Seriously Misunderstanding The Cline Of Instantiation

Martin & Rose (2007: 310, 333n):

Halliday’s … cline of instantiation includes system (the generalised meaning potential of a language), register (sub-potentials of meaning characterised as registers and genres), text type⁴ (generalised instances, a set of texts that actualise the potential of the system), and finally text (the meanings actually afforded by an instance). And we could add at the end of the cline reading (the meaning taken from a text according to the subjectivity of the reader):

⁴ Halliday and Matthiessen in fact discuss registers as sub-potentials in relation to system, and text types as super-potentials in relation to text, at the same level of generality along the cline; we’ve taken the liberty of adding a rung here by making text type more specific than register.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the cline of instantiation does not just apply to language, but to context as well. The poles of the cline and its intermediate point of variation is given by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20) as

potential ~ subpotential/ instance type ~ instance

Applying the cline of instantiation to the SFL stratification hierarchy yields the following matrix: 

Applying the cline of instantiation to Martin's stratification hierarchy exposes its inconsistency with SFL Theory:

In Martin's model, sub-systems and instance types of language, registers and genres (text types) are misconstrued as systems of context. Moreover, Martin regards instances of his context as texts, despite the fact that texts are instances of language, not context. And of course, what would constitute sub-systems/instances types of genre and register is not explored in this work or in Martin (1992).

[2] This misrepresents Halliday's model. To be clear, genres are not sub-potentials of meaning, but instance types of meaning and wording. That is, genres are registers viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a text type (genre) is not "generalised instances" but a type of which some instances are members on the basis of shared patterns of instantiation.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, texts are not "the meanings actually afforded by an instance", but the meanings and wordings of the system that are instantiated (selected) during logogenesis.

[5] This is a serious misunderstanding of the cline of instantiation. A reading of a text is an interpretation of an instance, not an instantiation of it.

[6] This misrepresents Halliday & Matthiessen. Text type is the view of of register from the instance pole, but in characterising text type in terms of potential, the authors have instead viewed it from the system pole. That is, Martin & Rose do not understand the difference between viewing from the system and instance poles.

[7] To be clear, Martin & Rose misunderstand the cline of instantiation as a scale from general to specific, as if it were a scale of delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 14):

Note that it is important to keep delicacy and instantiation distinct. In early work on semantic networks, they were sometimes neutralised. The difference is essentially that between being a type of x (delicacy) and being a token of x (instantiation). Both may be construed by intensive ascription.

[8] To be clear, this "liberty" has not been supported by argument. Moreover, it is a misunderstanding that derives from not understanding the different polar perspectives on the cline of instantiation, as demonstrated in [6] above.

Misconstruing The Distinction Between Logical Complexing And Textual Cohesion As The Distinction Between External And Internal Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 115):

Section 4.1 outlines four general dimensions of conjunction: the difference between conjunctions that relate activities and those that organise texts; the role of conjunctions in what we expect to happen in a text; the four main types of conjunction (adding, comparing, time and consequence); and three types of dependency between clauses (paratactic, hypotactic and cohesive).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, "conjunctions that relate activities" are 'external' conjunctions, whether they do so logically and structurally (in clause complexes) or textually and non-structurally (cohesive relations between messages).  On the other hand, "conjunctions that organise texts" are those that function textually and non-structurally — not logically and structurally — whether externally (relating experiential functions) or internally (relating interpersonal functions).

In other words, in this chapter, Martin & Rose misconstrue the distinction between logical structure and textual cohesion as the distinction between external and internal expansion relations.

[2] To be clear, "what we expect to happen in a text" is concerned with the mental projections of readers, whereas text analysis is concerned with the verbal projections of speakers.

[3] To be clear, in the original textual grammatical model (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 242-3) that Martin & Rose here rebrand as logical discourse semantics, the main types of conjunctive relation were identified as:

• additive
• adversative
• causal
• temporal

However, these were later reinterpreted (Halliday 1985) as more delicate types within the three most general types of expansion — elaboration, extension and enhancement — that are manifested throughout the grammar.  In these terms, the authors'

• 'adding' is a subtype of extension, whereas
• 'comparing', 'time' and 'consequence' are all subtypes of enhancement.

Moreover, Martin & Rose, just like the source of "their" ideas, Halliday & Hasan, omit all types of elaboration (and projection) from their model.

[4] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue non-structural cohesive relations as a type of structural (inter)dependency relation.

The Discourse Semantic System Of Nuclear Relations In The Clause

Martin & Rose (2007: 95-6):

These four degrees of nuclearity are then set out as a system in Figure 3.13.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this entire discussion of nuclear relations confuses degrees of nuclearity of clause elements with the clause elements being related by degrees, and rebrands the grammatical confusion as Martin's  discourse semantics.

Moreover, the terminology, which uses synonyms for different degrees on the scale, names the model in terms of one of the intermediate degrees on the scale, the nucleus, instead of the central element to which all are said to be related.

[2] Contrary to SFL principles, this experiential system at the level of discourse semantics has no entry condition and no realisation statements that specify either discourse semantic structures or grammatical realisations.

More importantly, it presents the degrees of nuclearity as alternatives, such that only one can be chosen.  That is, the "discourse semantic" choices are clauses with either a central element or a nuclear element or a marginal element or a peripheral element.

Moreover, for each of these four options, only one clause function can be selected:

• either Process or Range, but not both, or
• either Medium or Range, but not both, or
• either Agent or Beneficiary, but not both, or
• either inner or outer circumstance, but not both.

This severely restricts the range of clauses that can be instantiated at the level of discourse semantics, to say the least.

In short, in Figure 3.13, Martin & Rose misrepresent a hyponymic taxonomy of their misunderstood theoretical categories as a system network that constitutes the discourse semantic choices available to language users.

Misunderstanding The Basis Of Nuclearity

Martin & Rose (2007: 92):

The Medium may be affected by the process, but the Agent is left implicit, as in I’m going to be haunted, amnesty was refused. As Agent and Beneficiary may be left out of the clause, they are relatively marginal in terms of nuclear relations. 

How do these grammatical functions interact with the lexical elements that instantiate them in particular texts?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the ergative model, the Medium is participant through which the Process is actualised; on the transitive model, in contrast, the Goal is the participant that is impacted by the Process.

[2] To be clear, the clause amnesty was refused is middle (medio-receptive), not effective.  That is, the clause lacks the feature [agency], so it does not feature an Agent, implicit or otherwise.

amnesty	was refused	by the Commission
Range	Process	Medium

[3] This seriously misunderstands nuclearity.  Agent and Beneficiary, as participants, are "marginal" in the sense of their participation in the Process, not because they can be left out.  The problems with 'omittability' as a criterion include:

• the omission of a participant serves a textual function, not an experiential function; and
• even the most nuclear participant, the Medium, can be omitted, as demonstrated by the medio-receptive clauses such as amnesty was refused, you were seen!  What was said?

It will be seen later that Martin & Rose contradict their own principle by interpreting 'Range: process' — e.g. a song in he sang (a song) — as central, despite the fact that it can be omitted.

[4] The notion of grammatical functions interacting with lexical items betrays the Martin's (1992) misunderstanding of the dimensions of SFL theory as the interaction of modules; see the clarifying critiques here.

To be clear, the relation between grammatical functions and lexical items involves both delicacy and realisation, since each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate features of lexicogrammatical systems.

[5] The notion of lexical items instantiating grammatical function confuses instantiation — the relation between potential and instance — with delicacy (and realisation), as explained above in [4].

∞

Importantly, none of this is

1. discourse semantic,
2. beyond the clause, or 
3. the authors' original theorising.

Confusing Contextual Field With Field-Specific Ideational Semantics

Martin & Rose (2007: 80):

Relations between classes and members, and between parts and wholes, make up two types of taxonomies by which we construe fields of experience. People, things and places belong to more general classes of entities, and at the same time they are parts of larger wholes, and are composed of smaller parts. These are known as classifying and compositional taxonomies respectively. Both hierarchies may have many layers, particularly in technical fields, for example (classifying) kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species, sub-species and (composing) ecosystem, food-chain, organism, organ system, organ, tissue, cell, organelle, metabolism…  Processes can also be viewed as instances of more general types, or as parts of larger activities, but their taxonomies are not as multi-layered as for people, things and places.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the SFL model, we construe experience as ideational meaning.  Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context: the culture as a semiotic system.  Field does not refer to the ideational dimension of language.  Following Martin (1992), Martin & Rose confuse contextual field with the semantic counterpart of a field: a domain; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 322-3).  The theoretical inconsistency is one of stratification (levels of symbolic abstraction).

[2] This confuses a type of circumstance ('places') with types of participant ('people, things').  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 54):

Participants are inherent in the process; they bring about its occurrence or mediate it. There are a number of specific ways in which a participant may take part in a process; it may act out the process, it may sense it, it may receive it, it may be affected by it, it may say it, and so on. The different configurations of participants are the bases for a typology of process types. The distinction between participants and circumstances is a cline rather than a sharp division, but it is semantically quite significant. 

Circumstances are typically less closely associated with the process and are usually not inherent in it. They specify the spatial or temporal location of the process, its extent in space or time (distance or duration), its cause, the manner of its occurrence, and so on.

[3] Trivially, metabolism is not a part of a organelle (e.g. mitochondrion).  'Metabolism' refers to the chemical processes that occur within a living organism in order to maintain life. 

[4] This confuses two distinct types of class membership: delicacy ('general') and instantiation ('instance'); see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145).

Construing A Lover As "An Organism Composed Of Parts"

Martin & Rose (2007: 79-80):

In the ‘repercussions’ phase of the second Incident in her story, Helena construes her second love as a tortured organism composed of various parts, including his anatomy and physiology, and his soul, highlighted below.

Sometimes he would just press his face into his hands and shake uncontrollably. I realised he was drinking too much. Instead of resting at night, he would wander from window to window. He tried to hide his wild consuming fear, but I saw it. In the early hours of the morning between two and half-past-two, I jolt awake from his rushed breathing. Rolls this way, that side of the bed. He's pale. Ice cold in a sweltering night - sopping wet with sweat. Eyes bewildered, but dull like the dead. And the shakes. The terrible convulsions and blood-curdling shrieks of fear and pain from the bottom of his soul. Sometimes he sits motionless, just staring in front of him. 1 never understood. I never knew. Never realised what was being shoved down his throat during the 'trips', I just went through hell. Praying, pleading: 'God, what's happening? What's wrong with him? Could he have changed so much? Is he going mad? I can't handle the man anymore!

We will refer to the relation between one part of a whole and the next as a co-part relation. The parts of Helena’s man are analysed as a lexical string in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Parts of Helena's second love
the man
part
his face
co-part
his hands
co-part
eyes
co-part
the bottom of his soul
co-part
his throat

In contrast to the classifying taxonomy in Figure 3.4 above, these parts of the man together make up a compositional taxonomy, consisting of wholes and their parts and sub-parts, which we can express as a tree diagram in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 Parts of Helena's second love

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin & Rose's absurd — though highly amusing — claim, that the author is construing her lover as an organism composed of parts, arises from their re-interpreting the textual system of lexical cohesion at the level of lexicogrammar (Halliday & Hasan 1976) as an experiential system at the level of discourse.  The theoretical inconsistency is primarily one of metafunction.

In the original work that provides the source for these ideas — unacknowledged by Martin & Rose — meronymic relations between lexical items help to create the texture that differentiates a unified text from a collection of unrelated instances.

[2] To be clear, a lexical string is a string of lexical items, not of nominal groups; that is, here Martin & Rose confuse lexis with grammar.  Moreover, lexical items, as the term suggests, are located at the level of lexicogrammar, not discourse semantics.  In this latter case, the theoretical inconsistency is one of stratification (levels of symbolic abstraction).

Activity Sequences: A Cornucopia Of Theoretical Inconsistencies

Martin & Rose (2007: 75-6):

We can identify three sets of lexical relations. … 

The third is the sequence of activities construed by clauses as a text unfolds. These are the relations from one process to the next that imply a series of steps, such as meeting - beginning relationship - marriage. As they construe the field of a text as unfolding in series of activities, these relations are known as activity sequences.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents lexicogrammar as discourse semantics.  To be clear, lexical relations are relations between lexical items, and lexical items are the synthetic realisations of feature combinations at the level of lexicogrammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 199).  The theoretical inconsistency is in terms of stratification.

[2] There are many inconsistencies here, five of which can be identified as follows.

Firstly, the notion of activity sequences as discourse semantic is inconsistent with the informing text, Martin (1992), where they are theorised as field, ideational context, where context is misunderstood as register.  For some of the problems with the theorising of activity sequences in Martin (1992), see here.

Secondly, the notion of activity sequences as experiential is inconsistent in terms of metafunction. As will be seen, relations between activities are not experiential relations, but a confusion of logical relations between clauses in complexes, on the one hand, and textual relations of cohesive conjunction, on the other.

Thirdly, the notion of activity sequences as lexical relations is inconsistent in terms of delicacy.  From the perspective of lexicogrammar, relations between activities are not lexical relations — relations between lexical items — but grammatical relations, whether structural or cohesive.

Fourthly, the relocation of activity sequences here to discourse semantics creates a further inconsistency, within the discourse semantic model, since relations between activities in sequences are also modelled in terms of the logical system of conjunction — itself a confusion of clause complexing and cohesive conjunction.  Martin & Rose (2007: 115):

Conjunction looks at interconnections between processes — adding, comparing, sequencing, or explaining them. These are logical meanings that link activities and messages in sequences.

Fifthly, as the previous four inconsistencies suggest, the modelling of activity sequences is also inconsistent with SFL theory, where the semantic counterparts of clauses, figures, are related logically in sequences; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104-27).

[3] This confuses levels of symbolic abstraction, mistaking an instance of language (relations between processes) for an instance of the culture (field) that the language realises.

Rebranding Halliday's Clause Nuclearity As Their Own Nuclear Relations

Martin & Rose (2007: 75-6):

We can identify three sets of lexical relations. …
The second is the configurations of elements within each clause. These include relations between people and things and the process they are involved in, and the places and qualities associated with the process, for example the configuration of two people and a process when Helena’s romance starts: Helena - meet - young man. As they are more or less central to the unfolding of the process, as in Figure 3.1, these are known as nuclear relations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents lexicogrammar as discourse semantics.  To be clear, lexical relations are relations between lexical items, and lexical items are the synthetic realisations of feature combinations at the level of lexicogrammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 199).  The theoretical inconsistency is in terms of stratification.

[2] To be clear, 'the configuration of elements within each clause' involves grammatical relations, not lexical relations, which obtain at the level of lexicogrammar, not discourse semantics.  The theoretical inconsistencies are thus twofold: in terms of delicacy and stratification.

[3] This is misleading.  These relations are those of clause nuclearity (Halliday 1985, 1994).  In not acknowledging the source of this work, Martin & Rose falsely present it as their own.

plagiarism (noun)

the practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own. 

synonyms: copying, infringement of copyright, piracy, theft, stealing, poaching, appropriation;

See also Jim Martin "Honouring" The Late Ruqaiya Hasan where Martin falsely accused the late Ruqaiya Hasan of plagiarism at a symposium organised to honour her.

On 'Better' And 'Best' As "Grammatical Items"

 Martin & Rose (2007: 44):

Next let’s examine vocabulary items that include degrees of intensity, such as happy/delighted/ecstatic. These kinds of words are known as attitudinal lexis, i.e. ‘lexis with attitude’. The intensifiers we have already looked at, like better/best, all/several/some, must/would/might, are grammatical items. That is their meaning depends on being combined with 'content words’. By contrast, ‘content words’ are referred to technically as lexical items, or simply lexis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The words 'better' and 'best' are not "grammatical items"; they combine the lexical features of 'good' with the grammatical features 'comparative' and 'superlative', respectively.

[2] This does not distinguish "grammatical items" from lexical items, since, in both cases, the meaning realised depends on the structural configuration in which they function.

"Grammatical items" are specified by the features of the closed and less delicate systems of the lexicogrammar, whereas lexical items form open sets and are specified by the features of the most delicate systems of the lexicogrammar.  Halliday (2008: 67, 174):

[…] you can, as expected, network through the grammar into the lexis; but what you end up with are not lexical items but lexical features. The lexical item will appear, but it will appear as a conjunct realisation of a number of these terminal features. The features are thus components of the lexical items, but the description differs from a usual componential analysis in two important respects. In the first place, the components are systemic: they are organised in sets of systemic options; and in the second place, more significantly, they are derived by ordered steps in delicacy all the way from the primary grammatical categories. …

The notion of grammaticalisation depends on the notion of a closed system. This has the properties:

1. a small fixed set of possibilities, x/y/z…, which are
2. mutually exclusive, x = “not y or z”, and
3. strictly proportional, x : y : z, is constant, with
4. a defined condition of entry, eg nominal group, and
5. generalised to a large domain of application, eg every major clause …

Lexical items, by contrast, form open sets; they are particular to certain domains, but open-ended and not so mutually defining: you can add a new lexical item to a set without perturbing the other members, whereas with a closed system if any term is added or taken away all the others move around.