The Notion That Text Phases Are Sensitive To Genre And Field

Martin & Rose (2007: 262):

As we introduced in Chapter 1, text phases are sensitive to both genre and field: while the stages of a genre unfold in a highly predictable sequence, the phases within each stage are partly predictable from the genre, and partly from its construal of a particular field of activities and entities. Stories, for example, unfold through phases such as settings, problems, people’s reactions, descriptions, solutions to problems, author’s comments and participants’ reflections on the significance of the events. Orators and authors use such phases in highly variable combinations, as the basic building blocks of stories, as we saw for Helena’s story. The phases of recounts are often a series of episodes, and in biographical recounts these episodes correspond to the person’s life stages. In argument genres, phases may include grounds and conclusions, as we saw for Tutu’s exposition, as well as evidence, examples and so on. In the Act we found phases such as purposes, motivations, provisions and definitions. In reports, each phase will tend to describe an element or aspect of the phenomenon under focus. These may include phases such as appearance, behaviour, location, types, parts and so on, depending on the particular type of report and its particular field. We have not attempted an exhaustive study of phase types in this book, as genres are not our primary focus (but see Martin and Rose 20076, and Rose 20076 for discussion of phases in various genres). It is an area of considerable variation that is wide open to further research; the tools we present here will help the analyst to develop this research.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the authors' 'genre' — misunderstood as a stratum of context — refers to text types that vary in their ideational semantic structures (stages), while the authors' 'field' is ideational semantics, misunderstood as context, misunderstood as register. Phases, on this model, are ideational subcomponents of stages; see [2].

In claiming that text phases vary according to genre and field, what Martin & Rose are actually saying is that the ideational subcomponents of stages vary according to the ideational stages and the ideational meaning of the text type.

[2] As can be seen from this inventory of text phases, all are ideationally defined units, which locates them theoretically within ideational semantics.

[3] To be clear, as demonstrated above and previously, developing this research is not developing research that is consistent with SFL Theory, the theory in which it is purported to be located.

The Global Purpose Of A Genre

Martin & Rose (2007: 261, 345):

Crucially all texts have more than one purpose, and for this reason they will include elements that we would expect to find in other genres. But all texts also have a global defining purpose, and it is this global purpose that predicts the stages the text will go through to achieve this goal, i.e. its genre. Its additional purposes are realised below the level of generic stages, in the variable phases of meaning within each stage, and within the messages that make up each phase. Identifying the genre of a text sometimes involves some shunting up and down, from identifying its global purpose, to analysing its stages and phases, and back up again to its purpose. As with other features of language, a first glance is often not sufficient to identify a genre. A useful guide is the table of genres, their purposes and stages, presented as an Appendix to this book.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, text types (genres) differ by their patterns of instantiation; that is by different frequencies of feature selection in semantic and grammatical systems. Systemic Functional Linguistics gives priority to system over structure.

[2] This is the opposite of what is true. As Martin & Rose have just demonstrated — see the previous post — they use their stages of a text to identify ("predict") the genre of a text, and thus its global purpose. As Appendix A (above) demonstrates, the 'purpose' of a text is just a gloss of its genre classification. In SFL Theory, the purpose of a text is modelled as a dimension of mode. Halliday (2002 [1981]: 225):

Halliday has suggested (1975) that the “textual” properties of a text – the cohesive patterns and those of ‘functional sentence perspective’ – tend to be determined by the “mode”, the function ascribed to the text in the given context of situation, the purpose it is intended to achieve.

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose propose a 'generic' compositional scale of

• stage
• phase, and
• message.

Now, although these are clearly semantic units of language defined ideationally, Martin & Rose incongruously locate them two levels of symbolic abstraction above semantics, on their stratum of genre, which they define as context, not language.

On terminology, in Martin (1992: 325), 'message' is proposed as the unit for his logical discourse semantics, whereas in SFL Theory, 'message' refers to the textual semantic counterpart of the clause (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 88, 212).

[4] To be clear, there is no shunting between levels here. On the authors' own description, in order to identify the global purpose of a text (a gloss of its genre classification), it is necessary to analyse its stages; see [2] above.

Two Reasons Why Martin's Model Of Genre Is Inconsistent With SFL Theory

Martin & Rose (2007: 260-1):

We can be confident that these are the genres we are looking at by asking a few probing questions. 

First is the global structure one of activities unfolding in time, or of phenomena described out of time? This criterion distinguishes the first and third sections, which are sequenced in time, from the second section, which describes and reflects on the struggle and its protagonists, but is not sequenced in time. 

Secondly, is the sequence of activities about specific people and events or about generic participants? This distinguishes stories from explanations and histories in the natural and social sciences. 

Thirdly is the story structured around a major disruption to the course of events or does it simply recount a series of events? This distinguishes narratives, anecdotes and exemplums (which involve a significant disruption) from recounts (whose series of events may or may not be problematic). 

And finally is it a recount of events in an episode of experience, as in the first recount, or of stages in a person’s life, as in the last? These and other generic criteria are discussed in detail in Martin and Rose (20076).

Blogger Comments:

As these generic criteria demonstrate, Martin & Rose classify genres (text types) according to their ideational semantic structure. That is, the authors classify text types in terms of just one metafunction, the ideational, and by taking the view 'from below': structural realisation.

This is seriously inconsistent with SFL Theory on two counts. Firstly, the authors ignore the other two metafunctions, the interpersonal and textual, and secondly, the perspective taken in SFL Theory is 'from above': that is, in terms of what is being expressed, not in terms of the expression.

In SFL Theory, therefore, in terms of stratification, different text types (genres) realise different combinations of contextual features of field, tenor and mode (Hasan's 'contextual configurations'), and it is these contextual differences that account for the different patterns of instantiation, of linguistic systems, that distinguish one text type from another.

See also Jim Martin Misunderstanding SFL Methodology.

Misconstruing Genres As Units Of Discourse Structure

Martin & Rose (2007: 260):

The formatting of the chapter thus gives us three main units of discourse to work with (although we need to keep in mind that formatting reflects but does not determine discourse structure). Generically speaking, Inauguration Day is a recount, a genre that chronicles an episode of experience, Cost of Courage is a report, a genre for making generalised descriptions, and Meaning of Freedom is an autobiographical recount, a genre for chronicling the significant stages of the author’s life.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Martin & Rose claim that a text consists of genres (text types). In terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the semantic structure of a text ("units of discourse structure") with a point of variation on the cline of instantiation (text type).

In terms of the authors' own model, it posits categories of a contextual stratum outside language, genre, as structural units of the discourse semantic stratum within language — a stratum which is, moreover, two levels of symbolic abstraction below the genre stratum. The authors' model of stratification is given in Figure 9.2 (p309):

Serial Expansion

Martin & Rose (2007: 199):

The strategy of predicting phases of discourse with macroThemes and hyperThemes constructs a ‘hierarchy’ of periodicity of smaller units of discourse ‘scaffolded’ within larger units. But there are alternative ways of constructing unfolding discourse so it is sensible to the reader. One way to highlight this is to compare hierarchy with an alternative strategy for expanding text, which is the strategy Tutu uses to build up his argument. We can call this ‘serial expansion’. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, it is not possible to predict what follows introductory paragraphs (macroThemes) and topic sentences (hyperThemes), except with the benefit of hindsight. Instead, in writing that conforms with these pedagogical principles, these "Themes" are elaborated by what follows. That is, Martin & Rose have confused textual transitions (conjunctive relations) with textual statuses (thematic prominence).

[2] The unacknowledged source of the notion of a ‘hierarchy of periodicity' is Halliday (1981).

[3] To be clear, Martin & Rose have not identified the units of which these higher level Themes are elements, nor discussed their complementary elements: higher level Rhemes.

[4] To be clear, these 'alternative ways' are the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction: conjunction, reference, ellipsis-&-substitution, and lexical cohesion.

[5] As will be seen, this alternative strategy of 'serial expansion' is cohesive conjunction, the textual resource that Martin & Rose have already unwittingly drawn on in describing their higher level Themes and News (see [1] above).

Confusing Structure With Instantiation

Martin & Rose (2007: 199):

As analysts, we tend to treat texts as objects, and reify the structure that in fact unfolds as spoken or written discourse is produced. So it is important to keep in mind that the periodicity we are discussing here is an unfolding process, not a rigid structure linking parts to wholes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this follows Martin (1992) in confusing structure with instantiation; evidence here. In SFL Theory, structure is the relation between elements on the syntagmatic axis, whereas the unfolding of discourse is the logogenesis of text through the instantiation of potential. But see [2] below.

[2] To be clear, as far as (lowest level) Theme and New is concerned, this is accidentally true. This is because, unknown to Martin & Rose, the process of selecting Themes and News forms not structures, but patterns of instantiation in the logogenesis of text.

[3] To be clear, Martin & Rose have not presented any structures; they have merely presented single elements — (macro- & micro-) Theme and New — as if they were structures. There has been no account of the complementary elements — (macro- & micro-) Rheme and Given — with which they would form structures.

[4] To be clear, this confuses constituency (part-whole relations) with structure (part-part relations). In SFL Theory, constituency is modelled as a rank scale: a clause consists of groups ± phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes, whereas structure is modelled as the relations between functional elements at each of these ranks: Theme to Rheme, Senser to Process to Phenomenon, etc.

Confusing Different Strata, Different Metafunctions, And Different Grammatical Elements

Martin & Rose (2007: 119-20):

Like Tutu, Helena uses explicit conjunctions to signal the beginning of new phases in her story. But whereas Tutu uses them to organise his argument, Helena uses them to sequence the phases in time.

 

Helena uses the time conjunctions Then and After to connect each phase to the immediately preceding events, but the scope of finally is the story as a whole. During all the preceding events Helena didn’t understand the struggle, but now she finally does. 

The other resources Helena uses here to sequence the story in time are Circumstances - As an eighteen-year-old, one day, More than a year ago, After my unsuccessful marriage, After about three years with the special forces, Today. These Circumstances set the events in an exact time period, while time conjunctions simply indicate the sequence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this confuses different levels of description.  Although this is presented as discourse semantics, conjunctions are grammatical, the stratum below discourse semantics, and phases of story are, on the authors' model, genre, the stratum two levels above discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, the two instances of after in the extract are not conjunctions and do not function conjunctively, either logically within a clause complex, or textually as a cohesive relation.  Both are prepositions and function, experientially, as the minor Process — and interpersonally as the minor Predicator — of a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance of temporal Location.

[3] To be clear, this is (high school) reading comprehension, not (academic) linguistic analysis.

[4] To be clear, circumstances do not function logically or sequence a story in time.  Circumstances function experientially within a clause.  However, each of circumstances cited is also highlighted in the text as a marked Theme, and it is this textual logogenetic pattern of Theme selection (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 659ff) that works with the textual grammatical system of conjunctive cohesion — misunderstood by Martin & Rose as logical discourse semantics — in creating text.

Misconstruing The Distinction Between Logical Complexing And Textual Cohesion As The Distinction Between External And Internal Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 115):

Section 4.1 outlines four general dimensions of conjunction: the difference between conjunctions that relate activities and those that organise texts; the role of conjunctions in what we expect to happen in a text; the four main types of conjunction (adding, comparing, time and consequence); and three types of dependency between clauses (paratactic, hypotactic and cohesive).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, "conjunctions that relate activities" are 'external' conjunctions, whether they do so logically and structurally (in clause complexes) or textually and non-structurally (cohesive relations between messages).  On the other hand, "conjunctions that organise texts" are those that function textually and non-structurally — not logically and structurally — whether externally (relating experiential functions) or internally (relating interpersonal functions).

In other words, in this chapter, Martin & Rose misconstrue the distinction between logical structure and textual cohesion as the distinction between external and internal expansion relations.

[2] To be clear, "what we expect to happen in a text" is concerned with the mental projections of readers, whereas text analysis is concerned with the verbal projections of speakers.

[3] To be clear, in the original textual grammatical model (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 242-3) that Martin & Rose here rebrand as logical discourse semantics, the main types of conjunctive relation were identified as:

• additive
• adversative
• causal
• temporal

However, these were later reinterpreted (Halliday 1985) as more delicate types within the three most general types of expansion — elaboration, extension and enhancement — that are manifested throughout the grammar.  In these terms, the authors'

• 'adding' is a subtype of extension, whereas
• 'comparing', 'time' and 'consequence' are all subtypes of enhancement.

Moreover, Martin & Rose, just like the source of "their" ideas, Halliday & Hasan, omit all types of elaboration (and projection) from their model.

[4] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue non-structural cohesive relations as a type of structural (inter)dependency relation.

Misconstruing A Clause Beneficiary As A Nominal Group Qualifier

Martin & Rose (2007: 112):

In the following example the processes of ‘exposing’ and ‘humiliating’ become things that qualify the penalty, and are themselves qualified by their participant the perpetrator:

Blogger Comments:

Original Text:

Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator.

Here Martin & Rose misconstrue an element of clause structure (Beneficiary) as an element of nominal group structure (Qualifier):

Thus	there	is	the penalty of public exposure and humiliation	for the perpetrator
		Process	Existent	Beneficiary

The fact that the prepositional phrase for the perpetrator serves a function at clause rank, and not group rank, is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike a nominal group Qualifier, it can be relocated to other parts of the clause:

1. Thus, for the perpetrator, there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation.
2. Thus there is, for the perpetrator, the penalty of public exposure and humiliation.

Rebranding Halliday's 'Extended Numerative' As Martin's 'Focus'

Martin & Rose (2007: 97):

Finally, we must also account for various ‘of’ structures in nominal groups. These include facets (the side of the house), measures (a glass of beer), types (a make of car), and so on. For simplicity we will label all these here as Focus. Like Classifier Thing structures, Focus Thing structures also comprise a single lexical element:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose rebrand Halliday's extended Numerative as "their" Focus. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 395):

Moreover, the rebranding is not only unmotivated theoretically, but it is also a poor choice of term, since it is already in use in SFL theory as the focus of New in an information unit.

[2] To be clear, here the criterion for nuclearity switches back from syntagm (structural proximity) to lexis ("a single lexical element"), the inconsistency again demonstrating that the authors do not understand the principle on which nuclearity is based.

As can be seen, each of the authors' example nominal groups features more than one lexical item, and none of the three nominal groups constitutes a lexical item specified by the most delicate lexicogrammatical features.

As can also be seen, this is grammar within the clause, not discourse semantics, not meaning beyond the clause.

The Argument For Epithet As Less Central ("Nuclear") In The Nominal Group

Martin & Rose (2007: 96-7):

Third, people and things may also be described with qualities, that function in the nominal group as an Epithet:

 

The Epithet is less central in a nominal group; structurally it is further from the Thing than the Classifier.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Martin & Rose switch their criterion for nominal group nuclearity from lexis ("unified lexical element"), in the case of Classifier, to the syntagmatic axis (structural distance from Thing), in the case of Epithet.

As well as creating theoretical inconsistency — two different criteria for the one scale of relatedness — this demonstrates that the authors do not understand the sense in which elements of nominal group structure are central or otherwise.

The Argument For Classifier As Central In The Nominal Group

Martin & Rose (2007: 96):

Lexically, we are concerned with five functional elements of nominal groups. First, in Halliday’s model, the central function of a nominal group is called the Thing. The lexical noun that realises a Thing is a class of person or thing, such as girl, man, window, bed. Second, the Thing may be sub-classified by an item functioning as Classifier. Classifier and Thing together form a unified lexical element:

Blogger Comments:

Here again Martin & Rose confuse the two distinct notions of 'word', lexical item and grammatical rank unit, and use the confusion to justify their claim that Classifier, along with Thing, is 'central' to the nominal group, without identifying the sense in which they are 'central'.

To be clear, the claim that Classifier is 'central' to the nominal group rests on the claim that the grammatical structure Classifier^Thing forms a "unified lexical element". The argument is therefore invalidated by any Classifier^Thing structure that does not form "a unified lexical element", such as plastic warthog.

Lexical items composed of more than one word are also sometimes called lexical chunks, gambits, lexical phrases, lexical units, lexicalised stems, or speech formulae. The term polyword listemes is also sometimes used.

Mistaking Range For Medium And Medium For Agent

Martin & Rose (2007: 92):

Amnesty is construed here as a commodity that is given or refused to various recipients, by an implicit giver (the Commission), and is also demanded by potential recipients (police officers). The central elements in this construal are the processes of exchanging (given, not given, refused, applied for), the nuclear element is the commodity exchanged (amnesty), and the marginal elements are its givers and recipients. We can represent these nuclear relations in Figure 3.10.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin & Rose use the terms of speech function (enacting interpersonal meaning) — exchanging (giving or demanding) commodities (goods–&–services or information) — as the basis for determining the relative involvement of participants in a process, in their rebranding of Halliday's ergative model of transitivity (construing experiential meaning) as a discourse semantic system. The confusion is thus one of metafunction.

[2] To be clear, Martin & Rose provide no argument as to why processes are central, why the commodity (Range misinterpreted as Medium) is nuclear, or why givers (Medium misinterpreted as Agent) and recipients (Beneficiaries) are marginal.  This confirms that Martin & Rose do not understand the ergative principle on which Halliday's model of clause nuclearity is based.

[3] To be clear, Martin & Rose misinterpret the ergative functions of these clauses, mistaking Range for Medium and Medium for Agent:

the Commission	may grant	amnesty	to those who plead guilty
Medium	Process	Range	Beneficiary

the Commission	does not give	amnesty	to innocent people
Medium	Process	Range	Beneficiary

the Commission	does not give	amnesty	to those who claim to be innocent
Medium	Process	Range	Beneficiary

the Commission	refused	amnesty	to the police officers
Medium	Process	Range	Beneficiary

the police officers	applied for	amnesty
Medium	Process	Range

That is, it is through the Commission and the police officers that the processes of 'granting' etc. are actualised, with amnesty as the domain of such processes.

These errors invalidate the model in Figure 3.10, even in its own terms.  In Halliday's original model, the Commission and the police officers are nuclear, with amnesty outside the nucleus:




[4] To be clear, Martin & Rose construe nuclear relations

• as lexical (and discourse semantic), even though the relations obtain between elements of grammatical structure, and
• as nuclear, even though, in their understanding, it is not the nucleus to which other elements are related.

∞

The bigger picture here is that Martin & Rose are taking Halliday's ergative model of clause grammar and rebranding it as part of Martin's model of discourse semantics.  Yet, in doing so, they demonstrate that they do not understand the principle on which Halliday's model is based, and that they cannot apply it accurately to data. 

Misrepresenting 'Field' And Mistaking Range For Medium And Medium For Agent

Martin & Rose (2007: 92):

In the grounds that Tutu gives for his second Argument, he names its field as the granting of amnesty. This field is expanded in the following clauses as processes of ‘giving’, ‘not giving’, ‘refusing’ and ‘applying for’ (in italics below), of which amnesty is the Medium (in bold), with various Agents and Beneficiaries (underlined):

It is also not true that THE GRANTING OF AMNESTY encourages impunity ...
because amnesty is only given to those who plead guilty ...
Amnesty is not given to innocent people or to those who claim to be innocent.
It was on precisely this point that amnesty was refused to the police officers
who applied for [amnesty] for their part in the death of Steve Biko.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ideational meaning instantiated in Tutu's text is semantics, not context.  In SFL theory, 'field' refers to the ideational dimension of the context that is realised by language — along the cline from the culture that is realised by language as system to the situation that is realised by an instance of language (a text).  For Martin's misunderstandings of the SFL notion of field, see the clarifying critiques here.

[2] This is potentially misleading, since field (context) and clause (lexicogrammar) are different levels of symbolic abstraction. To be clear, taking metaredundancy into account, context (e.g. field) is realised in the realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar (e.g. clauses).

[3] To be clear, amnesty serves as the Range of these four Processes, not the Medium.  The processes of ‘giving’, ‘not giving’, ‘refusing’ and ‘applying for’ are not actualised by amnesty, but by the Commission, which is omitted from these medio-receptive clauses.

[4] To be clear, no Agents are underlined.  Of the underlined, the only participant that is not a Beneficiary, who, serves as the Medium through which the Process applied (for) is actualised — in a rankshifted clause serving as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

because	amnesty	is	only	given	to those who plead guilty
	Range	Pro-		-cess	Beneficiary

amnesty	is not given	to innocent people or to those who claim to be innocent
Range	Process	Beneficiary

[[amnesty	was refused	to the police officers [[who applied for (amnesty) for their part in the death of Steve Biko]] ]]
Range	Process	Beneficiary

[[who	applied for	(amnesty)	for their part in the death of Steve Biko]]
Medium	Process	Range	Cause

Misunderstanding The Basis Of Nuclearity

Martin & Rose (2007: 92):

The Medium may be affected by the process, but the Agent is left implicit, as in I’m going to be haunted, amnesty was refused. As Agent and Beneficiary may be left out of the clause, they are relatively marginal in terms of nuclear relations. 

How do these grammatical functions interact with the lexical elements that instantiate them in particular texts?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the ergative model, the Medium is participant through which the Process is actualised; on the transitive model, in contrast, the Goal is the participant that is impacted by the Process.

[2] To be clear, the clause amnesty was refused is middle (medio-receptive), not effective.  That is, the clause lacks the feature [agency], so it does not feature an Agent, implicit or otherwise.

amnesty	was refused	by the Commission
Range	Process	Medium

[3] This seriously misunderstands nuclearity.  Agent and Beneficiary, as participants, are "marginal" in the sense of their participation in the Process, not because they can be left out.  The problems with 'omittability' as a criterion include:

• the omission of a participant serves a textual function, not an experiential function; and
• even the most nuclear participant, the Medium, can be omitted, as demonstrated by the medio-receptive clauses such as amnesty was refused, you were seen!  What was said?

It will be seen later that Martin & Rose contradict their own principle by interpreting 'Range: process' — e.g. a song in he sang (a song) — as central, despite the fact that it can be omitted.

[4] The notion of grammatical functions interacting with lexical items betrays the Martin's (1992) misunderstanding of the dimensions of SFL theory as the interaction of modules; see the clarifying critiques here.

To be clear, the relation between grammatical functions and lexical items involves both delicacy and realisation, since each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate features of lexicogrammatical systems.

[5] The notion of lexical items instantiating grammatical function confuses instantiation — the relation between potential and instance — with delicacy (and realisation), as explained above in [4].

∞

Importantly, none of this is

1. discourse semantic,
2. beyond the clause, or 
3. the authors' original theorising.