Problems With The System Network Of Ideational Meanings In Images

 Martin & Rose (2007: 325):

A very general outline of options for ideational meanings in images is given in Figure 9.10.

Blogger Comments:

As previously demonstrated, these systems model textual meaning, not ideational meaning. On the one hand, it is the textual metafunction that focuses on phenomena, and on the other hand, it is the textual metafunction at the level of context, mode, that is distinguishes the channel of 'construal'. That is, the authors' network is theoretically inconsistent in terms of both metafunction and plane of symbolic abstraction.

With regard to the wiring of the network, the claim is that entity-focused images either classify entities (e.g. 'boy') or present them as composed of parts (eg. 'head', 'fist' etc.), but not both.

With regard to the argument on which the network is based, as previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose have not provided an instance of a complex activity, and have not provided a consistent theoretical argument for their inclusion of the term 'indexical'.

Problems With The Authors' Negotiation System Network

Martin & Rose (2007: 252-3):

Above SPEECH FUNCTION, in the discourse semantics, we have the system of NEGOTIATION, which sequences moves. The basic system allows for exchanges consisting of between one and five moves, as outlined in Figure 7.6. 

In addition there are tracking and challenging options which have not been included in the network. Either can increase the number of moves an exchange works through before establishing its obligatory K1 or A1 move; and in many cases challenges abort an exchange completely by refusing to comply and perhaps leading the negotiation off in another direction (by initiating a new exchange).

The different roles of dKl, K2, K1, K2f, K1f, dA1, A2, A1, A2f, A1f and tracking or challenging moves can be shown in analysis by modelling the former as constituency to the left of the move labels, and the latter as dependency to the right:

 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for the system of NEGOTIATION to be above the system of SPEECH FUNCTION on Martin's stratum of discourse semantics, there needs to be a scale on which these two systems can be ranked as higher or lower. Martin & Rose have not proposed any such rank scale here.

[2] To be clear, the network does not specify the sequence of moves — it merely specifies which moves can be selected; but see [3] below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. The network specifies either:

• an anticipatory primary initiation OR
• a nuclear primary initiation OR
• a secondary initiation

and, in the case of action, either immediate or prospective compliance. That is, these two systems  of the network specify two — and only 2 — moves.

The third system is incoherent, because it misconstrues the presence or absence of a primary follow up move as more delicate options of secondary follow up move. That is, it confuses paradigmatic delicacy with syntagmatic sequence.

See also the clarifying critique of the first appearance of this network, Figure 7.2, here.

[4] To be clear, the failure to include these tracking and challenging options in the network is a serious shortcoming of the NEGOTIATION system, since, in SFL Theory, it is the system that specifies structures.

Problems With The Exchange Structure NEGOTIATION System

Martin & Rose (2007: 240):

Expressed as a network of choices, we have a resource with three intersecting systems. One system is concerned with how the exchange is initiated — by the primary actor/knower or the secondary one, and if by the primary actor/knower whether the nuclear Al/Kl move is anticipated or directly enacted. Another system distinguishes between action and knowledge exchanges, and for action exchanges allows for negotiations in which goods can be proffered or services enacted immediately (in which case verbalising the A1 move is optional, and in a sense redundant) and negotiations in which some time will pass before the goods are proffered or the service enacted (in which case verbalising the A1 move as a promise is obligatory, and actually acting to fulfil the promise may not eventuate). Finally there is a system allowing for follow-up moves, first for the secondary actor/knower, and then, if they do make a move, for the primary actor/knower. These options are set out in Figure 7.2.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this system is inconsistent with the preceding exposition of exchange structure. For example, it presents the obligatory nuclear move (A1/K1) only as a potential option — though not even an option if the exchange is initiated by the secondary knower/actor. 

Moreover, the system does not allow exchanges that include both an optional anticipatory move and an obligatory nuclear move, since only one option can be chosen.

These shortcomings are partially masked by the inclusion of structure types, after the systemic features, none of which are valid realisations of the system selections.

Even more problematically, the network unintentionally (and incongruously) allows exchange structures of just a single move, which is optional, not obligatory, such as:

• dK1 [anticipate, knowledge, no follow up], and
• K2 [secondary, knowledge, no follow up].

Problems With The Authors' Speech Function System

 Martin & Rose (2007: 225, 226):

This account gives us a speech function system comprising the basic options displayed in Figure 7.1.

Blogger Comments:

The most obvious problems with the authors' network are as follows:

1. There is no entry condition;
2. The minor speech functions are split ('express self' vs 'attending'), with the latter grouped with major speech functions ('negotiating');
3. The minor speech function 'alarm' is not accounted for;
4. The INITIATING ROLE system ('giving' vs 'demanding') is not named;
5. The COMMODITY system ('information' vs 'goods-&-services') is not named; but most importantly,
6. The INITIATING ROLE system ('giving' vs 'demanding') appears six times instead of once.

A competently organised network is provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

Tracking Systems

Martin & Rose (2007: 183-4):

As for tracking, presumed information can be recovered either on the basis of communal understandings (the Truth Commission, Mandela) or situational presence, as shown in Figure 5.4. Within a situation, information can be presumed from either verbal (endophora) or non-verbal modalities (exophoric). Reference to the co-text can point forward or back: if back, then direct reference can be distinguished from inference; if forward, then reference from a nominal group to something following that group can be distinguished from reference that’s resolved within the same nominal group. Terminologically, we can refer to bridging as a type of anaphora; but forward reference within (esphora) is so much more common than forward reference beyond the nominal group that it’s probably best to reserve the term cataphora for reference beyond.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, the misunderstanding of reference as tracking leads to absurdities such as speakers using I, me, my, mine to keep track of themselves.

[2] As previously noted, homophoric reference — as in the Truth Commission —is 'self-specifying; there is only one – or at least only one that makes sense in the context' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 631). Homophoric reference is not textually cohesive.

[3] As previously explained, the use of names, such as Mandela, is reference in the sense of ideational denotation, not textual reference in which a reference item presumes an identity to be resolved elsewhere.

[4] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, a 'situation' is an instance of context, the culture as semiotic system, which is realised in language. Inconsistent with theory, Martin & Rose here use it to refer to both the perceptual field of the interlocutors (phenomena) and their projected text (metaphenomena) that realises a situation.

[5] To be clear, this is the first use of 'modalities' in the chapter. Endophoric reference is reference to within the text, exophoric reference is reference to outside text. Both verbal and non-verbal modalities (eg. pictures) can be referred to either endophorically or exophorically. For example, endophoric reference to a 'non-verbal modality' is to a diagram within the same text; exophoric  reference to a 'verbal modality' is reference to a different text.

[6] As previously demonstrated here, bridging (inference/indirect reference) is a confusion of reference with lexical cohesion.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this is the distinction between non-structural cataphora, which is cohesive, and structural cataphora ("esphora") which is not.

Theoretical Problems With The System Of Internal Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 140-1):

The full system for internal conjunction is displayed as Table 4.6.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this a taxonomy, presented as a table, rather than a system. It lacks, for example, both an entry condition and realisation statements that specify how the features are realised structurally.

For theoretical problems with the system of internal addition, see

1. Misconstruing Continuity As Additive Conjunction
2. Misconstruing Distractive And Dismissive Clarification (Elaboration) As Addition (Extension)
3. Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Addition

For theoretical problems with the system of internal comparison, see

1. Misconstruing Elaboration And Modal Assessment As Comparison
2. Misconstruing Subclasses Of Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Subclasses Of Comparison (Enhancement)
3. Misconstruing Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Comparison And Misunderstanding The Ideational Content Of The Illustrative Text
4. Mistaking Comment Adjuncts For Conjunctive Adjuncts Of Comparison
5. Misconstruing Subtypes Of Variation And Addition (Extension) As Subtypes Of Comparison (Enhancement)
6. Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Comparison

For theoretical problems with the system of internal time, see

1. Misconstruing Conditional 'Then' As Temporal 'Then'
2. Misrepresenting The Conjunctive Relation Of Internal Simultaneity
3. Problems With The System Of Internal Time

For theoretical problems with the system of internal consequence, see

1. Misconstruing Means (And Clarification) As Internal Consequence
2. Misconstruing Continuity As Internal Consequence
3. Misconstruing Modal Assessment As Internal Consequence [1]
4. Misconstruing Dismissive Clarification As Internal Consequence
5. Misconstruing Modal Assessment As Internal Consequence [2]
6. Rebranding Concessive Condition As Internal Unexpected Consequence
7. Rebranding Concessive Condition As Internal Concessive Consequence
8. Theoretical Problems With The System Of Internal Consequence

The Reason Why We Need Conjunction As A Discourse Semantic System

Martin & Rose (2007: 116):

This illustrates one reason why we need to set up conjunction as a discourse semantic system. The meanings of conjunction are realised through conjunctions such as if and then, but they are also realised by other kinds of wordings, and they are frequently left implicit, for the reader or listener to infer.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this does not constitute an argument for setting up conjunction as a discourse semantic system, since the various realisations are already accounted for by the two grammatical systems that Martin & Rose confuse and rebrand as Martin's discourse semantic system of conjunction, namely Halliday's system of clause complexing (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 438):

and Halliday's system of cohesive conjunction (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612):

On the other hand, for a theoretically-consistent account of the semantic systems that are congruently realised in lexicogrammar as clause complexing, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104-27). 

The Discourse Semantic System Of Nuclear Relations In The Group

Martin & Rose (2007: 98):

These options in nuclearity in groups are then set out in Figure 3.15.

 

Blogger Comments:

Contrary to SFL principles, this experiential system at the level of discourse semantics has no entry condition and no realisation statements that specify either discourse semantic structures or grammatical realisations. Moreover, the network is poorly conceived, since it represents what is logically a single simultaneous system, nominal vs verbal, as three systems more delicate than the most general system.

More importantly, it presents the degrees of nuclearity as alternatives, such that only one can be chosen.  That is, the "discourse semantic" choices are groups with either a central element or a nuclear element or a peripheral element.

Moreover, the network only affords one structural configuration to be selected:

• either Classifier Thing
• or Focus Thing
• or Event Particle
• or Epithet Thing
• or Event Event
• or Thing Qualifier
• or Event Quality.

This severely restricts the range of groups that can be instantiated at the level of discourse semantics, to say the least.

In short, in Figure 3.15, Martin & Rose misrepresent a hyponymic taxonomy of their misunderstood theoretical categories as a system network that constitutes the discourse semantic choices available to language users.

The Discourse Semantic System Of Nuclear Relations In The Clause

Martin & Rose (2007: 95-6):

These four degrees of nuclearity are then set out as a system in Figure 3.13.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this entire discussion of nuclear relations confuses degrees of nuclearity of clause elements with the clause elements being related by degrees, and rebrands the grammatical confusion as Martin's  discourse semantics.

Moreover, the terminology, which uses synonyms for different degrees on the scale, names the model in terms of one of the intermediate degrees on the scale, the nucleus, instead of the central element to which all are said to be related.

[2] Contrary to SFL principles, this experiential system at the level of discourse semantics has no entry condition and no realisation statements that specify either discourse semantic structures or grammatical realisations.

More importantly, it presents the degrees of nuclearity as alternatives, such that only one can be chosen.  That is, the "discourse semantic" choices are clauses with either a central element or a nuclear element or a marginal element or a peripheral element.

Moreover, for each of these four options, only one clause function can be selected:

• either Process or Range, but not both, or
• either Medium or Range, but not both, or
• either Agent or Beneficiary, but not both, or
• either inner or outer circumstance, but not both.

This severely restricts the range of clauses that can be instantiated at the level of discourse semantics, to say the least.

In short, in Figure 3.13, Martin & Rose misrepresent a hyponymic taxonomy of their misunderstood theoretical categories as a system network that constitutes the discourse semantic choices available to language users.