

[5] To be clear, the exposition of ENGAGEMENT is concerned only with instances of heteroglossia, and misrepresents its grammatical resources (projection, modalisation, concession) as its subsystems. For genuine examples of ENGAGEMENT subsystems, see White's Appraisal website.

Sunday, 18 March 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Continuatives"

Martin & Rose (2007: 58):
Alongside conjunctions another important set of resources for adjusting expectations are continuatives. These are like conjunctions but they occur inside the clause, rather than at the beginning. They include words like already, finally, still and only, just, even. Continuatives that express time indicate that something happens sooner or later, or persists longer than one might expect. In the following example Helena comments on white peoples’ greed as persisting longer than one might reasonably expect:
If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it.
Other continuatives indicate that there is more or less to a situation than has been implied:
It was the beginning of a beautiful relationship. We even spoke about marriage. 
Amnesty didn't matter, It was only a means to the truth.
Tutu uses much less of this resource to adjust expectancy:
They denied that they had committed a crime, claiming that they had assaulted him only in retaliation for his inexplicable conduct in attacking them.
Now that we have brought modality and concession into the picture, alongside projection, it is timely to introduce the technical term used to name this region of meaning, namely engagement.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, continuatives are not a "set of resources for adjusting expectations".  Instead, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 107) explain:
A continuative is one of a small set of words that signal a move in the discourse: a response, in dialogue, or a new move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing. The usual continuatives are yes no well oh now.
[2] This is untrue of continuatives.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 109):
continuatives and conjunctions, are inherently thematic: if they are present in the clause at all, they come at the beginning.
[3] This continues the confusion of Martin (1992: 230-4) in which mood Adjuncts are misconstrued as continuatives, as documented in the relevant critiques here.  The adverbs only, just and even serve as mood Adjuncts of intensity (counterexpectancy), whereas the adverbs already and still serve as mood Adjuncts of temporality.  The odd one out here is finally, which serves as a conjunctive Adjunct (temporal: conclusive); Martin & Rose may have been aiming for eventually, which serves as a mood Adjunct of temporality.

[4] To be clear, this is a characterisation mood Adjuncts of temporality, not continuatives.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 187):
Adjuncts of temporality relate to interpersonal (deictic) time. They relate either (i) to the time itself, which may be near or remote, past or future, relative to the speaker-now; or (ii) to an expectation, positive or negative, with regard to the time at issue (sooner or later than expected …
[5] This vague characterisation falls short of identifying the function of the mood Adjuncts of intensity that Martin & Rose misconstrue as continuatives.  In the cited texts, the adverb even signals 'exceeding what is to be expected', whereas the adverb only signals 'limiting what is to be expected'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 187):
Those of counterexpectancy are either ‘limiting’ or ‘exceeding’ what is to be expected: the meaning is either ‘nothing else than, went no further than’ or ‘including also, went as far as’.
[6] As this and previous posts have demonstrated, Martin & Rose's exposition of the system of ENGAGEMENT has been limited to misunderstandings of only one of its two most general features 'heterogloss'.  There has been no discussion of the other most general feature 'monogloss', nor of the proposed systems of features more delicate than 'heterogloss', such as the distinction between 'intravocalise' and 'extravocalise', and the more delicate distinctions within each; see, for example, the systems on White's Appraisal website here.

Sunday, 11 March 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"

Martin & Rose (2007: 57-8):
Tutu also makes some use of concession in his exposition …
Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships.
... including the ‘internal’ rhetorical sense of ‘in spite of what I’ve led you to expect me to say’ (as opposed to the ‘external’ meaning ‘in spite of what you expect to happen’). Here Tutu means that although he’s granted that public hearings weren’t an absolute requirement, in fact virtually all important cases were heard that way:
The Act required that where the offence is a gross violation of human rights — defined as an abduction, killing, torture or severe ill-treatment — the application should be dealt with in a public hearing unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice (for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session). In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  The structural (logical) expansion relation expressed by but is here replacive variation ('instead': not X but Y), not concessive condition ('yet': if P then contrary to expectation Q).  The misunderstanding of concessive expansion relations is widespread throughout the informing text, Martin (1992), as demonstrated, for example, here, here, here, here, here and here.

[2] This is misleading.  The structural expansion relation here is not internal to the speech event (between propositions), but external (between the two identifying figures).  The misunderstanding of the distinction between internal and external expansion relations is widespread throughout the informing text, Martin (1992), as demonstrated here.

[3] This is misleading.  If in fact is interpreted as a conjunctive Adjunct, the cohesive (textual) expansion relation it expresses here is verifactive clarification, not concessive condition.  If in fact is interpreted as a modal Adjunct, it serves as an unqualified speech-functional comment Adjunct of the type 'factual'.

[4] This misunderstands the text in order to misrepresent the expansion relation as concessive.  Tutu "grants" (concedes) nothing.  He identifies a requirement set out by the Act, including where such requirements may be waived, and verifies that the waiving of the requirement has, for the most part, not been necessary in important cases.

Sunday, 4 March 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of Monitoring Expectancy

Martin & Rose (2007: 57):
Monitoring expectancy is in fact a pervasive feature of conjunctions, realised as time, contrast and causes. In the next examples suddenly means ‘sooner than expected’ and instead of resting at night implies that ‘resting at night’ is what we’d normally expect:
They even stayed over for long periods. Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless. 
Instead of resting at night, he would wander from window to window.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the function of conjunctions and conjunctive Adjuncts is to conjoin units and relate them in terms of expansion features, either structurally through logical relations in complexes, or non-structurally through textual cohesion.

[2] In this way of thinking, 'blue' means 'less red than expected'.  To be clear, the adverb suddenly can function as a conjunctive Adjunct marking an immediate temporal enhancing cohesive relation between messages, as it does in the cited instance, or as a circumstance of Manner: quality.

[3] To be clear, the conjunctive Adjunct instead of marks an extending relation of replacive variation between a primary clause and a dependent non-finite secondary clause in a hypotactic clause nexus.

[4] Most importantly, neither of the cited examples includes an instance of heteroglossic engagement — the subject under discussion — since neither involves an acknowledgement of other voices with regard to the propositions involved.

[5] To be clear, the modal Adjunct even enacts interpersonal counterexpectancy (exceeding).

Sunday, 25 February 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Martin & Rose (2007: 57):
But is the most common conjunction used to signal concession. But there are other possibilities, including however and although, and variations on the theme including even if and even by; in fact, at least, indeed; and nevertheless, needless to say, of course, admittedly, in any case etc:
Even if God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times — I have to live with this hell.
Even if here means ‘more than expected’ — given the condition of forgiveness, his continued hell is unexpected.
I envy and respect the people of the struggle — at least their leaders have the guts to stand by their vultures, to recognise their sacrifices. 
Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder. At least a murder victim rests.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 422) point out, the conjunction but is used for three distinct types of expansion:
  • adversative addition (extension): 'on the other hand' [X and conversely Y]
  • replacive variation (extension): 'instead' [not X but Y]
  • concessive condition (enhancement): 'nevertheless' [if P then contrary to expectation Q]

[2] Of these, the only items that are conjunctive Adjuncts that can mark a relation of concession are however, although, even if and nevertheless — though however, like but, can also mark adversative addition.  The remaining items serve either as conjunctive Adjuncts marking an elaborating relation, or as modal Adjuncts, mood or comment:

Item
Conjunctive Adjunct
Modal Adjunct
in fact
elaboration: clarification: verifactive
mood: intensity; comment: factual
at least
elaboration: clarification: corrective

in any case
elaboration: clarification: dismissive

needless to say

comment: obvious
of course

comment: obvious
admittedly

comment: concession*

* Interestingly, admittedly signals interpersonal concession as a comment Adjunct, though Martin & Rose misconstrue it as conjunctive.

[3] This continues the (previously cited) confusion between interpersonal counterexpectancy (exceeding vs limiting) and the enhancement relation of concessive condition (if P then contrary to expectation Q):
  • if God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times
  • then contrary to expectation I have to live with this hell

Sunday, 18 February 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"

Martin & Rose (2007: 56-7):
The third resource we need to consider, as far as heteroglossia in discourse is concerned, is known as ‘counterexpectancy’. This is more a feature of Helena’s narrative than the exposition or Act, and has to do with the way she tracks readers’ expectations, adjusting them as her story unfolds. In her prayer for example, she tells God she can’t handle her second love anymore, creating an expectation as she does so that she will try to leave. Then she counters this by saying that she can’t leave.
I can’t handle the man anymore! But, I can't get out.
In this example Helena uses the conjunction but to signal that she is countering an expectation that she’s created for the reader. At any point in a text, readers have an expectation about what is likely to follow, and Helena takes this into account as she counters it. In other words she is acknowledging voices in addition to her own, in this case those of her readers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the interpersonal system of counterexpectancy (exceeding vs limiting) is distinct from the conditional relation of concession, whose meaning is 'if P then contrary to expectation Q', and which may function logically between units in complexes or textually in conjoining messages cohesively.

[2] The claim here is that an author can track ('trail', 'follow') the expectations of all future readers.

[3] This misunderstands the data.  Firstly, the proposition I can’t handle the man anymore does not entail the proposition I will leave — any more than numerous other possible propositions such as He's got to go or Something has to change etc.

Secondly, the cohesive conjunction relation between the two messages is not the enhancing relation of concessive condition ('if P then contrary to expectation Q'):
  • if I can't handle the man anymore
  • then, contrary to expectation, I can't get out.
but the extending relation of adversative addition (X and conversely Y):
  • I can't handle the man anymore
  • and conversely I can't get out.


[4] The claim here is that the author's use of but acknowledges the "voice" of the reader, and that this acknowledgement constitutes an instance of heteroglossia.  Regardless of whether acknowledging the voice of the reader would constitute an instance of heteroglossia, as demonstrated in [3], the claim itself rests on a misinterpretation of the text and a misconstrual of the expansion relation between the two clauses.

Sunday, 11 February 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"

Martin & Rose (2007: 56):
Some projections also include modality or polarity in their meaning, and so can be interpreted as heteroglossic with respect to both projection and modalisation (Hyland 1998). Tutu uses three of these:
They denied that they had committed a crime, claiming that they had assaulted him only in retaliation for his inexplicable conduct in attacking them.
I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice.
Denied includes the meaning of ‘not true’; claiming allows for doubt; contend is less strong than claim (more ‘should be’ than ‘must be true’).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The general confusion here is between the verbal process of a projecting clause — denied, claiming, contend — and the locution clause that it projects; see further below.

[2] All clauses, whether projecting or projected, "include polarity in their meaning".  If polarity were sufficient grounds for heteroglossia, then all clauses would be heteroglossic, and the distinction with monoglossia would be meaningless.

[3] Not one of the clauses in Tutu's projection nexuses includes an instance of modalisation; see [6] and [7] below.

[4] The implication here is that the cited work — Hyland, K. (1998) Hedging in Scientific Research Articles Amsterdam: Benjamins — somehow endorses the authors' claim, though none of its 264 pages is identified in this regard.

[5] This misconstrues the truth value of the projected clause as the polarity of the projecting clause — the latter misconstrued as the meaning of denied.

[6] This appears to confuse what was said by the author (claiming) with what might be thought by the reader ('doubt').

[7] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by data, argument, or dictionary definitions, such as
  • contend: 'assert something as a position in an argument.'
  • claim: 'state or assert that something is the case, typically without providing evidence or proof'.

Sunday, 4 February 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation

Martin & Rose (2007: 55-6):
The Act, because it is concerned with what should happen, is mainly concerned with obligation (how obliged people are to act):
AND SINCE it is deemed necessary to establish the truth in relation to past events as well as the motives for and circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have occurred, and to make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in future; 
AND SINCE the Constitution states that the pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society; 
AND SINCE the Constitution states that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation; 
AND SINCE the Constitution states that in order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the past
The last example here makes use of what we might call legislative’ shall to signal incontestable obligation. By Chapter 2 of the Act, this use of shall becomes dominant as the various processes around the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are prescribed:
(3) In order to achieve the objectives of the Commission -

(a) the Committee on Human Rights Violations, as contemplated in Chapter 3, shall deal, among other things, with matters pertaining to investigations of gross violations of human rights;

(b) the Committee on Amnesty, as contemplated in Chapter 4, shall deal with matters relating to amnesty;

(c) the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, as contemplated in Chapter 5, shall deal with matters referred to it relating to reparations;
(d) the investigating unit referred to in section 5(d) shall perform the investigations contemplated in section 28(4)(a); and
(e) the subcommittees shall exercise, perform and carry out the powers, functions and duties conferred upon, assigned to or imposed upon them by the Commission.

Blogger Comments:

The claim here (e.g. p59) is that the instances of obligation in these texts signal heteroglossia, the acknowledgement of other points of view.  As might be expected of a text of this type, this is about as monoglossic as a text can get.  No other positions on any of the proposals are acknowledged, as Martin & Rose should have realised in using the term 'incontestable obligation'.

The general misunderstanding of Martin & Rose in discussing modality as a resource for heteroglossia can be traced to a misunderstanding of why it is that one type of modality, probability, can acknowledge other voices.

The reason why probability can acknowledge other voices is that the explicit subjective form, 'I think', is agnate with circumstances of Angle: viewpoint (just as 'I say' is agnate with circumstances of Angle: source).

However, Martin & Rose have mistaken probability to acknowledge other voices through the selection of one value — low, median or high — rather than another, with the unselected values mistaken for other voices.  This sort of logic can also be misapplied to the selection of one Subject, rather than other, one mood, rather than another, and so on, right through every system in the language.

Sunday, 28 January 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability

Martin & Rose (2007: 55):
Helena uses modality even more often, across a range of modal meanings:
Negotiating information
how usual         He and his friends would visit regularly
how probable    there must have been someone out there who is still alive 
Negotiating services
how obliged      I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best
how inclined     I would have done the same had I been denied everything
how able           who can give a face to 'the orders from above' for all the operations
These examples show the five types of modality discussed by Halliday (1994): usuality, probability, obligation, inclination and ability.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, negotiation is discussion aimed at reaching an agreement.

[2] These four instances do not exemplify heteroglossia, the acknowledgment of other voices.  Each instance is monoglossic, since each enacts the author's voice only; no other viewpoints are acknowledged.

[3] These three instances are modulated propositions, not proposals — they are neither offers nor commands — and so the commodity of exchange is information, not (goods–&–)services.  The first two are modulated statements that give information, the third is a modulated question that demands information.

Sunday, 21 January 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality

Martin & Rose (2007: 54-5):
Modality functions very much like negation when we look at it in terms of these scales (cf. Fuller 1998; Martin and White 2005). Arguing that something must be the case, for example, sounds assertive but in fact allows an element of doubt; it’s stronger than saying something would be true, but not as strong as avoiding modality completely and arguing it is the case. So modality, like polarity, acknowledges alternative voices around a suggestion or claim. Unlike polarity, it doesn’t take these voices on and deny them; rather it opens up a space for negotiation, in which different points of view can circulate around an issue, a space perhaps for mediation and possible reconciliation. 
Tutu uses a range of modal resources in his exposition to acknowledge alternative positions, including usuality when he is generalising about the effects of a public hearing:
It was often the very first time that their communities and even sometimes their families heard that these people were, for instance, actually members of death squads or regular torturers of detainees in their custody.
Here the grading has to do with ‘how often’ something happened, along a scale like the following:

Blogger Comments:

The claim here is that usuality acknowledges alternative voices, or viewpoints, on a proposition. Martin & Rose do not identify the different positions acknowledged by the use of instances of usuality in the exemplifying text, but instead make reference to the grading of values of usuality. In doing so, they confuse an assessment of usuality with the recognition of different viewpoints (engagement: heteroglossia).

Sunday, 14 January 2018

On The Heteroglossic Function Of Negative Polarity

Martin & Rose (2007: 53):
As we’ve said, modality can be used as a resource for introducing additional voices into a text, and this includes polarity. To see how this works, let’s start with polarity and the role of negation. Tutu begins his exposition with a question, which he follows up immediately with a negative clause:
So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.
What Tutu is doing here is countering anyone who thinks that the cost of justice issue is a frivolous question (or perhaps anyone who says Tutu thinks it’s frivolous).  He uses a negative clause to pre-empt this position before it can cloud the discussion.  Negation places his voice in relation to a potential opposing one; two voices are implicated. In this respect negative polarity is different from positive polarity; all things being equal, positive polarity invokes one voice whereas negative polarity invokes two.

Blogger Comments: 

[1] This misunderstands the text. The negative element here functions at group rank, not clause rank, and it marks a logical relation — extension: variation: replacive (not X but Y) — between the nominal groups in a group complex:

not
a frivolous question
but
a very serious issue

1

+ 2

[2] This misunderstands the text.  It is amnesty, not the cost of justice, that is the issue.  As Subject, it is amnesty that carries the modal responsibility of the proposition:

so
is
amnesty
being given
at the cost of justice being done

Process:
Goal
material
Contingency: default

Finite
Subject
Predicator
Adjunct

Mood
Residue

The agnate statement of this rhetorical question is that 'amnesty is being given at the cost of justice being done', which entertains a negative ethical judgement of 'giving amnesty'. It is the use of this rhetorical question, not the logical deployment of not that acknowledges voices other than the author's. In terms of Appraisal theory, the rhetorical question can be interpreted as an instance of ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss: expand: entertain; see Martin & White (2005: 110).

[3] This misunderstands the text.  What Tutu is doing is enacting a positive appreciation (social value) of the rhetorical question itself:

this
is
not a frivolous question but a very serious issue
Carrier
Process: attributive
Attribute
Subject
Finite
Predicator
Complement
Mood
Residue

[4] This misunderstands the text. The negation here marks a replacive relation between a frivolous question and a very serious issue; see [1].

[5] This misunderstands the text.  The other voice is implicated by the rhetorical question, not by the use of negation; see [2].

[6] Since this claim is made following a misunderstanding, it stands here as a bare assertion. What is true is that positive and negative polarity are mutually defining, and that positive polarity is more probable to be instantiated than negative polarity across registers (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 173). The claim can be falsified by considering minimal pairs such as:
  • Go to sleep! vs Don't go to sleep!
  • Do you have any? vs Don't you have any?
  • I believe in God. vs I don't believe in God.
  • How did you manage to see him? vs How did you manage not to see him?