Martin & Rose (2007: 325, 333n):
Beyond this is the manner in which they are construed. Photos and realistic drawings can depict entities and activities iconically; there is a direct visual relation between the image and the category it construes. In contrast, images such as flags or diagrams construe their categories symbolically; the viewer must know the symbol to recognise its meaning.
In between are images that are neither iconic nor symbolic, but indicate categories by one or more criteria; an example is the relation between the crowd, the dignitaries on the stage, and the flag, which indicate the categories of the people, their leaders and the nation by their relative positions — bottom, top and middle. In Peirce’s 1955 terms, this kind of visual construal is indexical.⁷
⁷ Previous efforts to interpret ideational and interpersonal meanings in visual images have been based on analogies with grammatical categories of process types, mood and modality (e.g. Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, O’Toole 1994, Unsworth 2001) rather than discourse semantics. In keeping with the discourse oriented approach here, and to keep labels manageable, we have used the same terms as for verbal texts wherever possible. For example, where Kress and van Leeuwen use the cryptic terms ‘overt/covert’, we use ‘explicit/implicit’; and where they use polysemous terms ‘concrete/abstract’, we have found the semiotic terms ‘iconic/indexical/symbolic’ less ambiguous.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the manner in which they are construed" is modelled as channel, a system within MODE, the textual dimension of the context (culture); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 34). It will be seen in the following post that Martin & Rose misconstrue this as an ideational system at the level of discourse semantics.
[2] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channels might be subcategorised as photographic and pictographic, there is a natural (non-arbitrary) relation between their content and expression.
[3] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, for such images, whose graphic channel might be subcategorised as ideographic, there is a non-natural (conventional) relation between their content and expression.
[4] To put this in terms of SFL Theory, unlike the preceding characterisations of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, this characterisation of 'indexical' images is not concerned with a relation between content and expression, but with a relation between levels of symbolic abstraction within the content of the image:
That is, Martin & Rose reconstrue the meanings that are 'iconically' realised in the image as metaphorical symbols of a higher level, more congruent meaning.
To be clear, in order to be theoretically consistent with their characterisation of 'iconic' and 'symbolic' images, the authors need to demonstrate an indexical relation between the content of the image (its meanings) and the expression of the image (its ink patterns).
[5] To be clear, all the terms — iconic, symbolic and indexical — derive from the semiotics of Peirce, a model that is epistemologically inconsistent with SFL Theory. Peirce (1955: 102-3):
According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol.
An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign ; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it.
An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind ; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by " existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances ; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol.
[6] Firstly, the content plane of images is not stratified into semantics and grammar, so the discourse semantic vs grammatical distinction does not apply. Crucially, if images did have a grammar, it would be possible to read them aloud — to verbally project locutions — as is possible for written texts.
Secondly, neither of the pretexts for relabelling Kress & van Leeuwen's original terms withstands close scrutiny. On the one hand, the original distinction 'overt/covert' is simpler, not more "cryptic", than 'explicit/implicit'. On the other hand, the original distinction 'concrete/abstract' is not ambiguous in this context, but, more importantly, it is consistent with SFL Theory, whereas Peirce's 'iconic/indexical/symbolic' distinctions are not.
Moreover, rebranding other people's work to get credit for their ideas is Martin's modus operandi, as demonstrated on this blog, as well as on other blogs here and here. For example, Martin (1992) rebrands Halliday's speech function as his negotiation, rebrands Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesion as his discourse semantics, rebranding their cohesive reference as his identification, their lexical cohesion as his ideation, and their cohesive conjunction as his conjunction (now 'connexion').
More recently, Martin and his colleagues have rebranded Cléirigh's model of gestural and postural semiosis as their model of paralanguage, incongruously rebranding linguistic body language as "sonovergent" paralanguage, and epilinguistic body language as "semovergent" paralanguage, on the pretext that the (wrongly conceived) meaning of these invented words is more transparent. Evidence here.
No comments:
Post a Comment