Misconstruing The Relation Between Semogenesis And Language As Projection

 Martin & Rose (2007: 320-21):

Along these lines, configuring language, register and genre as system amounts to mapping the reservoir of meanings available to interlocutors within discourse formations. Systems of language, register and genre are immanent as a result of the meanings that have been or could have been made by interlocutors in the past and are still relevant. Of these meanings, repertoires are distributed across subjects according to their socialisation. And of these meanings, arrays of choices are negotiated through unfolding text. This notion of time giving value to meaning is outlined in Figure 9.8. … Halliday’s (1994) ⍺ ’ꞵ notation for the projecting relation between clauses has been borrowed to represent the idea of time giving value to meaning. This represents one of the senses in which history (i.e. semogenesis) gives meaning to synchronic (albeit always changing) semiosis, since where we are in all three kinds of time is what sets the relevant valeur — the ways in which meanings are opposed to one another and thus have value in the system.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'along these lines' refers to the authors' (quite bizarre) misunderstanding that semogenesis projects "language, register and genre"; see the clarifying critiques in the immediately preceding post.

[2] To be clear, this purports to characterise the authors' misunderstanding that phylogenesis projects "language, register and genre" (Figure 9.8). Instead, it identifies the authors' misunderstanding of phylogenesis with their misunderstanding of language — more specifically: it decodes their misunderstanding of language by reference to their misunderstanding of phylogenesis:

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands the meaning of the term 'immanent' in linguistics, where it refers to the epistemological assumption that meaning is 'something that is constructed in, and so is part of, language itself' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 416).

[4] To be clear, this purports to characterise the authors' misunderstanding that ontogenesis projects "language, register and genre" (Figure 9.8). Instead, it merely makes the observation that the ontogenesis of meaning varies according to social factors.

[5] To be clear, this purports to characterise the authors' misunderstanding that logogenesis projects "language, register and genre" (Figure 9.8). Instead, it misconstrues the instantiation of potential in text (logogenesis) as the negotiation of meaning in text (Martin's interpersonal discourse semantics).

[6] To be clear, this purports to characterise the authors' general misunderstanding that semogenesis projects "language, register and genre" (Figure 9.8). Instead, it confuses the process of semogenesis with the temporal dimension along which the process unfolds, and misconstrues the temporal dimension as assigning "value" to meaning ("language, register and genre"):

[7] Trivially, it is not where we are in time that sets the "relevant valeur". Time is the dimension along which the logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis of the system of meaning contrasts unfolds.

[8] As the gloss of 'projection' as 'means' in Figure 9.8 demonstrates, Martin & Rose confuse projection with verbal (and identifying) Processes.

Seriously Misunderstanding Projection

Martin & Rose (2007: 319-20):

In Chapters 2 and 3 we described how processes of saying and sensing can project locutions (what is said) or ideas (what is sensed), and also attribute the source of saying or sensing, as well as locating it in time. So if we say Bakhtin argued that creativity depends on mastery of the genre, then the projecting clause Bakhtin argued:

• projects the locution that creativity depends on mastery of the genre, through the process argue
• places the saying in the past (argued) with respect to if we say
• sources the locution to Bakhtin.

The projecting clause in other words provides a frame for interpreting its projection. By analogy, we can argue that genesis projects language, register and genre by conditioning the semantic oppositions that hold sway at one or another point of time, with respect to the unfolding of a text, with respect to interlocutors’ subjectivities and with respect to the meanings at risk in the relevant discourse formations. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, the logico-semantic relation of projection does not feature in the authors' model of logical discourse semantics: conjunction. This is because Martin's model derives from Halliday & Hasan (1976), where conjunction is a non-structural (cohesive) relation, and projection is not a cohesive relation.

[2] To be clear, this misunderstanding seriously misrepresents projection. The projecting clause construes the first-order symbolic processing that brings the second-order projected clause into symbolic existence; see, e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 110, 129). Importantly, only mental and verbal processes project, and projection is a relation between two different orders of experience.

[3] To be clear, this analogy seriously misunderstands semogenesis and projection. Logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis do not project language — and register and genre are (varieties) of language, not distinct from it. Instead, mental and verbal processes project the content plane of language. In contrast, logogenesis is the instantiation of the linguistic system in text, ontogenesis is the development of the linguistic system — not just "interlocutors' social subjectivities" — in the individual, and phylogenesis is the evolution of the linguistic system — not just "discourse formations" — in the species.

Reductive Glosses Of Semogenesis

Martin & Rose (2007: 319):

Read from the perspective of critical theory, phylogenesis might be glossed in terms of a concern with the evolution of discourse formations (as explored in Fairclough (1995)), ontogenesis with the development of social subjectivities (e.g. Walkerdine and Lucey (1989)) and logogenesis with the de/naturalisation of reading positions (e.g. Cranny-Francis (1996)). Glossing with respect to Bernstein (1996), phylogenesis is concerned with changes in a culture’s reservoir of meanings, ontogenesis with the development of individual repertoires (i.e. coding orientations); logogenesis is concerned with what in SFL is referred to as the instantiation of system in text (or 'process’ for a more dynamic perspective). These perspectives are illustrated in Figure 9.7.

 Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'phylogenesis' refers to the evolution of the system in the species, 'ontogenesis' refers to the development of the system in the individual, and 'logogenesis' refers to the instantiation of the system in the text (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 17-8).

[1] This reduces (the phylogenesis of) language to (the phylogenesis of) an aspect of the semantic stratum of language.

[Foucault's] term discursive formation identifies and describes written and spoken statements with semantic relations that produce discourses.

[2] This reduces (the ontogenesis of) language to (the ontogenesis of) one metafunction: the interpersonal enactment of intersubjective relations.

[3] This confuses the logogenesis of texts with critiques of the meanings of texts.

[4] To be clear, this wording invites the confusion of language with culture that pervades the work of Martin & Rose (e.g. confusing language variants, register and genre, with culture).

[5] This reduces (the ontogenesis of) language to (the ontogenesis of) socially-correlated variants.

[6] To be clear, the instantiation of the system is a dynamic process.

Misunderstanding Semogenesis, Confusing Culture With Language, And Confusing Social With Sociosemiotic

Martin & Rose (2007: 318):

In a model of this kind, phylogenesis provides the environment for ontogenesis which in turn provides the environment for logogenesis. In other words, where a culture has arrived in its evolution provides the social context for the linguistic development of the individual, and the point an individual is at in their development provides resources for the instantiation of unfolding texts, illustrated in Figure 9.6. 

Conversely, logogenesis provides the material (i.e. semiotic goods) for ontogenesis, which in turn provides the material for phylogenesis; in other words, texts provide the means through which individuals interact to learn the system. And it is through the heteroglossic aggregation of individual systems (that are always already social systems), through the changing voices of us all, that the semiotic trajectory of a culture evolves. Language change in this model is read in terms of an expanding meaning potential, a key feature of semiotic systems as they adapt to new discursive and material environments.

 
Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a restatement of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18):

[2] To be clear, this misunderstands the previous sentence (Halliday's model), once again confusing culture with language. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18) explain:

Following the downward arrow, the system of the language (the meaning potential of the species) provides the environment in which the individual's meaning emerges;

[3] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18) add the missing elements from the authors' gloss:

… the meaning potential of the individual provides the environment within which the meaning of the text emerges.

[4] To be clear, ontogenesis is the coming into being of the meaning potential of the individual; that is, the coming into being of the individual as meaner. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18):

the individual's (transfinite) meaning potential is constructed out of (finite) instances of text;

[5] To be clear, this confuses two misunderstandings. On the one hand, yet again Martin & Rose confuse language with culture: the model is concerned with the phylogenesis of language. On the other hand, phylogenesis is fed by the instances of meaners, not by "the aggregation of individual systems", since systems are potential, not actual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18):

the (transfinite) meaning potential of the species is constructed out of (finite) instances of individual 'meaners'.

[6] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse semiotic systems, of the subtype 'social', with social systems. In SFL Theory, social systems do not involve the exchange of symbolic value, and so are not semiotic systems. Social systems include those social insect colonies where the values exchanged, as through pheromones, are not symbolic. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" …. A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. … Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.

[7] Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 18):

These are the three major processes of semohistory, by which meanings are continually created, transmitted, recreated, extended and changed.

Seriously Misunderstanding Instantiation, Stratification, Ontogenesis & Phylogenesis

Martin & Rose (2007: 317-8, 333n):

The play of genres and their recontextualisations around issues draws attention to the crucial role of change in ideological analysis. For the distribution of power in a culture is never more than metastable; in order for power relations to remain stable over time, they must continually adapt to change: there has to be both inertia and change for life to carry on. Halliday and Matthiessen (Halliday 1992, 1993; Halliday and Matthiessen 1999) have developed a comprehensive outline of social semiotic change which is highly relevant here. For relatively short time frames such as that involved in the unfolding of a text, they suggest the term ‘logogenesis’ (the perspective we've been foregrounding in this book); for the longer time frame of the development of language in the individual, they use the term ‘ontogenesis' (Painter 1984, 1998); and for maximum time depth, ‘phylogenesis’ (as in Halliday’s reading of the history of scientific English in Halliday and Martin (1993)). A good example is Mandela’s Meaning of Freedom recount, which unfolds in a spiral texture that maps out his development as a political leader (ontogenesis) in the context of major cultural shifts in post-colonial history (phylogenesis). This trinocular framework is summarised as follows.

⁶ The term ‘instantiation’ refers to texts as instances of the semiotic system of a culture, i.e. the language system is instantiated in texts.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the authors' model, genres cannot be recontextualised, because genre is the highest level of context. That is, genre is a context without a context.

[2] To be clear, here the authors continue their previous confusion of power with ideology — the latter being neither defined nor exemplified.

[3] To be clear, Halliday's model is concerned with socio-semiotic systems; that is, semiotic systems that are social, as opposed to, for example, somatic. Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 18):

These are the three major processes of semohistory, by which meanings at continually created, transmitted, recreated, extended and changed. Each one provides the environment within which the 'next' takes place, in the order in which we have presented them; and, conversely, each one provides the material out of which the previous one is constructed: see Figure 1-6.

[4] To be clear, logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis refer specifically to semogenic processes, not to other processes whose duration coincides with these three time frames.

[5] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands the three semogenic processes, confusing them with the ideational content of a text. In this particular case, logogenesis describes the unfolding of Mandela's text; ontogenesis would describe the development of the languages, Xhosa and English, in Mandela himself; and phylogenesis would describe the evolution of Mandela's languages, Xhosa and English, in the human species.

[6] To be clear, this is potentially misleading. Ontogenesis is the development of a semiotic system in the individual, and phylogenesis is the evolution of a semiotic system in the species.

[7] To be clear, this misunderstands instantiation and stratification. Texts are instances of language, not culture. In SFL Theory, culture is modelled as a semiotic system that is realised by language. That is, culture and language are different levels of symbolic abstraction. An instance of the culture is a situation; that is, culture is instantiated as situations, not texts. The confusion of culture with language pervades Martin's model, as demonstrated by his modelling varieties of language, register/genre, as culture instead of language.

The Authors' Notion Of Register As A Resource For Generalising Across Genres

Martin & Rose (2007: 297-8):

As far as genre is concerned we can think of field, tenor and mode as resources for generalising across genres from the differentiated perspectives of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. 

In other words, taking tenor as an example, we need to take account of recurrent patterns of domination and deference as we move from one genre to another; we don’t want to have to stop and describe the same thing over and over again each time. 

Similarly for mode, the move from more concrete to more abstract metaphorical discourse takes place in explanations, expositions, historical recounts and reports (as we have seen); register allows us to generalise these shifts in abstraction as a resource that can be deployed in many genres.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is neither warranted by, nor consistent with, the authors' own model. Martin & Rose model their register (field, tenor and mode) and their genre as two levels of symbolic abstraction (strata) related by realisation. To understand the absurdity of the claim that a lower stratum generalises across a higher stratum, it is only necessary to consider other strata, such as phonology and lexicogrammar, where the claim would be that phonology "generalises across lexicogrammars".

The theoretical inconsistencies of the claim become multidimensional when considered in terms of SFL Theory, where

• 'context' refers to the culture — not varieties of language — as a semiotic system,
• 'register' and 'genre' (text type) refer to varieties of language, not context, and to different perspectives on the same point on the cline of instantiation, with 'register' the view from the system pole, and 'text type' the view from the instance pole.

[2] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the interpersonal dimension of context, tenor, with the interpersonal meanings of language ("recurrent patterns of domination and deference") that realise a given set of tenor features.

[3] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, any "recurrent patterns" of meaning across text types (genres) are modelled as a move up the cline of instantiation from text type towards the system pole, since these are patterns of instantiation that are common to different text types.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the textual dimension of context, mode, with the language ("abstract metaphorical discourse") that realises a given set of mode features.

[5] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, "the move" that "takes place" — "shift in abstraction" — is a change in the pattern of instantiation during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[6] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, these are modelled in terms of mode, whereas for Martin & Rose, they are categories (purposes) of genre. Given that the authors treat mode as a dimension of register, treating them as genre creates a theoretical inconsistency within their own model.

[7] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the potential ("resource") of moving from instantiating congruent wordings to instantiating metaphorical wordings during the logogenesis of text is a property of the language system itself.

On this basis, in terms of SFL Theory, the notion that register "allows us to generalise" this process "as a resource that can be deployed in many genres" is, at best, nonsensical.

Problems With The Notion That Field Unfolds Through Genre

Martin & Rose (2007: 261-2):

Having established the genres we are working with, our next step in analysis is to interpret how the field unfolds through each genre. One reason we start with the field is that the steps in which it unfolds are readily accessible to conscious reflection. This can be illustrated by asking people to retell a text they have heard or read; they will rarely repeat its language features, but will typically summarise its sequence of phases. As analysts, the things we are interested in include the ideational language resources that construe the unfolding field, the interpersonal resources which evaluate it from phase to phase, and the textual resources that present each phase as a pulse of information. First identifying phases from the perspective of genre and field can provide a useful scaffold for us to identify other less obvious discourse patterns.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, there are two serious misunderstandings here.  Firstly, it is a text that unfolds, not a text type (genre). This is because the unfolding of text, logogenesis, occurs at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation (text), not at a point of variation halfway up the cline (text type/genre).

Secondly, 'field' refers to the ideational dimension of context, the culture as semiotic system, not to the ideational dimension of language. It is the ideational dimension of language that unfolds through the instantiation of text, not the ideational dimension of context, since text is an instance of language, not context. In short, the authors here confuse ideational semantics with ideational culture (field). For evidence that Martin (1992) routinely misunderstands the SFL notion of field, see the clarifying critiques here.

In terms of the authors' own model, the claim is that the ideational dimension of register, field, unfolds at a level of symbolic abstraction (stratum) above register, genre. This is analogous to claiming that a metafunctional dimension of phonology unfolds through lexicogrammar. That is, Martin & Rose confuse a stratal relation (between genre and register) with logogenesis (unfolding of text).

[2] As this demonstrates, what Martin & Rose regard as 'field' is actually the ideational meaning of language itself.

[3] There are multiple confused misunderstandings here. Firstly, as a dimension of context, field is construed by all of language, not just by its ideational resources. This is because 'construal', in SFL Theory, means the assignment of an intensive identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction — in this case: between the semantics and context — irrespective of metafunction. For example, the field of science is construed by propositions, interpersonal meaning, whose validity is contested by scientists.

Secondly, the interpersonal resources of language do not evaluate field, because language and field are different levels of symbolic abstraction (strata). An analogous claim would be that interpersonal phonology (lower stratum) evaluates ideational grammar (higher stratum).

[4] To be clear, the reason why Martin & Rose suggest identifying phases from the perspective of genre and field, is that, in terms of SFL Theory

• their phases are ideational semantic units,
• their genres are identified by ideational semantic units (stages),
• their field is ideational semantics misconstrued as field (their register).

Confusing Structure With Instantiation

Martin & Rose (2007: 199):

As analysts, we tend to treat texts as objects, and reify the structure that in fact unfolds as spoken or written discourse is produced. So it is important to keep in mind that the periodicity we are discussing here is an unfolding process, not a rigid structure linking parts to wholes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this follows Martin (1992) in confusing structure with instantiation; evidence here. In SFL Theory, structure is the relation between elements on the syntagmatic axis, whereas the unfolding of discourse is the logogenesis of text through the instantiation of potential. But see [2] below.

[2] To be clear, as far as (lowest level) Theme and New is concerned, this is accidentally true. This is because, unknown to Martin & Rose, the process of selecting Themes and News forms not structures, but patterns of instantiation in the logogenesis of text.

[3] To be clear, Martin & Rose have not presented any structures; they have merely presented single elements — (macro- & micro-) Theme and New — as if they were structures. There has been no account of the complementary elements — (macro- & micro-) Rheme and Given — with which they would form structures.

[4] To be clear, this confuses constituency (part-whole relations) with structure (part-part relations). In SFL Theory, constituency is modelled as a rank scale: a clause consists of groups ± phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes, whereas structure is modelled as the relations between functional elements at each of these ranks: Theme to Rheme, Senser to Process to Phenomenon, etc.

Indeterminate Participant Tracking

Martin & Rose (2007: 177):

Another place where the story sends out mixed signals has to do with tracking Helena’s second love and his special forces friends. In the passage below, we can’t be completely sure whether they (in they stayed over) includes her second love or not. If her second love is living with her, presumably not; but if he’s away living with his team, probably so. Helena hasn’t made it clear whether moving to a special unit also meant moving away from home:

Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. 'We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now.' We were ecstatic. We even celebrated. He and his friends would visit regularly.
They even stayed over for long periods. 
Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless.

As the text unfolds it seems clear that they includes her second love, since he obviously takes off on trips with his team; and from this we might conclude that he has in fact moved away from home after promotion just like her first love:

Then he says:
He and three of our friends have been promoted.
'We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling.
We are real policemen now.' We were ecstatic. We even celebrated.
He and his friends would visit regularly.
They even stayed over for long periods.
Suddenly, at strange times,
they would become restless.
Ø Abruptly mutter the feared word 'trip'
and Ø drive off.
I ... as a loved one.. .knew no other life than that of worry, sleeplessness, anxiety about his safety and where they could be.

So at one point we can’t be sure; but looking back we feel more confident. This kind of tension shows us that participant tracking is a dynamic device that’s very sensitive to just where we are as a discourse unfolds. In analysis it’s important not to lose sight of indeterminacy that eventually gets resolved because we can look backwards, carefully, taking as much time as we like, and with hindsight weigh up the evidence and make sense of the meaning overall. The ways in which meaning accumulates in discourse is just as significant as what we finally decide a discourse meant. Reading opens; readings close.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the text. To be clear, we can be sure that they (even stayed…) refers anaphorically to he and his friends, because, given that both Helena's lover and his friends visit, it follows that these visitors are the ones that 'stay over'.

[2] To be clear, any indeterminacy in resolving a referent is evidence against the claim that the function of reference is to track participants, since indeterminacy undermines the effectiveness of the tracking.

[3] To be clear, the accumulation of meaning in the unfolding of text, logogenesis, is the instantial system of that text. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ):

It is helpful to have a term for this general phenomenon – i.e. the creation of meaning in the course of the unfolding of text. We shall call it logogenesis, with ‘logos’ in its original sense of ‘discourse’. Since logogenesis is the creation of meaning in the course of the unfolding of a text, it is concerned with patterns that appear gradually in the course of this unfolding; …. We shall refer to the version of the system created in the course of the unfolding of a text as an instantial system since it represents a distillation of patterns at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

[4] Inanity opens, inanities close.