Problems With The Authors' Negotiation System Network

Martin & Rose (2007: 252-3):

Above SPEECH FUNCTION, in the discourse semantics, we have the system of NEGOTIATION, which sequences moves. The basic system allows for exchanges consisting of between one and five moves, as outlined in Figure 7.6. 

In addition there are tracking and challenging options which have not been included in the network. Either can increase the number of moves an exchange works through before establishing its obligatory K1 or A1 move; and in many cases challenges abort an exchange completely by refusing to comply and perhaps leading the negotiation off in another direction (by initiating a new exchange).

The different roles of dKl, K2, K1, K2f, K1f, dA1, A2, A1, A2f, A1f and tracking or challenging moves can be shown in analysis by modelling the former as constituency to the left of the move labels, and the latter as dependency to the right:

 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for the system of NEGOTIATION to be above the system of SPEECH FUNCTION on Martin's stratum of discourse semantics, there needs to be a scale on which these two systems can be ranked as higher or lower. Martin & Rose have not proposed any such rank scale here.

[2] To be clear, the network does not specify the sequence of moves — it merely specifies which moves can be selected; but see [3] below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. The network specifies either:

• an anticipatory primary initiation OR
• a nuclear primary initiation OR
• a secondary initiation

and, in the case of action, either immediate or prospective compliance. That is, these two systems  of the network specify two — and only 2 — moves.

The third system is incoherent, because it misconstrues the presence or absence of a primary follow up move as more delicate options of secondary follow up move. That is, it confuses paradigmatic delicacy with syntagmatic sequence.

See also the clarifying critique of the first appearance of this network, Figure 7.2, here.

[4] To be clear, the failure to include these tracking and challenging options in the network is a serious shortcoming of the NEGOTIATION system, since, in SFL Theory, it is the system that specifies structures.

A Problem With The Argument For A 'Move Complex'

Martin & Rose (2007: 244-5):

To begin, David prepares the class to read the first sentence by telling them what it means, paraphrasing it in terms they can all understand, and then reads it to them. He then prepares the students to identify one element of the sentence, its initial temporal circumstance, by giving them its transitivity category ‘when’ and telling them exactly where to find it (‘that sentence starts by telling us… '). The logical relation between the sentence and the two preparations is elaboration (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). Following Ventola (1987) we can treat this semantic triplet as a move complex, filling a single slot in exchange structure — two statements in other words functioning together as a K1 move. We'll highlight these move complexes by putting '=’ as a superscript before elaborating moves, and using dependency lines on the left, to group them with one another:

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, 'when' is not a transitivity category; 'temporal circumstance' is its transitivity function.

[2] To be clear, the logico-semantic relation of elaboration does not feature in Martin's logical semantics, because his system of CONJUNCTION is a rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's cohesive conjunction (textual grammar) as logical discourse semantics, and Halliday & Hasan (1976) did not yet use the general expansion systems of elaboration, extension and enhancement.

Moreover, the logical relation between "the sentence and its two preparations" is not elaboration. In the first move by the teacher, he projects a clause complex that is a more congruent rendering of the metaphorical clause in his second move. It is the projected more congruent clause complex that can be said to be an elaboration of the (unprojected) metaphorical clause.

In the third move by the teacher, he projects a clause (when they were rebelling) that encodes the function of the temporal circumstance of the second move (In the mid-1980s). Again, the relation between the two is a type of elaboration (intensive identity), but there is no elaborating relation between the two sentences.

These distinction are important because the notion of a move complex depends on there being a logico-semantic relation between the sentences as moves, which is not the case here.

Problems With The Exchange Structure NEGOTIATION System

Martin & Rose (2007: 240):

Expressed as a network of choices, we have a resource with three intersecting systems. One system is concerned with how the exchange is initiated — by the primary actor/knower or the secondary one, and if by the primary actor/knower whether the nuclear Al/Kl move is anticipated or directly enacted. Another system distinguishes between action and knowledge exchanges, and for action exchanges allows for negotiations in which goods can be proffered or services enacted immediately (in which case verbalising the A1 move is optional, and in a sense redundant) and negotiations in which some time will pass before the goods are proffered or the service enacted (in which case verbalising the A1 move as a promise is obligatory, and actually acting to fulfil the promise may not eventuate). Finally there is a system allowing for follow-up moves, first for the secondary actor/knower, and then, if they do make a move, for the primary actor/knower. These options are set out in Figure 7.2.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this system is inconsistent with the preceding exposition of exchange structure. For example, it presents the obligatory nuclear move (A1/K1) only as a potential option — though not even an option if the exchange is initiated by the secondary knower/actor. 

Moreover, the system does not allow exchanges that include both an optional anticipatory move and an obligatory nuclear move, since only one option can be chosen.

These shortcomings are partially masked by the inclusion of structure types, after the systemic features, none of which are valid realisations of the system selections.

Even more problematically, the network unintentionally (and incongruously) allows exchange structures of just a single move, which is optional, not obligatory, such as:

• dK1 [anticipate, knowledge, no follow up], and
• K2 [secondary, knowledge, no follow up].

The Problem With The Obligatory/Optional Move Distinction

Martin & Rose (2007: 239-40):

To complete the picture we can now allow for the possibility of follow-up moves by the secondary actor or knower (with 'f' standing for ‘follow up’):

And if they do follow up, then there is the possibility of a further follow-up move by the primary actor or knower:

We can sum up the various possibilities reviewed here using parentheses for optional moves. The structure potential for action exchanges is thus:

((dA1) ^ A2) ^ A1 ^ (A2f ^ (A2f))

And for information exchanges, we find the same possibilities:

((dK1) ^ K2) ^ K1 ^ (K2f ^ (K2f))

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on this model, the only obligatory move in the exchange between the waitress and Hendrik is said to be her A1 move Yes. All the other moves, including her offer Wine? and his metaphorical command Could I have a bottle of your best dry red? — which elicits her "obligatory" move — are mere optional extras.

Similarly, the only obligatory move in the exchange between Sannie and Llewelyn is said to be her K1 move Coetzee. All other moves, including her metaphorical command You'll never guess who's here and his question Who? — which elicits her "obligatory" move — are mere optional extras.

[2] Logically, these should read (dA1 ^) and (dK1 ^), not (dA1) ^ and (dK1) ^.

[3] Logically, these should read (^ A1f) and (^ K1f), not ^ (A2f) and ^ (K2f).

Problems With Analyses Using Anticipatory Moves (dA1 & dK1)

Martin & Rose (2007: 238):

A third possibility is for exchanges to be initiated by primary actors and knowers who anticipate proffering goods or performing a service by offering first to do so, or anticipate professing information by first alerting their addressee that it is coming. These anticipatory moves in a sense delay the exchange of goods-and-services and information, and so are referred to by Berry as dA1 and dK1 moves (with ‘d’ standing for ‘delay’):

These dK1^K2^K1 sequences can be used in conversation to re-affirm a proposition that needs to be foregrounded, for example as part of an argument amongst Daniel’s comrades about who betrayed him to the authorities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the exchange between the waitress and Hendrik involves two speech functions, offer and command, with the response to the offer ellipsed. A more congruent rendering of the exchange would be:

• Can I get you some wine? (Offer)
• Yes. (response: acceptance)
• Please bring a bottle of your best dry red. (Command)
• I will. (response: undertaking)

Similarly, the exchange between Sannie and Llewelyn also involves two speech functions, command and question, with the response to the command ellipsed. A more congruent rendering of the exchange would be:

• Guess who's here. (Command)
• Okay. (response: undertaking)
• Who's here? (Question)
• Coetzee is here. (response: answer)

Importantly, contrary to the authors' analysis, with the metaphor unpacked, the first move involves goods-&-services ('A'), not information ('K').

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137).

[2] To be clear, the exchange between Luke and Zako involves a rhetorical question: a question asked in order to create a dramatic effect or to make a point rather than to get an answer.

Problems With Obligatory Moves And With Primary vs Secondary Actor/Knowers

Martin & Rose (2007: 237-8):

We can interpret what is going on here as follows, drawing on work by Ventola (1987), who was in turn building on work by Berry (e.g. 1981). Minimally speaking, exchanges consist of one obligatory move. When negotiating goods-and-services, this is the move that proffers the goods or performs the service; when negotiating information, this is the move that authoritatively establishes the facts of the matter.

Berry refers to goods-and-services negotiations as action exchanges, and information exchanges as knowledge ones. And she refers to the person responsible for proffering goods or performing a service as the primary actor, and the person who has the authority to adjudicate information as the primary knower. On this basis, the waitress’s move below is nuclear A1 move, and Sannie’s is Kl:

Berry refers to the dialogue partner for primary actors as a secondary actor, who is the person who receives the goods or has the service performed for them; the secondary knower is the person who receives the information professed by the primary knower. Where exchanges are initiated by the secondary actor (requesting goods-and-services) or the secondary knower (requesting information), we find canonical two-part exchanges like the following:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the exchange of goods-&-services, the move that "proffers the goods" or "performs the service" is not the obligatory move, since these can be omitted in an exchange. These moves are responses to commands or offers, and responses are not obligatory. If there is an obligatory move in an exchange, it is the move that brings it into being, the initiating move.

[2] To be clear, this confuses semantics with context. Relations between interlocutors — primary vs secondary actor or knower — are a matter of tenor, the interpersonal dimension of context, the culture as a semiotic system. The moves they enact in an exchange are units in the interpersonal dimension of semantics, the language as a semiotic system.

Confusing Modal Responsibility With Moral Responsibility

Martin & Rose (2007: 234-5):

Technically speaking, what we are saying is that a move is a ranking clause, including any clauses embedded in it, and in addition any clauses dependent on it. So we can tag the main clauses in the examples below; they are negotiable. Coetzee makes others responsible for the torture facility, not his role in it:

And Sannie makes the village gossipmongers responsible, not her family:

The underlined clauses are not directly negotiable; to make them so would require an additional initiating move in which they are promoted from a subordinate to an arguable position.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Once again, Martin & Rose are misrepresenting Halliday's model of speech function as their own theoretical creation.

[2] To be clear, this confuses moral responsibility (for the torture facility) with modal responsibility (whether or not it is valid to state they had a facility outside Capetown…). 

[3] To be clear, the modal responsibility here is for the validity of the claim they'll say we're selling the house.

[4] To be clear, the projected clause we're selling the house can be challenged in a response move, as exemplified by But we're not (selling the house). Moreover, not only is this possible, it is more likely than a challenge to the projecting clause: But they won't say that.

In short, on the authors' model, the move But we're not (selling the house) would not be analysed as a responding move to they'll say we're selling the house, but would instead be analysed as a new initiating move.

Misunderstanding Halliday's Moodtags And Misrepresenting Them As The Authors' Work

Martin & Rose (2007: 226):

Moves may also end with tag 'questions' (don’t you?, isn't he?, etc.) oriented to the addressee. These tags do not function as separate moves, but are better treated as explicit invitations to a listener to respond. Both of Sannie’s speech acts below would thus be treated as tagged statements (not as statements followed by questions). There is after all only one proposition being negotiated, not two:

 

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Yet again, Martin & Rose here present Halliday's work as if it were their own. Importantly, the tag doesn't just invite a response; it signals the type of response expected. Halliday (1985:69):

[2] This is misleading. While the first instance is a tagged declarative clause realising a statement, the second instance does not feature a Moodtag, and realises two speech functions, not one. To explain:

Firstly, a Moodtag reprises the Finite and Subject of a clause, so the (unmarked) Moodtag for you could have killed the man is couldn't you? not you know.

Secondly, there are two propositions

• the projected statement: you could have killed the man, and
• the projecting question: you know (realised metaphorically as a declarative clause),

each of which could be challenged in response.

Moreover, the projecting clause you know can itself be tagged by don't you?, further demonstrating that it is not a Moodtag but a proposition in its own right.

Vocatives

Martin & Rose (2007: 225-6):

Moves may contain names which specify who is expected to respond (vocatives). For analysis purposes we recommend not treating vocatives as distinct moves when they simply accompany a speech act, addressing its receiver. This would mean treating Ernest’s move addressing Coetzee below as a statement including the vocative you white piece of shit, and his father’s move as a command including the vocative Ernest:

So vocatives are only taken as separate speech acts when they function as a move on their own, in greeting or calling sequences, as illustrated above… .

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because this is simply the analysis that is consistent with SFL Theory, and yet Martin & Rose present it as their recommendation.

[2] To be clear, unknown to Martin & Rose, this an instance of interpersonal metaphor: a command realised by a declarative clause with Mood ellipsis:

[3] Trivially, these are moves in exchanges, not sequences. Sequences (of figures) are ideational, not interpersonal.

Problems With The Authors' Speech Function System

 Martin & Rose (2007: 225, 226):

This account gives us a speech function system comprising the basic options displayed in Figure 7.1.

Blogger Comments:

The most obvious problems with the authors' network are as follows:

1. There is no entry condition;
2. The minor speech functions are split ('express self' vs 'attending'), with the latter grouped with major speech functions ('negotiating');
3. The minor speech function 'alarm' is not accounted for;
4. The INITIATING ROLE system ('giving' vs 'demanding') is not named;
5. The COMMODITY system ('information' vs 'goods-&-services') is not named; but most importantly,
6. The INITIATING ROLE system ('giving' vs 'demanding') appears six times instead of once.

A competently organised network is provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

Misrepresenting Halliday's Minor Speech Functions As The Authors' Ideas

Martin & Rose (2007: 224, 225):

Minimally, we need five more speech acts to complete the picture. Two are concerned with greeting and leave-taking (the hellos and good-byes framing conversations as people come and go, phone up and sign off). We can refer to these as greeting and response to greeting moves. …

Then there is the question of getting people’s attention once they are there - call and response to call. …

Finally we need to consider outbursts of appraisal, such as Helena’s Dammit! in the interpretation stage of her exemplum. … As explosions of personal affect, exclamations are not really negotiable — so we very seldom need to recognise a responding move.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because here Martin & Rose misrepresent Halliday's minor speech functions as their own theorising. Halliday (1994: 95-6):

As can be seen from the above, Martin & Rose fail to include Halliday's minor speech function 'alarm' and its two sub-types: 'warning' and 'appeal'.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Ideas As The Authors' Ideas

Martin & Rose (2007: 223):

Based on the examples introduced above we can extract three basic parameters of negotiation — what it is we are negotiating, whether we are giving or demanding it, and whether a move initiates the exchange or responds. First, there is the question of what we are negotiating — information or goods-and-services. Note, as illustrated below, that when negotiating information we expect a verbal response (or gesture), whereas when negotiating goods-and-services we expect action.

These examples also illustrate a second parameter — the complementarity of initiating and responding moves in dialogue. Compliant responding moves may be quite elliptical, since the content being negotiated is easily recovered from the initiating move; and with goods-and-services transactions, language is in any case an optional accompaniment to behaviour (unless we are promising future action).

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose continue to present Halliday's ideas as if they were their own. Cf Halliday (1985: 68-9):

Misrepresenting Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION As The Authors' Model

Martin & Rose (2007: 222-3):

We’ll begin with our model of kinds of moves, focusing initially on statements, questions, offers and commands and compliant responses to them, as set out in Table 7.1.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed. As well as failing to acknowledge Halliday as the intellectual source of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, Martin & Rose here explicitly misrepresent it as their own model. Cf Halliday (1985: 69):

The Intellectual Source Of Martin's NEGOTIATION

Martin & Rose (2007: 221-2):

NEGOTIATION provides resources for taking up speech roles in conversation — making statements, asking questions, offering services and demanding goods. … 

As we can see, each statement, question, offer and command positions people to respond — by acknowledging, answering, accepting and complying. So the moves in conversation tend to come in pairs — ‘adjacency pairs’ as conversation analysts have called them. … 

So responses may be compliant or they may not. Summing up, there are three dimensions we need to consider in dialogue — the kind of moves that speakers make, how they are sequenced, and what happens when things don’t work out as smoothly as planned.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION is Martin's (1992) rebranding of Halliday's (1985: 69) semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION. There is no acknowledgement, anywhere in this chapter, that the source of these ideas is Halliday. Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

[2] To be clear, this confuses speech functions (statement, question, offer) with the systemic features that specify them (goods, services and demand). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

[3] Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

Negotiating Feelings And Ideational Meanings

Martin & Rose (2007: 220):

The three principal texts we have used in the book up to now were essentially monologues. At certain points however both Helena and Tutu became more conversational. Helena, for example, talks to God, asking a series of questions about her husband’s disintegration and exclaiming about how she feels:

'God, what's happening? What's wrong with him? Could he have changed so much? Is he going mad? I can't handle the man anymore! But I can't get out. He's going to haunt me for the rest of my life if I leave him. Why, God?'

And Tutu addresses his readers with questions about the integrity of the Truth Commission:

Can it ever be right for someone who had committed the most gruesome atrocities to be allowed to get off scot-free, simply by confessing what he or she has done? Are the critics right; was the Truth and Reconciliation process immoral?... So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done?

Helena doesn’t get an answer from God, and Tutu has to answer his own questions in the argument that follows. So a conversation never really develops. But in spoken discourse, both the feelings we discussed in Chapter 2 and the ideational meanings we presented in Chapter 3 are indeed negotiated between speakers. The system of resources that enables this to-and-fro of dialogue is called NEGOTIATION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a dialogue involves a conversation between two or more speakers. This can occur at different orders of experience. For example, the dialogue may be first-order experience: people talking to each other, or second-order experience: people in a text talking to each other. 

(Tutu's questions are, of course, rhetorical questions.)

[2] To be clear, what people negotiate are interpersonal meanings: propositions and proposals. The mistaken notion that ideational meanings are negotiated derives, in part, from Martin's (1992: 391, 488) misunderstanding of metafunctions as interacting modules.

Rebranding Speech Function As Negotiation

Martin & Rose (2007: 21):

Negotiation

The key resources here are for exchanging roles as an interaction unfolds, for example by asking a question and answering it, or demanding a service and complying with the command. Here one speaker demands information with a question, and the other responds with a statement:

Sannie: Are you leaving?
Coetzee: - Of course I'm leaving.

Next a father demands a service with a command, and his son complies:

Hendrik: Ernest, get those snœk [a kind of fish],
Ernest: - (Ernest proceeds to do so.)

Blogger Comments:

Martin's discourse semantic system of negotiation is a rebranding of Halliday's semantic system of speech function.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 135):

These two variables [speech rôle and commodity], when taken together, define the four primary speech functions of offer, command, statement and question. These, in turn, are matched by a set of desired responses: accepting an offer, carrying out a command, acknowledging a statement and answering a question.