The Authors' Inconsistent Use Of Peirce's 'Iconic', 'Indexical' And 'Symbolic'

Martin & Rose (2007: 325, 333n):

Beyond this is the manner in which they are construed. Photos and realistic drawings can depict entities and activities iconically; there is a direct visual relation between the image and the category it construes. In contrast, images such as flags or diagrams construe their categories symbolically; the viewer must know the symbol to recognise its meaning. 

In between are images that are neither iconic nor symbolic, but indicate categories by one or more criteria; an example is the relation between the crowd, the dignitaries on the stage, and the flag, which indicate the categories of the people, their leaders and the nation by their relative positions — bottom, top and middle. In Peirce’s 1955 terms, this kind of visual construal is indexical.⁷ 

⁷ Previous efforts to interpret ideational and interpersonal meanings in visual images have been based on analogies with grammatical categories of process types, mood and modality (e.g. Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, O’Toole 1994, Unsworth 2001) rather than discourse semantics. In keeping with the discourse oriented approach here, and to keep labels manageable, we have used the same terms as for verbal texts wherever possible. For example, where Kress and van Leeuwen use the cryptic terms ‘overt/covert’, we use ‘explicit/implicit’; and where they use polysemous terms ‘concrete/abstract’, we have found the semiotic terms ‘iconic/indexical/symbolic’ less ambiguous.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the manner in which they are construed" is modelled as channel, a system within MODE, the textual dimension of the context (culture); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 34). It will be seen in the following post that Martin & Rose misconstrue this as an ideational system at the level of discourse semantics.

[2] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channels might be subcategorised as photographic and pictographic, there is a natural (non-arbitrary) relation between their content and expression.

[3] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channel might be subcategorised as ideographic, there is a non-natural (conventional) relation between their content and expression.

[4] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, unlike the preceding characterisations of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, this characterisation of 'indexical' images is not concerned with a relation between content and expression, but with a relation between levels of symbolic abstraction within the content of the image:

That is, Martin & Rose reconstrue the meanings that are 'iconically' realised in the image as metaphorical symbols of a higher level, more congruent meaning.

To be clear, in order to be theoretically consistent with their characterisation of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, the authors need to demonstrate an indexical relation between the content of the image (its meanings) and the expression of the image (its ink patterns).

[5] To be clear, all the terms — iconic, symbolic and indexical — derive from the semiotics of Peirce, a model that is epistemologically inconsistent with SFL Theory. Peirce (1955: 102-3):

According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. 

An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign ; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it. 

An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind ; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. 

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by " existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances ; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol.

[6] Firstly, the content plane of images is not stratified into semantics and grammar, so the discourse semantic vs grammatical distinction does not apply. Crucially, if images did have a grammar, it would be possible to read them aloud — to verbally project locutions — as is possible for written texts.

Secondly, neither of the pretexts for relabelling Kress & van Leeuwen's original terms withstands close scrutiny. On the one hand, the original distinction 'overt/covert' is simpler, not more "cryptic", than 'explicit/implicit'. On the other hand, the original distinction 'concrete/abstract' is not ambiguous in this context, but, more importantly, it is consistent with SFL Theory, whereas Peirce's 'iconic/indexical/symbolic' distinctions are not.

Moreover, rebranding other people's work to get credit for their ideas is Martin's modus operandi, as demonstrated on this blog, as well as on other blogs here and here. For example, Martin (1992) rebrands Halliday's speech function as his negotiation, rebrands Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesion as his discourse semantics, rebranding their cohesive reference as his identification, their lexical cohesion as his ideation, and their cohesive conjunction as his conjunction (now 'connexion').

More recently, Martin and his colleagues have rebranded Cléirigh's model of gestural and postural semiosis as their model of paralanguage, incongruously rebranding linguistic body language as "sonovergent" paralanguage, and epilinguistic body language as "semovergent" paralanguage, on the pretext that the (wrongly conceived) meaning of these invented words is more transparent. Evidence here.

The Authors' Analysis Of An 'Entity-Focused' Image

 Martin & Rose (2007: 323, 324-5):

In this framework, the photo of the young boy is a classifying image. In nuclear terms, we have a young black boy (central), with his hand raised in a fist (nuclear), in front of a crowd (peripheral). But from the perspective of field, each of these elements has at least two possible referents. The boy at once represents the past roles of black youth in the anti-apartheid resistance, and their future lives in a free South Africa. His ‘black power’ salute evokes both the schoolchildren’s historical protests against the regime, and the celebration of Inauguration Day. In his 1995 edition, Mandela refers to this gesture as the Afrika salute (in photos between pp402-3), underlining its function in indigenous solidarity. And the boy can be construed both as a member of the crowd, and as its embodiment — a leader in other words, implying a connection with Mandela. 

The potential ambiguity of visual images is part of their power: their interpretation is left relatively open to the viewer, widening their appeal, and their multiple interpretations can map onto each other in the manner of metaphors, to evoke more general or abstract categories than the simple images they depict (cf. the discussion of grammatical metaphor and mode, in section 9.1 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is that this photograph is a classifying image because it is 'entity-focused' rather than 'activity-focused'. However, Martin & Rose provide no rationâle, either in terms of content or expression, for this claim. It might be alternatively argued that the photograph is 'activity-focused', since the 'Afrika salute' is highly relevant to the represented event, as well as being what chiefly distinguishes this image of a boy from other images of boys.

[2] To be clear, this is not an argument for the claim that the photograph is 'entity-focused' because it analyses its content in terms of ideational meaning (nuclearity) rather than textual meaning (focus); see previous post. Moreover, the analysis, which interprets the entity as if it were a nominal group, is inconsistent with the authors' own model (p98):

If this model is applied to the authors' verbal description of the photograph, then black boy is the centre (Classifier Thing), young is nuclear (Epithet), and both with his hand raised in a fist and in front of a crowd are peripheral (Qualifier).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, such "referents" are Values that are realised symbolically by Tokens.

[4] To be clear, these reinterpretations of the meanings of the photograph, the boy and his raised fist, are reconstruals of them as metaphorical realisations of a higher level, more congruent meaning; see Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 272, 289).

[5] This is a non-sequitur. If the boy "embodies" the crowd, then he "embodies" the opposite of a leader. As such, the photograph does not imply a connection with Mandela in this sense.

[6] Trivially, this ambiguity could also narrow the appeal of an image to viewers, as when one possible meaning of an image is interpreted as offensive to some members of a community.

Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor

Martin & Rose (2007: 299-300):

Once this step into ideational metaphor is taken then the entire world of uncommon sense discourse is opened up including all of humanities, social science and science and their applications as bureaucracy and technology. The power of this discourse is not simply to generalise across experience, but to organise it and reflect on it at a high level of abstraction which can be instantiated in variable ways, sometimes with a view to enabling behaviours:

ACT — To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or outside the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: the authors' discussion of ideational metaphor has been limited to elemental metaphor, largely processes realised as things. Moreover, their model of discourse semantics undermines the study of metaphor, since it does not provide the means — e.g. semantic units: sequence, figure, element — of contrasting congruent vs metaphorical grammatical realisations, which is itself necessary for unpacking metaphor.

[1] To be clear, one of the unacknowledged sources here is Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible. At the same time, there are also textual and interpersonal consequences of this metaphorical realignment in the grammar: ideational metaphor can be a powerful textual resource for managing the creation of text, creating new mappings between the ideational and textual quanta of information; and it can also be a powerful interpersonal resource for organising the ongoing negotiation of meaning, creating new mappings between the ideational and interpersonal propositions/proposals.

[2] This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not "generalise across experience". Ideational metaphor is the reconstrual of the meanings of congruent mode, with the result that lexicogrammatical choices construe two meanings at once: that of both the metaphorical and congruent realisations.

[3] This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not organise experience; it "reorganises" the meanings construed of experience in congruent mode.

[4]  This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, semantically, metaphorical meanings are of a lower level of symbolic abstraction (Token) than their congruent counterparts (Value). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 289):

[5]  This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not involve a "higher level of abstraction which can be instantiated in variable ways". As potential, ideational metaphor is an incongruent relation between semantic and grammatical choices. Variable instantiations of ideational metaphor are instances of different incongruent relations between semantic and grammatical choices.

[6] The notion of ideational metaphor "enabling behaviours" is a puzzling one, given that

• Martin & Rose are concerned with processes realised as things,
• none of their highlighted words realise behavioural processes, and
• 9 of the 14 highlighted words — nature, causes, extent, rights, period, constitution, Republic, fate, whereabouts — do not even realise processes.

Problems With The Authors' Example Of Grammatical Metaphor Untying A Text From A Situation

 Martin & Rose (2007: 299):

Note for example how Mandela reconstrues aircraft roaring over the Union buildings as symbols (a display and a demonstration) of precision, force and loyalty; in doing so he reworks evaluation of the event through affect and appreciation (in awe as a spectacular array ... in perfect formation ...), into evaluation through judgement (capacity, tenacity and propriety: pinpoint precision and military force, loyalty to democracy ... freely and fairly elected ...). 

The transformation enables the evaluation he wants for this event of the day:

A few moments later we all lifted our eyes in awe as a spectacular array of South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared in perfect formation over the Union Buildings. It was not only a display of pinpoint precision and military force, but a demonstration of the military's loyalty to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is purported to be an example of the use of grammatical metaphor to untie a text from a situation — as part of a discussion of the contextual system of mode. (See the previous post for some of the theoretical misunderstandings behind this nonsensical notion.)

It can be seen that the 'situation' here is ideational semantics within Mandela's text, rather than the material setting in which Mandela wrote his text — which was one of the authors' previous uses of the term 'situation'. In other words, Martin & Rose have trouble distinguishing different orders of experience: the phenomenal order of speakers/writers projecting language, and the metaphenomenal order of the language that speakers/writers project.

[2] To be clear, these evaluations, which are irrelevant to the issues being discussed, do not require the use of ideational metaphor, since they can also be made with less metaphorical construals, such as:

A few moments later we all looked up and felt awe as South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared over the Union Buildings in a spectacular, perfectly formed array. This not only displayed that the military could fly absolutely precisely and how forceful it is, but also demonstrated that they are loyal to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

Problems With The Authors' Notion That Grammatical Metaphor Unties Texts From Situations

Martin & Rose (2007: 299, 332n):

Taking this a step further, the key resource which unties texts from situations is grammatical metaphor because of its power to reconstrue activities as things and thus break the iconic connections between linguistic and material activity.¹ This transforms social action into another realm of discourse in which abstractions enter into relations of various kinds with one another.

¹ By iconic we mean matching relations between the world as we perceive it and ideation, i.e. between people and things as nouns, actions as verbs and so on.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: This is purportedly a discussion of mode, the textual dimension of context — 'culture' in SFL Theory, but misunderstood as 'register' by Martin ± Rose. In SFL Theory, 'situation' is the term for an instance of culture, but since Martin & Rose have replaced culture (field, tenor, mode) with register, and regard 'text' as an instance of their context, the term 'situation' can not mean an instance of context. In the preceding posts, Martin & Rose have used 'situation' to mean, on the one hand, the material environment of the speech/writing event, and on the other hand, the ideational meaning of the text, which they usually confuse with field instead. It is against this background of complicated theoretical misunderstandings — along the dimensions of stratification, instantiation and orders of experience — that the untangling of the confusions in the excerpt above is attempted below.

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the notion that a text can be "untied" from a situation is nonsensical, because it is the text that construes the situation.

[2] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is not a "non-iconic" relation between "linguistic and material activity", but an incongruent relation — within language — between semantics and grammar. Moreover, this characterisation reduces grammatical metaphor to ideational metaphor, and reduces ideational metaphor to elemental metaphor (processes incongruently realised as things). Importantly, grammatical metaphor is semantically junctional. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243):

When this happens, it is a signal that a phenomenon of this other kind — quality, or process — is being treated as if it was a thing. The grammar has constructed an imaginary or fictitious object, called shakiness, by transcategorising the quality shaky; similarly by transcategorising the process develop it has created a pseudo-thing called development. What is the status of such fictitious objects or pseudo-things? Unlike the other elements, which lose their original status in being transcategorised (for example, shaker is no longer a process, even though it derives from shake), these elements do not; shakiness is still a quality, development is still a process — only they have been construed into things. They are thus a fusion, or 'junction', of two semantic elemental categories: shakiness is a 'quality thing', development is a 'process thing'. All such junctional elements involve grammatical metaphor.

[3] To be clear, as explained above, this is a nonsensical claim. Elemental ideational grammatical metaphor does not "transform social action" into anything. Instead, it reconstrues the congruent model of experience into a metaphorical model which is further removed from everyday experience. Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the world as we perceive it" is the construal of experience as ideational meaning. In these terms, the authors' nonsensical claim becomes:

• By iconic we mean matching relations between ideational meaning and ideation

where 'ideation' is Martin's discourse semantic system, which, as demonstrated here, is his misunderstanding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexical cohesion (textual lexicogrammar) rebranded as his experiential semantics.

[5] To be clear, the relation here is the stratal relation within language between meaning (people, things, actions) and grammatical form (nouns, verbs). As such, it does not exemplify a relation between "the world as we perceive it" and Martin's experiential discourse semantic system of ideation.

The Authors' Notion Of Register As A Resource For Generalising Across Genres

Martin & Rose (2007: 297-8):

As far as genre is concerned we can think of field, tenor and mode as resources for generalising across genres from the differentiated perspectives of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. 

In other words, taking tenor as an example, we need to take account of recurrent patterns of domination and deference as we move from one genre to another; we don’t want to have to stop and describe the same thing over and over again each time. 

Similarly for mode, the move from more concrete to more abstract metaphorical discourse takes place in explanations, expositions, historical recounts and reports (as we have seen); register allows us to generalise these shifts in abstraction as a resource that can be deployed in many genres.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is neither warranted by, nor consistent with, the authors' own model. Martin & Rose model their register (field, tenor and mode) and their genre as two levels of symbolic abstraction (strata) related by realisation. To understand the absurdity of the claim that a lower stratum generalises across a higher stratum, it is only necessary to consider other strata, such as phonology and lexicogrammar, where the claim would be that phonology "generalises across lexicogrammars".

The theoretical inconsistencies of the claim become multidimensional when considered in terms of SFL Theory, where

• 'context' refers to the culture — not varieties of language — as a semiotic system,
• 'register' and 'genre' (text type) refer to varieties of language, not context, and to different perspectives on the same point on the cline of instantiation, with 'register' the view from the system pole, and 'text type' the view from the instance pole.

[2] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the interpersonal dimension of context, tenor, with the interpersonal meanings of language ("recurrent patterns of domination and deference") that realise a given set of tenor features.

[3] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, any "recurrent patterns" of meaning across text types (genres) are modelled as a move up the cline of instantiation from text type towards the system pole, since these are patterns of instantiation that are common to different text types.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the textual dimension of context, mode, with the language ("abstract metaphorical discourse") that realises a given set of mode features.

[5] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, "the move" that "takes place" — "shift in abstraction" — is a change in the pattern of instantiation during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[6] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, these are modelled in terms of mode, whereas for Martin & Rose, they are categories (purposes) of genre. Given that the authors treat mode as a dimension of register, treating them as genre creates a theoretical inconsistency within their own model.

[7] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the potential ("resource") of moving from instantiating congruent wordings to instantiating metaphorical wordings during the logogenesis of text is a property of the language system itself.

On this basis, in terms of SFL Theory, the notion that register "allows us to generalise" this process "as a resource that can be deployed in many genres" is, at best, nonsensical.

Misunderstanding Metaphors Of Modality

Martin & Rose (2007: 235):

One variation on this principle to watch out for involves certain mental process clauses in first or second person present tense (I think..., I suppose.. ., do you reckon..., don't you suppose, etc.). These are actually modalities involving grammatical metaphor (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004).

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands metaphors of modality. As this concerns explicit subjective modality, it is only first person variants that function this way. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 687) explain, beginning with the example I don't believe that pudding ever will be cooked:

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does. The reason for regarding this as a metaphorical variant is that the proposition is not, in fact, ‘I think’; the proposition is ‘it is so’. This is shown clearly by the tag; if we tag the clause I think it’s going to rain we get 

I think it’s going to rain, isn’t it?

not I think it’s going to rain, don’t I?. In other words the clause is a variant of it’s probably going to rain (isn’t it?) and not a first-person equivalent of John thinks it’s going to rain, which does represent the proposition ‘John thinks’ (tag doesn’t he?). Thus in

You know || what’s happening tomorrow at five o’clock, don’t you?

the ‘mental’ clause you know was able to be tagged because it does not stand for a modality. It is the fact that mental clause is a modal clause and serves as mood Adjunct that explains the tag. If it was just an ordinary mental clause in a clause nexus of projection, I don’t believe should be able to be tagged. But since it has a metaphorical status and serves as mood Adjunct, it cannot be tagged. Instead, the Moodtag picks up the Mood element of the modalised proposition: that pudding probably never will ... will it?

Misunderstanding Halliday's Moodtags And Misrepresenting Them As The Authors' Work

Martin & Rose (2007: 226):

Moves may also end with tag 'questions' (don’t you?, isn't he?, etc.) oriented to the addressee. These tags do not function as separate moves, but are better treated as explicit invitations to a listener to respond. Both of Sannie’s speech acts below would thus be treated as tagged statements (not as statements followed by questions). There is after all only one proposition being negotiated, not two:

 

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Yet again, Martin & Rose here present Halliday's work as if it were their own. Importantly, the tag doesn't just invite a response; it signals the type of response expected. Halliday (1985:69):

[2] This is misleading. While the first instance is a tagged declarative clause realising a statement, the second instance does not feature a Moodtag, and realises two speech functions, not one. To explain:

Firstly, a Moodtag reprises the Finite and Subject of a clause, so the (unmarked) Moodtag for you could have killed the man is couldn't you? not you know.

Secondly, there are two propositions

• the projected statement: you could have killed the man, and
• the projecting question: you know (realised metaphorically as a declarative clause),

each of which could be challenged in response.

Moreover, the projecting clause you know can itself be tagged by don't you?, further demonstrating that it is not a Moodtag but a proposition in its own right.

"Catalysing Symbiosis"

Martin & Rose (2007: 209):

Perhaps what we can learn from discourse of this kind is the significance of interaction among discourse systems. Conjunction, identification, ideation and periodicity are all interfacing in various ways to scaffold the argument and grammatical metaphor is catalysing this symbiosis at every turn. For most of us, a little discourse analysis wouldn’t hurt, when first learning to access texture of this kind.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of interaction between metafunctional systems continues the misunderstanding of metafunctions (and strata) as interacting modules in Martin (1992: 391, 488). The architecture of SFL Theory is relational, not modular. See the critiques here, and the clarification here.

[2] To be clear, if discourse semantic systems are scaffolding the argument, the question arises as to which systems are making the argument that they are scaffolding.

[3] To be clear, Martin & Rose have not demonstrated how grammatical metaphor catalyses anything. The authors have not unpacked any ideational metaphors in order to explain the nature of metaphor and how it functions; they have merely identified nominalised words in a text.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, it is the grammar that is the resource for discourse analysis.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, texture is created by the resources of the textual metafunction; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 650ff).

Identifying Nominalised Words Instead Of Unpacking Ideational Metaphor

Martin & Rose (2007: 207):

The text is also chock full of ideational metaphors alongside the occasional concrete participant (i.e. manuals, the priest, the penitent):

This internalisation of an exterior hierarchy consists of two interrelated procedures: the accounting of past events and the reproduction of the discourse of interrogation contained in the confession manuals.

First, the process of accounting. All confession manuals contain the unconditional demand that all sins be revealed

In terms of abstraction, discourse of this kind is probably the most metaphorical to have evolved in the history of writing in the world. Each sentence packs a lot of information into dense strings of abstract terms that derive from ideational metaphors, such as internal → internalise → internalisation.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here again the authors' view of ideational metaphor is limited to nominalisation: rewording the meanings of verbs and adjectives as nouns. Although nominalisation is 'the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 729), its rôle in ideational metaphor just part of a larger picture wherein semantic phenomena are re-mapped onto grammatical units. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 712-3, 719):

… grammatical metaphor within the ideational metafunction involves a ‘re-mapping’ between sequences, figures and elements in the semantics and clause nexuses, clauses and groups in the grammar. In the congruent mode of realisation that we described in Chapters 5 and 7, a sequence is realised by a clause nexus and a figure is realised by a clause. In the metaphorical mode, the whole set of mappings seems to be shifted ‘downwards’: a sequence is realised by a clause, a figure is realised by a group, and an element is realised by a word. The two modes of realisation are contrasted diagrammatically in Figure 10-14 below.

Despite this section being concerned with ideational metaphor and periodicity, instead of unpacking any of the ideational metaphor, Martin & Rose have merely identified what they take to be nominalisations. One reason the authors cannot unpack ideational metaphor is their model does not provide an ideational semantics that distinguishes congruent from incongruent grammatical realisations. To begin to do so, they would need to draw on the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

The Demonstrated Advantages Of Unpacking Ideational Metaphor

Martin & Rose (2007: 152):

Here is an example of ‘conjunction-as-quality' in Tutu’s argument:

Many of those in the security forces who have come forward had previously been regarded…as respectable members of their communities.

This could be unpacked as:

Many of those in the security forces who have come forward were regarded as respectable members of their communities before…they came forward.

How much we choose to unpack ideational metaphors in our analyses will depend on our purposes. We have shown two advantages of unpacking experiential and logical metaphors. One is that by paraphrasing highly metaphorical discourse in a more spoken form, we can show learners how it means what it does, and also design a curriculum that leads from more spoken to more written modes. Another is that we can recover participant roles and logical arguments that tend to be rendered implicit by ideational metaphor. This can be a powerful tool for critical discourse analysis — revealing implicit nuclear relations such as agency and effect, and implicit logical relations such as cause and effect.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this (inelegant) attempt to unpack grammatical metaphor involves reconstruing the temporal Location of a Process — not a Quality — as a temporal relation between two Processes, the second of which is a repetition of the Process embedded as Qualifier:

Many of those in the security forces who have come forward	had	previously	been regarded as	respectable members of their communities
Carrier	Process:	Location	relational	Attribute

Many of those in the security forces who have come forward	were regarded as	respectable members of their communities	before	they	came forward
α			× β
Carrier	Process: relational	Attribute		Behaver	Process: behavioural

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents what the authors have demonstrated. To be clear, Martin & Rose have not shown these advantages of unpacking ideational metaphors, not least because, in focusing on individual words, they have confined their explication to elemental metaphors, and largely ignored the syntagmatic syndromes in which elemental metaphors appear, such as the reconfiguring of functions that is necessitated when a sequence is metaphorically reconstrued as a figure. Merely paraphrasing text does not provide a theoretical understanding of what is involved in grammatical metaphor, still less a theoretically-informed curriculum design.

Moreover, because of this narrow focus, Martin & Rose have not shown how to recover participants and logical relations made implicit by ideational metaphor. For example, the unpacking of metaphor, above, does not recover any implicit participants or feature of time. See also the previous illustrative examples:

• Unpacking Grammatical Metaphor: "Conjunction" As Process, and
• Unpacking Grammatical Metaphor: "Conjunction" As Circumstance.

[3] To be clear, this is presumably 'effective', a feature of the grammatical system of AGENCY.

Unpacking Grammatical Metaphor: "Conjunction" As Circumstance

Martin & Rose (2007: 150):

Another common motif in abstract or technical writing is to present a logical relation as a circumstance:

Is      amnesty       being given     at the cost of justice being done?
         Medium      Process           Circumstance (accompaniment)

The logical meaning of at the cost of is concessive purpose (‘without’), giving the following sequence:

Is amnesty being given
without justice being done?

Again this strategy enables a sequence of two activities to be packaged as a single figure, with amnesty as one chunk of information and justice being done as another.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not a circumstance of Accompaniment, since it does not construe amnesty and the cost of justice being done as joint participants in the process is being given; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 324). Instead, at the cost of justice being done — like without justice being done — is a dependent non-finite clause:

is	amnesty	being given	at the cost of	justice	being done
			without
α			× β
Pro-	Medium	-cess		Medium	Process

[2] To be clear, interpreting at the cost of as marking purpose (enhancement) flatly contradicts the previous interpretation of it as marking accompaniment (extension). In SFL Theory, the relation between the two clauses is concessive condition: if P ('amnesty is being given') then contrary to expectation Q ('justice is not being done').

[3] To be clear, since this is a clause complex realising a sequence of two figures, it is not a metaphorical rendering of a sequence of two figures as a single figure.

Logical Metaphor And Patterns Of Information Flow

Martin & Rose (2014: 149-50):

The Act required that
the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice
(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

In this sequence, Tutu first uses a passive clause to start the first message with the application and end with a public hearing. The public hearing is then the starting point for the next message (such a hearing), that ends with a miscarriage of justice. This is then exemplified in the next step. This sequencing of information is shown as follows:

Such patterns of information flow are discussed further in Chapter 6 on periodicity. Here we can note that the logical metaphor (is likely to lead to) enables the sequence of cause (such a hearing) and effect (a miscarriage of justice) to be packaged as chunks of information within a single message.

Blogger Comments:

[1] There are only four problems with this claim:

• ideationally, this is a sequence of four figures;
• textually, this is a message complex of four messages;
• terminologically, 'passive' is a feature of the verbal group; the clause is receptive; and
• the passive verbal group appears in the second message, not the first.

The Act required	that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing	unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice	(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session)
α	" β
	α	× β
		α	= β

The Act	required
Theme	Rheme

that the application	should be dealt with in a public hearing
Theme	Rheme

unless such a hearing	was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice
Theme	Rheme

for instance, where witnesses	were too intimidated to testify in open session
Theme	Rheme

[2] This confuses an exemplifying relation between figures (logical metafunction) with information flow between messages (textual metafunction), and, moreover, misrepresents both:

• logically, the final figure exemplifies the preceding figure, not a miscarriage of justice; and
• textually, the final message does not take up a miscarriage of justice as its point of departure (Theme).

[3] To be clear:

• the mood Adjunct likely is not part of the Process;
• the metaphor is not merely the logical relation realised as a Process;
• the metaphor involves a sequence of two causally-related figures being realised as a figure of causally-related elements (Token and Value).

The Function Of Logical Metaphor Oriented To Periodicity

Martin & Rose (2014: 149):

On the other hand, logical metaphors combine with experiential metaphors to package activity sequences as manageable chunks of information. This function of logical metaphor is oriented to periodicity. For example, this figure is one step in the argument that Tutu is advancing:

The Act required that
the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice
(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the textual metafunction that deploys ideational metaphor to provide alternative groupings of quanta of information. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 401, 413):

But ideational grammatical metaphors typically have a discourse function of this kind; they are as it were pressed into service by the textual metafunction, to provide alternative groupings of quanta of information.

… the textual metafunction is a powerful part of the explanation of ideational metaphor: ideational meaning is reconstrued in such a way that it suits textual organisation when meanings are being distributed in text. 

[2] As will be seen, 'periodicity' is a confusion of writing pedagogy with SFL Theory, specifically: the textual grammatical systems of THEME and INFORMATION, both misunderstood and rebranded as discourse semantics.

[3] This misunderstands the text. Tutu is not advancing an argument; he is merely reporting what the Act stipulated.

Unpacking Grammatical Metaphor: "Conjunction" As Process

Martin & Rose (2007: 149):

A common motif in abstract or technical writing is to present a consequential conjunction as a process:

This strategy compresses a sequence of two activities into a single figure, by means of experiential and logical metaphors. Experientially, the Agent and Medium stand for activities (‘hearing an application’ and ‘miscarrying justice’) that are reconstrued as things (a hearing, a miscarriage). Logically, there is a relation of consequence between these activities (‘if…then’), which is reconstrued as a process (is likely to lead to). We can unpack such a sequence as a sequence of two figures related by conjunctions:

if such a hearing happens
then justice will be miscarried.

However the logical metaphor of ‘relation as process’ incorporates more than simply consequence. For one thing, the probability of the result is graded as likely to lead to (in contrast to high probability will certainly lead to or low probability will possibly lead to). And the necessity of the consequence is also graded lexically as lead to (in contrast to the stronger result in or weaker associated with).

So one of the reasons that writers use logical metaphors for conjunctions is that they can grade their evaluation of relations between events or arguments. This is a crucial resource for reasoning in fields such as science or politics, in which it is important not to overstate causal relations until sufficient evidence has been accumulated. This function of logical metaphors is oriented to engagement of the reader.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, in this instance, a sequence of two figures is metaphorically reconstrued as a single figure. See the earlier post: Activity Sequences: A Cornucopia Of Theoretical Inconsistencies.

[2] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misrepresent the transitivity of the identifying clause through accidentally misconstruing it as encoding instead of decoding. The clause is clearly decoding because the Value, a miscarriage of justice, is New information, and therefore Identifier:

Such a hearing	is	likely	to lead to	a miscarriage of justice
Medium Identified Token	Process:		relational: circumstantial: cause	Range Identifier Value
Subject	Finite	Adjunct	Predicator	Complement
Mood			Residue

As a result, the authors misconstrue the Medium as Agent and the Range as Medium — in addition to misconstruing the mood Adjunct as a component of the Process.

[3] To be clear, the expansion relation in the metaphorical clause is causal, not conditional, because a miscarriage of justice is construed as the likely result of such a hearing. It is therefore invalid to unpack the metaphor as a conditional relation.

[4] To be clear, the potential for modal assessment is afforded by both the congruent and metaphorical realisations, and as such, it is not a reason why writers use ideational metaphor. This misunderstanding appears to arise from Martin & Rose misconstruing the mood Adjunct likely as a component of the metaphorical Process.

[5] To be clear, lead to and result in both (equally) construe a causal relation, whereas associated with does not. See, for example, correlation does not imply causation.

[6] To be clear, it is the interpersonal system of modal assessment (e.g. likely) that serves such functions, not ideational metaphor, since it is the interpersonal metafunction that is concerned with enacting intersubjective relations, such as those between writer and reader.