On The Implicit Coupling Of Field With Appreciation

Martin & Rose (2007: 70-1):

Further complicating this issue is the implicit coupling of field with appreciation (the evocation variable noted above). As with affect and judgement, ideational meanings can be used to appraise, even though explicitly evaluative lexis is avoided. It perhaps should be stressed again here that appraisal analysts do need to declare their reading position, in particular since the evaluation one makes of evocations depends on the institutional position one is reading from. For example, according to reading position, formal and functional linguists will evaluate terms in the following sets of oppositions in complementary ways with firm convictions about what the good guys and the bad guys should celebrate:

rule/resource :: cognitive/social :: acquisition/development :: syntagmatic/paradigmatic :: form/function :: language/parole :: system/process :: psychology&philosophy/socioiogy&anthropology :: cognitive/social :: theory/description :: intuition/corpus :: knowledge/meaning :: syntax/discourse :: pragmatics/context :: parsimony/extravagance :: cognitive/critical :: technicist/humanist :: truth/social action :: performance/instantiation :: categorical/probabilistic :: contradictory/complementary :: proof/exemplification :: reductive/comprehensive :: arbitrary/natural :: modular/fractal :: syntax&lexicon/lexicogrammar...

Blogger Comments:

[1] As pointed out in the previous post, the notion of "coupling" of field with appreciation betrays the authors' misunderstanding of strata and metafunctions as interacting modules of meaning (Martin 1992: 390); see, for example Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules. 

[2] The notion that 'ideational meanings can be used to appraise' continues the misunderstanding of metafunctions as modules.  The implication here is that the terms that enact explicit appraisals, such as 'disorganised', do not also serve an ideational function.

To be clear, the ideational metafunction is language in its function of construing experience as meaning, whereas the interpersonal metafunction is language in its function of enacting intersubjective relations as meaning.  As an interpersonal system, appraisal is the enactment of intersubjective relations as meaning, not the use of "ideational" meanings to appraise. 

[3] This confuses the reading position of the discourse analyst with the appraisals enacted in a text — the latter being either those of the author, or those reported by the author to be those of instantial participants.

[4] These proportionalities actually disclose the reading position of Martin & Rose.  The following table sets out what the authors believe are appraised as positive by "the good guys and the bad guys":

What Formal Linguists Should Celebrate	What Functional Linguists Should Celebrate
rule	resource
cognitive	social
acquisition	development
syntagmatic	paradigmatic
form	function
language	parole
system	process
psychology & philosophy	socioiogy & anthropology
cognitive	social
theory	description
intuition	corpus
knowledge	meaning
syntax	discourse
pragmatics	context
parsimony	extravagance
cognitive	critical
technicist	humanist
truth	social action
performance	instantiation
categorical	probabilistic
contradictory	complementary
proof	exemplification
reductive	comprehensive
arbitrary	natural
modular	fractal
syntax & lexicon	lexicogrammar

On The "Coupling" Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning

Martin & Rose (2007: 70):

Of these dimensions, valuation is especially tied up with field, since the criteria for valuing a text/process are for the most part institutionally specific. But beyond this, since both judgement and appreciation are in a sense institutionalisations of feeling, all of the dimensions involved will prove sensitive to field. An example of this coupling of ideational and interpersonal meaning is presented in Table 2.11 for appreciations of research in the field of linguistics.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the appraised with the system of appraisal (appreciation).  It is the appreciated that varies according to the field being realised in language-as-register, not the means of appreciating.  This is shown by the fact that the terms of appreciation in Table 2.11 are not limited to a specialised field like linguistics, and by the fact that the positive and negative values of the terms are also not limited to a specialised field like linguistics.

[2] The reason the authors link 'institutionalisation' to 'field' is because Martin (1992: 180-1, 292, 527, 536) mistakenly identifies 'institution' with only the ideational dimension of context (misconstrued as register).  In SFL theory, on the other hand, 'institution' is 'situation type' viewed from the potential pole of the cline of instantiation, such that institution variation is realised by register variation.

[3] The notion of "this coupling of ideational and interpersonal meaning" — ideational context and interpersonal semantics — betrays the authors' misunderstanding of strata and metafunctions as interacting modules of meaning (Martin 1992: 390); see, for example Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules. 

On Appreciation As The Evaluation Of Products And Performances

Martin & Rose (2007: 69-70):

Appreciation can be thought of as the institutionalisation of feeling, in the context of propositions (norms about how products and performances are valued). Like affect and judgement it has a positive and negative dimension corresponding to positive and negative evaluations of texts and processes (and natural phenomena). The system is organised around three variables: reaction, composition and valuation.  Reaction has to do with attention (reaction: impact) and the emotional impact it has on us with the degree to which the text/process in question captures our attention (reaction: impact) and the emotional impact it has on us (reaction: quality).  Composition has to do with our perceptions of proportionality (composition: balance) and detail (composition: complexity) in a text/process. Valuation has to do with our assessment of the social significance of the text/process.

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose limit appreciation to the assessment of 'products and performances', and 'texts and processes (and natural phenomena)', leading some to conclude that appreciation does not apply to humans or human behaviour, despite the fact that humans and behaviours can be assessed as

• 'surprising' (reaction: impact),
• 'dull' (reaction: quality),
• 'sloppy' (composition: balance),
• 'complicated' (composition: complexity) and 
• 'shallow' (valuation).

Confusing Orientation Distinctions With Judgement Distinctions

Martin & Rose (2007: 68-9):

The kinds of judgement speakers take up is very sensitive to their institutional position. For example only journalists with responsibility for writing editorials and other comment have a full range of judgmental resources at their disposal; reporters writing hard news that is meant to sound objective have to avoid explicit judgements completely (Iedema et al 1994; Martin and White 2005). The distinction between social esteem and social sanction in other words has important implications for the subjective or objective flavour of an appraiser's stance.

Blogger Comments:

This simply confuses two distinct dimensions of orientation:

• subjective vs objective, and
• explicit vs implicit

with the judgement distinction between social esteem and social sanction.

To be clear, none of the following three oppositions between social esteem and social sanction enacts the distinction between subjective and objective orientation:

• Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs Trump is dishonest (social sanction)
• I think Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs I think Trump is dishonest (social sanction)
• It is widely acknowledged that Trump is stupid (social esteem) vs It is widely acknowledged that Trump is dishonest (social sanction).

Major Inconsistencies In The Martin & Rose Interpretation Of Judgement

Martin & Rose (2007: 68):

Each of these varieties of judgements are exemplified in Table 2.9. For each set, examples are given that express various types of judgement (e.g. lucky, normal, fashionable), and different degrees of intensity within each type (e.g. lucky, fortunate, charmed).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Many of the distinctions in Table 2.9 that are used to classify types of judgement do not survive close scrutiny.

As already mentioned, the opposition between 'admire/criticise' and 'praise/condemn' does not characterise the opposition between social esteem and social sanction.  For example, assessing someone as cowardly (esteem) is as much a condemnation (sanction) as a criticism (esteem).

The opposition between 'venial' (pardonable) and 'moral', also, does not characterise the opposition between social esteem and social sanction, nor is it a valid opposition.  On the first point, for example, what makes 'brave' (esteem) pardonable, rather than moral (sanction)?  On the second point, the distinction between 'venial' (pardonable) and 'moral' is not a mutually exclusive opposition within a superordinate category, and 'venial' is irrelevant for positive values of esteem, since they are not transgressions of a moral code.

Within social esteem, as already mentioned, the term 'normality' — the state of being usual, typical, or expected — is problematic because it represents a midpoint on any scale of variation rather than a scale itself, and so the authors' (conservative) presumption that normal is positive and abnormal is negative is itself invalid; cf. SNAFU.

The glossing of 'normality' as 'fate' — the course of someone's life, or the outcome of a situation for someone or something, seen as outside their control — is inconsistent in terms of the meanings of the two words, and invalid for 'normality' categories that are not outside someone's control, such as 'fashionable' and 'avant garde'. 

Moreover, the examples provided demonstrate that this category is a set of leftover subtypes that don't fit either of the other two categories, 'capacity' or 'tenacity', since it subsumes various different types of scalar values, as shown by the oppositions of 'lucky/unlucky' and 'fashionable/(unfashionable)' — with 'fashionable' presumed to be a positive judgement; cf. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont.

Within social sanction, the glossing of 'propriety' as 'ethics' is problematic, because 'ethics' is a superordinate term — like the gloss of social sanction: 'moral' — that subsumes its hyponym 'veracity'.  That is, the opposition between 'truth' (veracity) and 'ethics' (propriety) is a false dichotomy, since it presents two different levels of a hyponymic taxonomy as an opposition at the same level.

[2] Again, the system of GRADUATION ('degrees of intensity') is confused here with a system of ATTITUDE — this time with JUDGEMENT, rather than AFFECT.

On Judgement: Esteem, Sanction & Normality

Martin & Rose (2007: 67-8):

Judgement can be thought of as the institutionalisation of feeling, in the context of proposals (norms about how people should and shouldn’t behave). Like affect, it has a positive and negative dimension corresponding to positive and negative judgements about behaviour. Media research reported in Iedema et al. (1994) has suggested dividing judgements into two major groups, social esteem and social sanction. Social esteem involves admiration and criticism, typically without legal implications; if you have difficulties in this area you may need a therapist. Social sanction on the other hand involves praise, and condemnation, often with legal implications; if you have problems in this area you may need a lawyer. Judgements of esteem have to do with normality (how unusual someone is), capacity (how capable they are) and tenacity (how resolute they are); judgements of sanction have to do with veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Contrary to the claim, the opposition 'admiration and criticism' versus 'praise and condemnation' does not characterise the distinction between social esteem and social sanction.  For example, a person can be

• praised for their cleverness (esteem, not sanction),
• condemned for their cowardice (esteem, not sanction),
• admired for their honesty (sanction, not esteem), or
• criticised for their immorality (sanction, not esteem).

[2] The term 'normality' is problematic in this context, because, unlike the terms 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety', it does not refer to a scale of gradable values, but to a midpoint on all scales.  That is, it is not only possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety' (judgement), but it is also possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'reaction', 'composition' and 'valuation' (appreciation).  This is likely to result in confusion, even between judgement and appreciation, in text analysis.

The assessment of 'normality' itself, as positive or negative, is another matter.

Confusing Affect And Graduation

Martin & Rose (2007: 66-7):

Feelings can be experienced as emotional dispositions, such as sad or happy, or they may appear as surges of behaviour, such as crying and laughing. Each group of emotions is set out in Table 2.8, including examples of both dispositions and surges. Each group includes both positive and negative feelings, with examples that express three degrees of intensity. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the use of emotion to appraise — interpersonal enactments — not with emotion as a construal of experience.  The distinction is one of metafunction.

[2] This again confuses the system of GRADUATION ('intensity') with what is purported to be a system of ATTITUDE.

Misconstruing Ascriptions Of Emotion As Appraisals By Reference To Emotion

Martin & Rose (2007: 65-6):

(6) Finally we can group emotions into three major sets having to do with un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. For example:

in/security             the boy was anxious/confident

dis/satisfaction      the boy was fed up/absorbed

un/happiness         the boy was sad/happy

Blogger Comments:

This again confuses the construal of emotions with appraisal by reference to emotions (affect).  None of the three propositions exemplifies affect, since none enacts an appraisal by reference to emotion.  Neither the boy nor the author is making an appraisal.  The author is merely attributing qualities of emotion to the boy.  Genuine examples would be:

in/security                 the boy was anxious/confident about the result
dis/satisfaction          the boy was fed up with/absorbed in the computer game
un/happiness             the boy was sad/happy that his teacher had died

Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Behavioural Surges Of Mental Desideration

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):

(5) Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather than realis).

realis      the boy liked the present
irrealis   the boy wanted the present 

Irrealis affect seems always to be directed at some external agency, and so can be outlined as in Table 2.7 (setting aside parameter 3 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the distinction between emotive (liked) and desiderative (wanted) mental processes.  (The ir/realis distinction is not an interpersonal distinction.)

[2] This is manifestly untrue in terms of both agency, as demonstrated by the authors' own example: the boy wanted the present, and externality, as demonstrated by the boy wanted to feel safe.

[3] There are two main theoretical inconsistencies in Table 2.7.

In presenting behavioural processes manifesting emotion (tremble, shudder, cower) as behavioural surges of desideration (fear), and qualities of emotion as dispositions of desideration, it confuses 'fear' as emotion with 'fear' as desideration.

In presenting verbal processes (suggest, request, implore) as behavioural surges of desideration (desire), it confuses verbal processes with mental processes.  To be clear, affect is the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.

Confusing Graduation With Attitude

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):

(4) How are the feelings graded: towards the lower valued end of a scale of intensity, towards the higher valued end or somewhere in between? We don’t wish at this stage to imply that low, median and high are discrete values (as with modality, cf. Halliday 1994: 358-9), but expect that most emotions offer lexicalisations that grade along an evenly-clined scale.

low             the boy liked the present
'median'      the boy loved the present
high            the boy adored the present

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this scale is concerned with GRADUATION, a system that is distinct from — parallel with — the system of ATTITUDE.  Here Martin & Rose present it as the fourth means of classifying affect (ATTITUDE).

Misconstruing The Construal Of Emotion As 'Undirected' Affect

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):

(3) Are the feelings construed as directed at or reacting to some specific external agency (typically conscious) or as a general ongoing mood for which one might pose the question ‘Why are you feeling that way?’ and get the answer ‘I’m not sure.’ 

reaction to other       the boy liked the teacher/the teacher pleased the boy
undirected mood      the boy was happy

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  Agency is not a necessary feature of the appraised, as demonstrated by the boy liked the teacher.

[2] This is manifestly untrue.   'Conscious' is at least as typically not a feature of the appraised, as demonstrated by instances of the following types:

• the boy loved chocolate [unconscious thing]
• the boy enjoyed riding his bike [act]
• the boy liked the fact that his team had won [fact]

[3] This once again confuses the ideational construal of emotion — as Process or qualitative Attribute — with affect: the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.  The confusion is thus in terms of metafunction.

Confusing Ideational Construals With Interpersonal Enactments

Martin & Rose (2007: 64):

(1) Are the feelings popularly construed by the culture as positive (good vibes that are enjoyable to experience) or negative ones (bad vibes that are better avoided)? We are not concerned here with the value that a particular psychological framework might place on one or another emotion (cf. It’s probably productive that you’re feeling sad because it’s a sign that...’).

positive affect           the boy was happy

negative affect          the boy was sad

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the appraisal of emotions by a culture with appraisal by reference to emotions (affect).

[2] Neither proposition enacts an appraisal by emotion (affect).  Neither the boy nor the author is making an appraisal.  The author is merely attributing qualities of emotion to the boy.  Genuine examples of positive and negative affect would be:

positive affect           the boy was happy that his teacher had been arrested

negative affect          the boy was sad that the death penalty had been abolished

In each instance the boy appraises a fact by reference to an emotion.

On Martin's "Communion With Nelson Mandela In So Many Respects"

Martin & Rose (2007: 61-3):

We’ll close this section with an example of stance shifting from one of Jim’s papers where he tried to figure out what he found so moving about the final couple of pages of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography Long Walk to Freedom (a text we’ll return to in Chapter 7). …

By the end of this study however he was still feeling a little mystified about why the text he was analysing was so moving. His communion with Mandela, at such a distance in so many respects, seemed to transcend the sum of the analyses he had undertaken, however focused he tried to make them on what was going on.  In exasperation, he decided to shift stance and wrote:

… In a sense then, Mandela is promoting socialism in the name of freedom; … We need, in other words, more positive discourse analysis (PDA?) alongside our critique; and this means dealing with texts we admire, alongside those we dislike and try to expose (Wodak 1996). (Martin 1999a: 51-2)

… [Jim] evaluates the text as graceful, he’s charmed by it, he admires it and of course the man who wrote it. … Allowing himself a reaction got him thinking about how Mandela finesses his radical politics, disarming people [a]round the world into communities of admiring fans. And it allowed Jim to make a further point about the importance of focusing on heartening discourses of this kind instead of being so depressingly critical all the time by focusing solely on hegemony and all that’s wrong with the world. … These guys are heroes; let’s see how they move the world along’. … 

Just as we’ve been changing voices here; we’ll pull back now, in case our scholarly credentials are wearing a little thin.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Since this section is neither an exposition of Appraisal theory, nor an application of Appraisal theory to text analysis, it is useful to consider the function it serves.

[2] Here Martin & Rose are informing the reader that one of them, Jim Martin, has much in common with Nelson Mandela — in terms of shared mental or spiritual experience.  (The word 'communion' means the sharing or exchanging of intimate thoughts and feelings, especially on a mental or spiritual level, or shared participation in a mental or spiritual experience.)

For a reality check, see Jim Martin "Honouring" The Late Ruqaiya Hasan.

For an insightful portrait of the 'academic revolutionary', enjoy Rumpole And The Right To Silence by John Mortimer.

[3] A critique is a detailed analysis and assessment of something, especially a literary, philosophical, or political theory. It is 'critical' in the sense of critical thinking, as expressing or involving an analysis of the merits and faults of a work. Martin, however, relates 'critique' to the other, less scholarly meaning of 'critical' as simply expressing adverse or disapproving comments or judgements.

[4] This would appear to be the objective of Mandela's soul-mate as well. The choice of the word 'disarm' — deprive of the power to hurt — betrays the authors' interest in the power relation between the hero and his fans.

[5] Martin's focus on heroes (and on positive "critiques", and on communities of admiring fans) can be explained by his ideological orientation as a disciplinarian, rather than a libertarian.  Bertrand Russell explains the distinction in his History Of Western Philosophy (pp 21-2):

Throughout this long development, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them. With this difference, others have been associated. 

The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically. They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred. They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.

The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion. 

This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

[6] As should be clear from this clause, and the authors' likening of Jim Martin to Nelson Mandela, this section of Martin & Rose's text is merely an exercise in managing the readers' perception of the authors.

If this critique of Martin & Rose (2007) has taken a bizarre and personal turn at this point, it is because the text under discussion has itself taken a bizarre and personal turn at this point.  See also Rose as a semiotic reincarnation of Benjamin Whorf.