The Authors' Inconsistent Use Of Peirce's 'Iconic', 'Indexical' And 'Symbolic'

Martin & Rose (2007: 325, 333n):

Beyond this is the manner in which they are construed. Photos and realistic drawings can depict entities and activities iconically; there is a direct visual relation between the image and the category it construes. In contrast, images such as flags or diagrams construe their categories symbolically; the viewer must know the symbol to recognise its meaning. 

In between are images that are neither iconic nor symbolic, but indicate categories by one or more criteria; an example is the relation between the crowd, the dignitaries on the stage, and the flag, which indicate the categories of the people, their leaders and the nation by their relative positions — bottom, top and middle. In Peirce’s 1955 terms, this kind of visual construal is indexical.⁷ 

⁷ Previous efforts to interpret ideational and interpersonal meanings in visual images have been based on analogies with grammatical categories of process types, mood and modality (e.g. Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, O’Toole 1994, Unsworth 2001) rather than discourse semantics. In keeping with the discourse oriented approach here, and to keep labels manageable, we have used the same terms as for verbal texts wherever possible. For example, where Kress and van Leeuwen use the cryptic terms ‘overt/covert’, we use ‘explicit/implicit’; and where they use polysemous terms ‘concrete/abstract’, we have found the semiotic terms ‘iconic/indexical/symbolic’ less ambiguous.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the manner in which they are construed" is modelled as channel, a system within MODE, the textual dimension of the context (culture); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 34). It will be seen in the following post that Martin & Rose misconstrue this as an ideational system at the level of discourse semantics.

[2] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channels might be subcategorised as photographic and pictographic, there is a natural (non-arbitrary) relation between their content and expression.

[3] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channel might be subcategorised as ideographic, there is a non-natural (conventional) relation between their content and expression.

[4] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, unlike the preceding characterisations of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, this characterisation of 'indexical' images is not concerned with a relation between content and expression, but with a relation between levels of symbolic abstraction within the content of the image:

That is, Martin & Rose reconstrue the meanings that are 'iconically' realised in the image as metaphorical symbols of a higher level, more congruent meaning.

To be clear, in order to be theoretically consistent with their characterisation of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, the authors need to demonstrate an indexical relation between the content of the image (its meanings) and the expression of the image (its ink patterns).

[5] To be clear, all the terms — iconic, symbolic and indexical — derive from the semiotics of Peirce, a model that is epistemologically inconsistent with SFL Theory. Peirce (1955: 102-3):

According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. 

An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign ; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it. 

An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind ; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. 

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by " existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances ; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol.

[6] Firstly, the content plane of images is not stratified into semantics and grammar, so the discourse semantic vs grammatical distinction does not apply. Crucially, if images did have a grammar, it would be possible to read them aloud — to verbally project locutions — as is possible for written texts.

Secondly, neither of the pretexts for relabelling Kress & van Leeuwen's original terms withstands close scrutiny. On the one hand, the original distinction 'overt/covert' is simpler, not more "cryptic", than 'explicit/implicit'. On the other hand, the original distinction 'concrete/abstract' is not ambiguous in this context, but, more importantly, it is consistent with SFL Theory, whereas Peirce's 'iconic/indexical/symbolic' distinctions are not.

Moreover, rebranding other people's work to get credit for their ideas is Martin's modus operandi, as demonstrated on this blog, as well as on other blogs here and here. For example, Martin (1992) rebrands Halliday's speech function as his negotiation, rebrands Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesion as his discourse semantics, rebranding their cohesive reference as his identification, their lexical cohesion as his ideation, and their cohesive conjunction as his conjunction (now 'connexion').

More recently, Martin and his colleagues have rebranded Cléirigh's model of gestural and postural semiosis as their model of paralanguage, incongruously rebranding linguistic body language as "sonovergent" paralanguage, and epilinguistic body language as "semovergent" paralanguage, on the pretext that the (wrongly conceived) meaning of these invented words is more transparent. Evidence here.

Confusing Material And Semiotic Phenomena In Misunderstanding Context

Martin & Rose (2007: 321-2):

In our discussion of mode above we talked about the way in which the exophoric references in Vincent Lingiari’s speech made it ‘context dependent’ — dependent on our being there or on reading images of what was going on. Another way of putting this would be to say that more than one modality was involved, using the term modality here in the sense of a modality of communication such as language, music, image or action. To understand Lingiari, in other words, we need to process language in relation to image, or language in relation to action. There are two modalities co-articulating what is going on. In register terms what this suggests is that we need to expand our conception of mode to embrace multimodal discourse analysis (hereafter MDA). This entails moving beyond linguistics into social semiotics and taking into account as many modalities of communication as we can systematically describe.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin & Rose model context as register and genre (varieties of language), but here contradict their own model by using 'context' to mean both the first-order material setting ("being there") and the second-order co-text (images).

[2] To be clear, by 'action' here, Martin & Rose mean the material setting. That is, they misconstrue first-order material experience (phenomena) as second-order semiotic experience (metaphenomena). Meanings projected from the material setting are another matter.

[3] To be clear, despite conventional opinion, music itself — unlike musical theory, notation and lyrics — is not a semiotic system. If it were, it would have long been possible to construct system networks of the meaning contrasts realised by sound contrasts. Instead, as a perceptual phenomenon, music potentially induces mental processes of emotion, desire and cognition.

[4] To be clear, inconsistent with the opening sentence, here Martin & Rose return to their own model of context, which misconstrues culture as functional varieties of language (registers).

[5] Trivially, SFL Theory models language as a social semiotic system. That is, the linguistics deployed by Martin & Rose is already within social semiotics.

Confusing Context And Language In Misunderstanding The Cline Of Instantiation

Martin & Rose (2007: 312-3):

To make all this a little more concrete, at the level of instance we’ve read the mix of spoken and written discourse in Mandela’s Meaning of Freedom recount as a novel pattern, a kind of fusion of written discourse like Tutu’s exposition, with spoken discourse like Lingiari's hand-over speech. This fusion was designed especially by Mandela in his autobiography to drive his message home. 

At the level of text type we'd be looking for this kind of pattern to recur across a set of recounts (or other genres) and it might be worth exploring spoken texts as well as written ones, especially those written to be spoken aloud on public occasions. 

At the level of register, after a lot more analysis of a lot more discourse, we might be tempted to propose a new mode, blending features we’ve traditionally associated with either spoken and written text (cf. Halliday 1985). This may be something that’s been evolving all along in the rhetoric of certain kinds of religious and political discourse. 

Eventually, along this imaginary evolutionary journey, we might discover that the system itself had changed, that the systemic probabilities associated with negation, concession and elaboration for example just weren’t the same anymore. We’d be living in a different world, where speaking and writing weren’t just complementary fashions of meaning, where there was something in the seam, engendered through expanding electronic modalities of communication perhaps. Who knows? 

Our point here is only to illustrate a range of vantage points on data, the way in which instances can impact on systemic change and the monumental cost of doing as much discourse analysis as we’d like.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this extract is meant to explain points on the cline of instantiation, from instance to system. But see below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, instantiation is the process of selecting features and activating realisation statements in systems. An instance of language, a text, thus comprises the selected features and activated realisation statements from the systems of content: semantics and lexicogrammar. This is clearly not understood by Martin & Rose, who instead discuss the mode of a text. Mode is a system of context, not language, both in the authors' stratified model and in SFL Theory. From the perspective of SFL Theory, Martin & Rose are here actually concerned with an instance of context: a situation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, text type is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. Here again Martin & Rose misunderstand "patterns" of mode, context, as linguistic features shared by texts of a text type. From the perspective of SFL Theory, Martin & Rose are here actually concerned with situation type.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, register is text type viewed from the system pole of the cline of instantiation. On the one hand, here again Martin & Rose misunderstand features of mode, context, as linguistic features shared by texts of a register. From the perspective of SFL Theory, Martin & Rose are here actually concerned with subculture.

On the other hand, any proposed new mode is modelled by the networking of features at the system pole of the cline of instantiation, culture, not subculture (the authors' register). Since a subculture (or register) is a sub-potential of the overall system, it is nonsensical to claim that features are networked in the sub-potential but not the overall potential (of which it is a variety).

[5] To be clear, here Martin & Rose are concerned with the phylogenesis of the language system, rather than instantiation (or mode).

∞

Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

Misrepresenting Hasan's Model Of Generic Structure Potential

Martin & Rose (2007: 309):

Another perspective on the relationship between register and generic structure is proposed by Hasan and her colleagues, who model it on the ‘axial’ relationship between system and structure. In this model, obligatory elements of genre structure appear to be determined by field, and the presence of optional ones by tenor and mode. The question of relationships among genres is thus a question of the field, tenor and mode selections that genres do and do not share. 

This contrasts with the model developed by Martin (1992), where choices among genres form a system above and beyond field, tenor and mode networks at the level of register. 

Because field, tenor and mode remain relatively underspecified theoretical constructs in SFL, it is difficult to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of these modelling strategies (inter-stratal vs axial realisation) at this stage. 

Martin’s model has certainly been influenced by our work in educational linguistics where mapping relationships among genres across disciplines has been a central concern (Martin 2001a, 2002a, b; Martin and Plum 1997). For further discussion see Matth[ie]ssen (1993), Martin (1999c, 2001d), Hasan (1995, 1999), Martin and Rose (2005, 2007).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Hasan's model of Generic Structure Potential (1985/9) is an unacknowledged source of Martin's model (1992). Without Hasan's prior work, Martin would have no model.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Hasan. Hasan's model is concerned with the relation between cultural context and semantics. More specifically, it proposes that potential semantic structures vary according to the contextual configurations of field, tenor and mode features that a genre (text type) realises.

[3] This is misleading, because it repeats the misunderstanding previously expressed in Martin (1992). Hasan does not relate the obligatoriness of elements to the metafunctional dimensions of context. For Hasan (1985/9: 62), the obligatory elements of text structure are the elements that define the genre (text type):

So, by implication, the obligatory elements define the genre to which a text belongs;

[4] To be clear, this only presents a contextual perspective on how genres (text types) are related in SFL Theory. From the perspective of language, text types (genres) are related to each other by the relative frequencies of selected semantic and lexicogrammatical features.

[5] For a detailed examination of the model of genre in Martin (1992), see the posts here.

[6] To be clear, the authors' genre system, which is not provided anywhere in this publication or Martin (1992), is a simple taxonomy of genre classifications — narrative, anecdote etc. — rather than a system network of conjunct and disjunct features that specify different genres. Moreover, on this model, genre choices are realised by field, tenor and mode choices, where, as previously demonstrated, field is confused with ideational semantics, and tenor is confused with social structure.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, field, tenor and mode are specified as the metafunctional dimensions of the culture as a semiotic system. However, the degree of specification of these terms is not criterial in assessing the relative strengths of Hasan's model — properly understood — and Martin's model. Hasan's model is (largely) consistent with SFL Theory, whereas Martin's model is neither consistent with SFL Theory nor consistent with itself, as demonstrated in previous posts. Internal consistencies include modelling varieties of language (genre, register) as context, as opposed to language, and yet claiming that instances of context are instances of language (texts).

[8] To be clear, the work that Martin & Rose have done in educational linguistics is not evidence of the theoretical validity of Martin's model.

Mode: Misconstruing Culture As The Authors' Register Instead Of The Authors' Genre

Martin & Rose (2007: 302):

So cutting across genres then, we have the question of the role language is playing, i.e. mode. And we can explore the effect of technologies of communication on texture with respect to two clines: degrees of abstraction (action/reflection) and degrees of interactivity (monologue/dialogue). This is an area that needs a lot more research, but there are hints of progress in Halliday and Martin (1993), Martin and Veel (1998), Martin (2001a) and Christie (2002).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, mode is a system of the cultural context. However, Martin & Rose misunderstand context as register, and so misconstrue mode as a system of register.

Adding to the confusion, as previously explained, the SFL notion of mode, the rôle language is playing, corresponds to the authors' notion of the purpose of a genre. So by construing mode as a system of register, instead of genre, Martin & Rose are inconsistent even in terms of their own modelling.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, register is a sub-potential of language, not a system of context, and 'genre', in the sense of text type, is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

[2] To be clear, once again, the unacknowledged sources of these ideas are Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58-9) and Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354).

[3] To be clear, 'language in action' and 'language in reflection' do not differ in terms of abstraction. Both are construed as the same level of abstraction, but are opposite poles on a cline representing the degree to which discourse contributes to the total activity.

Misunderstanding The Mode Distinction Between Monologue And Dialogue

Martin & Rose (2007: 301-2):

Even where a response is not expected, as in prayers and various forms of public address, an interlocutor may be invoked as in Helena’s quoted prayer for example:

And both Mandela and Lingiari exhort an audience in their speeches, without giving up the floor:

Written discourse can also imitate dialogue, for rhetorical effect, as when Tutu asks a question, then answers it himself; or when Mandela replaces a mistaken proposition with its contradiction:

For something virtually monologic we probably need to turn to the Act, where propositions and proposals are enacted as performed. There is no right of reply:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the mode distinction between monologue and dialogue is the distinction between a text being created by one speaker and a text being created by more than one speaker. Each of these texts is a monologue, in terms of mode, because each is created by one speaker, namely: Helena, Lingiari, Mandela, Tutu and Mandela respectively.

[2] To be clear, these examples misrepresent the original texts by placing the speakers (material order) in the texts they project (semiotic order), as if they were characters in a play, further demonstrating the inability of Martin & Rose to distinguish different orders of experience.

[3] To be clear, since 'enact' and 'perform' are synonyms, this is, at best, a tautology.

[4] To be clear, a 'right of reply' is irrelevant to the mode distinction between monologue (single-authored text) and dialogue (multi-authored text). In this instance, what is true is that, in terms of Hasan's original model, the graphic channel does not afford process sharing; see previous post.

Misunderstanding "The Complementary Monologue Through Dialogue Cline"

Martin & Rose (2007: 300-1):

The other dimension of mode analysis we need to consider here is the complementary monologue through dialogue cline. This scale is sensitive to the effects of various technologies of communication on the kind of interactivity that is facilitated in spoken vs written discourse, and across a range of electronic channels such as short wave radio, intercom, telephone, fax, e-mail, chat rooms, websites, radio, audio tape, CD/MD, television, DVD/VCD, video and film. The key material factors here have to do with whether interlocutors can hear and see one another (aural and visual feedback) and the imminence of a response (immediate or delayed).

Obviously our written data is not ideal for illustrating this cline here. But technologies facilitate textures; they don’t absolutely determine them. And in any case a technology such as writing affords various degrees of interactivity along the continuum. There’s the possibility of writing dialogue for one thing (scripts of various kinds) and projection can always be used to import dialogue, as it was in Mandela’s exemplum for the imagined repartee:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, yet again, the unacknowledged source here is Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

[2] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse context (the mode distinction between monologue and dialogue) with language (dialogue and projection in texts).

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misrepresent the Mandela text (p259) as a script, for the purposes of their argument:

Misunderstanding The Cline From 'Language In Action' To 'Language In Reflection'

Martin & Rose (2007: 300):

This range of mode variation is sometimes discussed as a cline from language in action to language as reflection. We’ve been able to illustrate the middle and reflective end of this continuum here, since our written genres ranged along this part of the scale. For texts in which language plays a smaller role in what is going on we’d need to look at spoken language accompanying activity, for example [a] running commentary on a sporting event or parade, or pushing further, the things people manage to say when most of their directed consciousness is taken up with intense physical activity (playing sport, hard physical labour, rock climbing, dancing and so on). Here, for example, is an exchange in which a teacher directs a learner without naming any of the things or places he is acting on, so that the activity is not interpretable without being there (see Rose 2001a and b, 2006a for this exchange in the original Pitjantjatjara):

Learner: Here?

Teacher: - No, this is no good. It's over there. Dig on the far side.

Learner: - Here?

Teacher: - Yes, there.

Teacher: - See there?

Learner: -Aha!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the unacknowledged source here is Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

There is an important variable here, of course, that we have already referred to as the cline from 'language in reflection' to 'language in action'. In situations of the ‘language in action’ kind, where the discourse is a relatively minor component of the total activity, the grammar and the semantics are obviously less constructive of the whole than in a ‘reflection’ context …

This, in turn, derives from Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58), whose mode system, language rôle, distinguishes between language as 'constitutive' and language as 'ancillary'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, language as reflection refers to the ideational metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 29-30):

At the same time, whenever we use language there is always something else going on. While construing, language is always also enacting: enacting our personal and social relationships with the other people around us. The clause of the grammar is not only a figure, representing some process – some doing or happening, saying or sensing, being or having – together with its various participants and circumstances; it is also a proposition, or a proposal, whereby we inform or question, give an order or make an offer, and express our appraisal of and attitude towards whoever we are addressing and what we are talking about. This kind of meaning is more active: if the ideational function of the grammar is ‘language as reflection’, this is ‘language as action’. We call it the interpersonal metafunction, to suggest that it is both interactive and personal.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In this discussion, Martin & Rose have only presented texts whose rhetorical mode is at "the reflective end of this continuum". As previous posts have demonstrated, in discussing mode, which they misconstrue as a system of register, Martin & Rose have repeatedly confused the material environment of text production with the ideational meaning of the text.

[4] To be clear, this misunderstands the notion of 'language in action'/'language as ancillary'. A running commentary on a sporting event or parade is 'language in reflection/'language as constitutive', since the language of the commentator is not ancillary to the sporting event or parade, given that these activities unfold independently of — and are not constructed by — the language of the commentator. Instead, the language of the commentator is used to reflect on these activities. Once again, Martin & Rose have confused the material environment experienced by the speaker with the ideational meaning of the text projected by the speaker. As previously observed, Martin & Rose have enormous difficulty in distinguishing different orders of experience: the material domain of speakers (phenomena) versus the semiotic domain that speakers project in texts (metaphenomena).

[5] To be clear, this is only valid in instances where language contributes the unfolding of the activity. For example, consider the case of two people conversing while dancing. If the language of the dancers is the issuing of dance-step instructions by a teacher to a beginner, then the language can be said to play an ancillary rôle ('language in action') in the unfolding of the activity of dancing. 

However, if the language of the dancers is a discussion of recent political events, then the language plays neither an ancillary rôle ('language in action') nor a constitutive rôle ('language in reflection') in the unfolding of the activity of dancing. Instead, their language is constitutive ('language in reflection') of the unfolding of an activity other than dancing: a discussion of recent political events.

[6] To be clear, this is indeed a valid illustration of 'language in action'/'language as ancillary'.

Problems With The Authors' Example Of Grammatical Metaphor Untying A Text From A Situation

 Martin & Rose (2007: 299):

Note for example how Mandela reconstrues aircraft roaring over the Union buildings as symbols (a display and a demonstration) of precision, force and loyalty; in doing so he reworks evaluation of the event through affect and appreciation (in awe as a spectacular array ... in perfect formation ...), into evaluation through judgement (capacity, tenacity and propriety: pinpoint precision and military force, loyalty to democracy ... freely and fairly elected ...). 

The transformation enables the evaluation he wants for this event of the day:

A few moments later we all lifted our eyes in awe as a spectacular array of South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared in perfect formation over the Union Buildings. It was not only a display of pinpoint precision and military force, but a demonstration of the military's loyalty to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is purported to be an example of the use of grammatical metaphor to untie a text from a situation — as part of a discussion of the contextual system of mode. (See the previous post for some of the theoretical misunderstandings behind this nonsensical notion.)

It can be seen that the 'situation' here is ideational semantics within Mandela's text, rather than the material setting in which Mandela wrote his text — which was one of the authors' previous uses of the term 'situation'. In other words, Martin & Rose have trouble distinguishing different orders of experience: the phenomenal order of speakers/writers projecting language, and the metaphenomenal order of the language that speakers/writers project.

[2] To be clear, these evaluations, which are irrelevant to the issues being discussed, do not require the use of ideational metaphor, since they can also be made with less metaphorical construals, such as:

A few moments later we all looked up and felt awe as South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared over the Union Buildings in a spectacular, perfectly formed array. This not only displayed that the military could fly absolutely precisely and how forceful it is, but also demonstrated that they are loyal to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

Problems With The Authors' Notion That Grammatical Metaphor Unties Texts From Situations

Martin & Rose (2007: 299, 332n):

Taking this a step further, the key resource which unties texts from situations is grammatical metaphor because of its power to reconstrue activities as things and thus break the iconic connections between linguistic and material activity.¹ This transforms social action into another realm of discourse in which abstractions enter into relations of various kinds with one another.

¹ By iconic we mean matching relations between the world as we perceive it and ideation, i.e. between people and things as nouns, actions as verbs and so on.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: This is purportedly a discussion of mode, the textual dimension of context — 'culture' in SFL Theory, but misunderstood as 'register' by Martin ± Rose. In SFL Theory, 'situation' is the term for an instance of culture, but since Martin & Rose have replaced culture (field, tenor, mode) with register, and regard 'text' as an instance of their context, the term 'situation' can not mean an instance of context. In the preceding posts, Martin & Rose have used 'situation' to mean, on the one hand, the material environment of the speech/writing event, and on the other hand, the ideational meaning of the text, which they usually confuse with field instead. It is against this background of complicated theoretical misunderstandings — along the dimensions of stratification, instantiation and orders of experience — that the untangling of the confusions in the excerpt above is attempted below.

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the notion that a text can be "untied" from a situation is nonsensical, because it is the text that construes the situation.

[2] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is not a "non-iconic" relation between "linguistic and material activity", but an incongruent relation — within language — between semantics and grammar. Moreover, this characterisation reduces grammatical metaphor to ideational metaphor, and reduces ideational metaphor to elemental metaphor (processes incongruently realised as things). Importantly, grammatical metaphor is semantically junctional. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243):

When this happens, it is a signal that a phenomenon of this other kind — quality, or process — is being treated as if it was a thing. The grammar has constructed an imaginary or fictitious object, called shakiness, by transcategorising the quality shaky; similarly by transcategorising the process develop it has created a pseudo-thing called development. What is the status of such fictitious objects or pseudo-things? Unlike the other elements, which lose their original status in being transcategorised (for example, shaker is no longer a process, even though it derives from shake), these elements do not; shakiness is still a quality, development is still a process — only they have been construed into things. They are thus a fusion, or 'junction', of two semantic elemental categories: shakiness is a 'quality thing', development is a 'process thing'. All such junctional elements involve grammatical metaphor.

[3] To be clear, as explained above, this is a nonsensical claim. Elemental ideational grammatical metaphor does not "transform social action" into anything. Instead, it reconstrues the congruent model of experience into a metaphorical model which is further removed from everyday experience. Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the world as we perceive it" is the construal of experience as ideational meaning. In these terms, the authors' nonsensical claim becomes:

• By iconic we mean matching relations between ideational meaning and ideation

where 'ideation' is Martin's discourse semantic system, which, as demonstrated here, is his misunderstanding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexical cohesion (textual lexicogrammar) rebranded as his experiential semantics.

[5] To be clear, the relation here is the stratal relation within language between meaning (people, things, actions) and grammatical form (nouns, verbs). As such, it does not exemplify a relation between "the world as we perceive it" and Martin's experiential discourse semantic system of ideation.

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Texts "Freeing Themselves From Situations"

Martin & Rose (2007: 299):

Beyond this we have texts which free themselves from situations by generalising across them, as with Mandela’s generalised exemplum about the experiences of an indefinite number of South African families:

It was as simple and yet as incomprehensible as the moment a small child asks her father, 'Why can you not be with us?' And the father must utter the terrible words: 'There are other children like you, a great many of them .…' and then one's voice trails off.

Blogger Comments:

Here the challenge for a theoretically-informed reader is to determine what Martin & Rose mean by 'situation' in this instance, given that

1. in SFL Theory, 'situation' is an instance of culture (context), which is realised by an instance of language (text), but
2. Martin & Rose have replaced culture with register and genre (varieties of language), and
3. Martin & Rose regard text, not situation, as an instance of context.

However, despite this discussion ostensibly being concerned with the contextual system of mode, 'situations' here refers to the ideational meaning within Mandela's text — situations in South Africa — which Martin & Rose claim that Mandela "generalises across". (More usually the authors confuse ideational meaning with field.)

However, this claim just adds to the multiple levels of confusion here. Mandela does not "generalise across situations" in South Africa. Instead, he provides a specific scenario that illustrates the general "situation".

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Context-Independency

Martin & Rose (2007: 298-9):

Mandela’s construction of his childhood on the other hand is not context dependent in this way. Everything presumed is provided for in the co-text. We know what’s going on simply by reading, not by being there:

I was born free — free in every way that I could know. Free to run in the fields near my mother's hut, free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls. As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because Martin & Rose misconstrue context as register, the unwitting claim here is that Mandela's text is not dependent on register. The reason why this is nonsensical is that, on the authors' stratified model, register is construed by the language that realises it; but see [2].

[2] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, what Martin & Rose actually mean by 'context dependent' is that the resolution of exophoric reference requires a reader's access to the material setting of the speech event. If this is applied consistently to Mandela's text, then 'context dependency' would mean that the resolution of exophoric reference requires a reader's access to the material setting in which Mandela wrote his text.

However, by 'context' in this instance, the authors do not mean the material setting in which the text was written, but the ideational meaning of the text: Mandela's construal of his own childhood, thereby adding yet another dimension of misunderstanding to their exposition of mode. This is the confusion that pervades the work of Martin & Rose: misconstruing the ideational meaning of language as the ideational dimension of context (field); see [3].

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, this nicely exemplifies the authors' confusion of field ('what's going on') — Mandela writing about his childhood — with the ideational meaning of his text (what we learn from reading it).

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Context-Dependency

Martin & Rose (2007: 298):

Let’s start with the orientation to goings on. In Vincent Lingiari’s speech (Lingiari 1986), for example, there are several exophoric references to people, places and things which are materially present at the hand-over ceremony: chains initiated by the important white men (Whites), us (Aboriginals), this land, today and arguably here (if not taken as anaphoric to this land). Texts of this kind can be characterised as context dependent, since we can’t process the participant identification without information from the situation (things we see from being there or that we read through images later on):

The important White men are giving us this land ceremonially, ceremonially they are giving it to us. It belonged to the Whites, but today it is in the hands of us Aboriginals all around here. Let us live happily together as mates, let us not make it hard for each other.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Martin & Rose, 'orientation to goings on' (orientation to field) is a system of mode, which is the textual dimension of their register. In SFL Theory, however, mode is a system of culture not register, and 'orientation to field' corresponds to the authors' model of genre, not register; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 34):

(iii) rhetorical mode: the orientation of the text towards field (e.g. informative, didactic, explanatory, explicatory) or tenor (e.g. persuasive, exhortatory, hortatory, polemic);

[2] To be clear, exophoric references in a text relate second-order experience (the metaphenomenal domain of language) to first-order experience (the phenomenal domain within which speakers project language). 

Context, on the other hand, whether understood as culture (SFL Theory) or misunderstood as register (Martin & Rose), is second-order experience, since it is construed by language. 

That is, here Martin & Rose confuse two distinct orders of experience: the phenomenal domain of speakers, with the metaphenomenal domain (context) that is realised in language. This is a very serious misunderstanding indeed.

[3] To be clear, since Martin & Rose misconstrue context as register, their unwitting claim here is that such texts are register-dependent, despite the fact that they model language as the realisation of register.

[4] To be clear, the authors' reason for unwittingly claiming that such texts are register-dependent is that the resolution of exophoric reference depends on the first-order material setting of the text, which they misconstrue as the second-order semiotic situation, even though they have previously replaced this SFL model of context with their register.

In short, these complex multidimensional misunderstandings arise because Martin & Rose confuse three different meanings of context:

• context as register (their model),
• context as culture construed by language (SFL Theory), and
• context as material setting of the speech event.

Misunderstanding Mode (And Field)

Martin & Rose (2007: 298):

Let’s explore each of these variables a little here, beginning with mode. One important variable in mode is the amount of work language is doing in relation to what is going on, that is to what degree it simply accompanies a field of activity or constructs its own field. And a complementary dimension of mode is the cline of monologue through dialogue, its orientation to interaction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Cf Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):

The MODE is the function of the text in the event, including therefore both the channel taken by the language — spoken or written, extempore or prepared — and its genre, or rhetorical mode, as narrative, didactic, persuasive, 'phatic communion', and so on.

To be clear, what Halliday & Hasan regard as the textual dimension of the cultural context, mode, Martin & Rose regard as the textual dimension of their register, despite the fact that the categories of rhetorical mode correspond to their genre. That is, the authors' model is not only inconsistent with SFL Theory, it is inconsistent in its own terms.

[2] To be clear, the unacknowledged source here is Hasan's distinction between constitutive and ancillary LANGUAGE RÔLE. Halliday & Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

The third variable, mode, can also be described under at least three different sub-headings. First, there is the question of the LANGUAGE RÔLE — whether it is constitutive or ancillary. These categories should not be seen as sharply distinct but rather as two end-points of a continuum.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Social action and language do not construct their own fields. Halliday, in Halliday & Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

The FIELD OF DISCOURSE refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action  that is taking place: what is it that the participants are engaged in, in which language figures as some essential component?

[4] To be clear, 'the cline of monologue through dialogue' is the continuum from one person speaking (or writing) the text to at least two people speaking (or writing) the text. A midpoint on this cline would be one and a half people speaking (or writing) the text.

The Authors' Notion Of Register As A Resource For Generalising Across Genres

Martin & Rose (2007: 297-8):

As far as genre is concerned we can think of field, tenor and mode as resources for generalising across genres from the differentiated perspectives of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. 

In other words, taking tenor as an example, we need to take account of recurrent patterns of domination and deference as we move from one genre to another; we don’t want to have to stop and describe the same thing over and over again each time. 

Similarly for mode, the move from more concrete to more abstract metaphorical discourse takes place in explanations, expositions, historical recounts and reports (as we have seen); register allows us to generalise these shifts in abstraction as a resource that can be deployed in many genres.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is neither warranted by, nor consistent with, the authors' own model. Martin & Rose model their register (field, tenor and mode) and their genre as two levels of symbolic abstraction (strata) related by realisation. To understand the absurdity of the claim that a lower stratum generalises across a higher stratum, it is only necessary to consider other strata, such as phonology and lexicogrammar, where the claim would be that phonology "generalises across lexicogrammars".

The theoretical inconsistencies of the claim become multidimensional when considered in terms of SFL Theory, where

• 'context' refers to the culture — not varieties of language — as a semiotic system,
• 'register' and 'genre' (text type) refer to varieties of language, not context, and to different perspectives on the same point on the cline of instantiation, with 'register' the view from the system pole, and 'text type' the view from the instance pole.

[2] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the interpersonal dimension of context, tenor, with the interpersonal meanings of language ("recurrent patterns of domination and deference") that realise a given set of tenor features.

[3] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, any "recurrent patterns" of meaning across text types (genres) are modelled as a move up the cline of instantiation from text type towards the system pole, since these are patterns of instantiation that are common to different text types.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the textual dimension of context, mode, with the language ("abstract metaphorical discourse") that realises a given set of mode features.

[5] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, "the move" that "takes place" — "shift in abstraction" — is a change in the pattern of instantiation during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[6] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, these are modelled in terms of mode, whereas for Martin & Rose, they are categories (purposes) of genre. Given that the authors treat mode as a dimension of register, treating them as genre creates a theoretical inconsistency within their own model.

[7] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the potential ("resource") of moving from instantiating congruent wordings to instantiating metaphorical wordings during the logogenesis of text is a property of the language system itself.

On this basis, in terms of SFL Theory, the notion that register "allows us to generalise" this process "as a resource that can be deployed in many genres" is, at best, nonsensical.

Confusing Context With Register (And Mode With Genre)

Martin & Rose (2007: 296-7):

Alongside genre, the main construct used by functional linguists to model context is known as register. In SFL, register analysis is organised by metafunction into field, tenor and mode. The dimension concerned with relationships between interactants is known as tenor; that concerned with their social activity is known as field; and that concerned with the role of language is known as mode. Halliday has characterised these three dimensions of a situation as follows:

Field refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action that is taking place: what it is that the participants are engaged in, in which language figures as some essential component.

Tenor refers to who is taking part, to the nature of the participants, their statuses and roles: what kinds of role relationship obtain, including permanent and temporary relationships of one kind or another, both the types of speech roles they are taking on in the dialogue and the whole duster of socially significant relationships in which they are involved.

Mode refers to what part language is playing, what it is that the participants are expecting language to do for them in the situation: the symbolic organisation of the text, the status that it has, and its function in the context. (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 12)

As language realises its social contexts, so each dimension of a social context is realised by a particular metafunction of language, as follows:

Taken together the tenor, field and mode of a situation constitute the register of a text. As its register varies, so too do the kinds of meanings we find in a text. Because they vary systematically, we will refer to tenor, field and mode as register variables. This model of language in social context is illustrated in Figure 9.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed. In SFL Theory, register is not a means of modelling context. Register is a functional variety of language, modelled as a point of sub-potential variation on the cline of instantiation from language system to language instance. 

Context, on the other hand, is the culture modelled as a semiotic system that is realised in language. Field, tenor and mode are the metafunctional dimensions of context, but not of register. Different configurations of field, tenor and mode features (Hasan) are realised by different registers of language.

This misunderstanding occurs in Martin (1992), and proliferates through the subsequent publications of Martin, his one-time students, and the less theoretically competent members of the SFL community.

[2] This is misleading, because, in the case of mode, Martin & Rose have selectively omitted the section of the quote that contradicts their model. Cf Halliday & Hasan (1985: 12):

The MODE of discourse refers to what part language is playing, what it is that the participants are expecting language to do for them in the situation: the symbolic organisation of the text, the status that it has, and its function in the context, including the channel (is it spoken or written or some combination of the two?) and also the rhetorical mode, what is being achieved by the text in terms of such categories as persuasive, expository, didactic, and the like.

That is, in SFL Theory, what Martin & Rose model as the purpose of a genre is modelled as a system of mode, the textual dimension of the culture as semiotic system.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. What is true is that SFL Theory maps the metafunctional dimensions of language — ideational, interpersonal and textual — onto the stratum of context as field, tenor and mode, respectively. What is not true is that each metafunctional dimension of context is simply realised by its metafunctional counterpart in language. For example, the cultural field of science is realised by interpersonal propositions as much as it is realised by ideational sequences of figures, and their structural elements are given various textual statuses in terms of theme and information.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Moreover, it is a misunderstanding of Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):

The linguistic features which are typically associated with a configuration of situational features — field, mode and tenor — constitute a REGISTER.

That is, it is not the contextual features of field, tenor and mode that constitute a register, but the features of language that are typically associated with a configuration of them.

In SFL Theory, the field, tenor and mode (features) of a situation characterise the instance of context (situation) that is realised by an instance of language: (text). Here again, Martin & Rose confuse different planes: context vs language, and different points on the cline of instantiation, in this case: register vs text.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, field, tenor and mode are not register variables; they are the dimensions of the culture, whereas registers are functional sub-potentials of language.

Martin's Register, Genre And Ideology

Martin & Rose (2007: 256):

In theoretical terms what we are saying is that register, genre and ideology all matter. …

From the angle of field, we want to analyse texts whose subject matter interests us, or at least is relevant to the topic we are studying or researching; from tenor, we are interested in how speakers in oral interactions negotiate their relationships, and in how written texts engage their readers, or position us to accept their authors’ point of view; and from mode we are interested in the interplay between spoken and written ways of meaning, and in their relation to other modalities of communication (e.g. image, sound, activity).

The concept of genre then gives us the kind of handle on discourse that the clause gives us for grammar — a genre is a recurrent configuration of meaning that matters in the culture, just as a clause is the recurrent configuration of meaning that matters for discourse. 

And from an ideological perspective there’s no point in analysing something that isn’t compelling, because analysis is a considerable investment in time and mental labour, so it has to be worth our while. 

It’s for these reasons that we have based this book on a field that fascinates us and is surely one of the key topics of our time, the overthrow of the world’s last regime of constitutional racism.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, register, genre and ideology are interpreted by Martin (1992) as three strata of cultural context, despite the fact that registers and genres are two perspectives on functional varieties of language: language as subpotential variation vs language as instance type variation. Martin has since jettisoned his stratum ideology from his model of context. For clarifying critiques of Martin's model, see:

• the 82 posts here on register, 
• the 67 posts here on genre, 
• the 15 posts here on ideology, and
• the 172 posts here on context.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, field, tenor and mode are the metafunctional dimensions of context, not language. Martin (1992) misunderstands these as metafunctional dimensions of register, a functional variety of language, which he misunderstands as a stratal system of context. Moreover, Martin routinely confuses contextual field with ideational semantics; see, for example:

• Confusing Field With The Language That Realises It or
• Misconstruing Semantics As Context. 

[3] To be clear, this is a false analogy, since a genre is a type of discourse (text), whereas a clause is not a type of grammar, but a constituent of grammar: a rank scale unit that serves as an entry condition to grammatical systems.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a text type (genre) is a pattern of instantiation that is shared across texts. The extent to which a genre (text type) "matters" in a culture might be gauged by the frequency of its instantiation.

[5] Trivially, the use of the word 'compelling' here might be seen as a Freudian slip, given that 'compel' means to force or oblige someone to do something, and that the language that realises ideology is the language of obligation and inclination — i.e. of desired proposals.

[6] To be clear, the effect of 'basing this book' on such texts is to have the reader associate the authors with the people who are actually involved in the struggle for social justice. This, in turn, has the effect of positioning a critic of their theorising as an enemy of social justice.

[7] This will come as a surprise to all the ethnic communities who are still systematically discriminated against by their national governments.