Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Behavioural Surges Of Mental Desideration

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):

(5) Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather than realis).

realis      the boy liked the present
irrealis   the boy wanted the present 

Irrealis affect seems always to be directed at some external agency, and so can be outlined as in Table 2.7 (setting aside parameter 3 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the distinction between emotive (liked) and desiderative (wanted) mental processes.  (The ir/realis distinction is not an interpersonal distinction.)

[2] This is manifestly untrue in terms of both agency, as demonstrated by the authors' own example: the boy wanted the present, and externality, as demonstrated by the boy wanted to feel safe.

[3] There are two main theoretical inconsistencies in Table 2.7.

In presenting behavioural processes manifesting emotion (tremble, shudder, cower) as behavioural surges of desideration (fear), and qualities of emotion as dispositions of desideration, it confuses 'fear' as emotion with 'fear' as desideration.

In presenting verbal processes (suggest, request, implore) as behavioural surges of desideration (desire), it confuses verbal processes with mental processes.  To be clear, affect is the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.