Misconstruing Means (And Clarification) As Internal Consequence

Marin & Rose (2007: 139):

Internal consequence is concerned with drawing conclusions from arguments, and countering them. We have already seen how Tutu uses Thus to signal a conclusion for each of his Arguments:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing ...
Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation 

…amnesty is only given to those who plead guilty ...
Thus the process in fact encourages accountability 

…there is another kind of justice, restorative justice,
Thus we would claim that... justice, is being served

Conjunctions such as thus, consequently, in conclusion signal that a conclusion is being drawn. By this means the conclusion is construed as the expected outcome of the argument that has been presented.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is that conjunction is a discourse semantic system of logical relations. As such, it is not concerned with "drawing conclusions from arguments and countering them"; see further below.

[2] To be clear, thus typically functions like thereby (manner: means) rather than therefore (cause-condition).  In the first two examples, the conjunctive relation is manner: means, as can be demonstrated by the fact that replacing thus with by such means still realises the same meaning. The third example, in contrast, realises cause-condition (consequently).

[3] To be clear, in conclusion typically marks a conjunctive relation of summative clarification (elaboration) rather than a consequential relation (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 613).  Here Martin & Rose confuse 'conclusion' in the sense of a logical inference (cause: result) with 'conclusion' in the sense of a summing up (clarification: summative).

[4] To be clear, two of these three examples did not present the result ("conclusion"/"outcome") of reasons ("argument'), and none of the three included wording that construed the 'means' or 'result' clause as expected.  Any "expectation" here could only be that of a reader, in hindsight.

Problems With The System Of Internal Time

Martin & Rose (2007: 139):

Options for internal time are summed up in Figure 4.7.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the feature 'ordering' conflates the distinction between 'following' and 'preceding', and the feature 'terminating' is a rebranding of 'conclusive'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612):

No argument was provided for the terms and distinction 'adjacent' vs 'interrupted', and no example was provided for the (mistaken) claim that still marks an internal relation of temporal simultaneity. See the two preceding posts for details.

Misrepresenting The Conjunctive Relation Of Internal Simultaneity

Martin & Rose (2007: 138):

But it is also possible to say that an argument, or piece of evidence, is simultaneous with another, using still or at the same time. The following example is from a report about our literacy work:

Significant increases in student achievement have been measured…the average improvement in reading and writing was 2.5 levels… 

At the same time, teachers have noted a range of student learning outcomes that are more difficult to measure, like an increased level of student engagement in their learning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, still does not relate interpersonal wordings as simultaneous in time.  When still functions conjunctively, the expansion relation realised is most likely to be concessive condition (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4). When still expresses time, it functions interpersonally as a mood Adjunct of temporality (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 187-9).

[2] To be clear, this instance of at the same time does not relate interpersonal wordings as simultaneous in time. The relation here is another instance of concessive condition, realising the same meaning as nevertheless or even so.

This again demonstrates the misunderstandings that can arise by giving priority to the view from below, the expression, instead of the view from above, the meaning being realised.

Misconstruing Conditional 'Then' As Temporal 'Then'

Martin & Rose (2007: 138):

In the spoken mode, internal time may also be used to sequence arguments. In the following example (from Forgiveness), Llewelyn’s first proposition is dismissed so he asks for a second:

Llewelyn:      I say maybe it was you who gave the cops Daniel's name.

Luke:             - Are you fucking berserk?

Llewelyn:      - Then who did?

These are all examples of internal succession - they order the steps in the text’s internal logic as first, second, next and so on.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, internal conjunction creates textual cohesion by relating portions of language in their interpersonal guise.  In the case of temporal relations, this means relating one to another as 'following', 'simultaneous', 'preceding' or 'conclusive'; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-4).

In the example provided, there is no temporal relation between propositions. The Then of the final clause marks a conditional relation with dependent clause ellipsis, along the lines of:

If you didn't, then who did?

This again demonstrates the misunderstandings that can arise by giving priority to the view from below, in this case the conjunction then, instead of the view from above, the meaning being realised.

Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Comparison

Martin & Rose (2007: 137):

Options for internal comparison are summed up in Figure 4.6.

 

Blogger Comments:

As demonstrated in the previous five posts, the authors' system of internal comparison is a confusion of genuine comparison ('similar: compare'), various subtypes of elaboration ('similar: reformulate') — confused with subtypes of modal assessment in the exposition — and various types of extension ('different'), all of which are Halliday's grammatical systems of cohesive conjunction (textual) and clause complexing (logical), not distinguished, and rebranded as Martin's logical discourse semantic systems.

A further consequence of misunderstanding grammatical systems and misrepresenting them as discourse semantic systems is that it creates an incongruent relation ("interstratal tension") between semantics and grammar even in the absence of grammatical metaphor, thereby undermining the notion of grammatical metaphor as an incongruent relation between strata.

Misconstruing Subtypes Of Variation And Addition (Extension) As Subtypes Of Comparison (Enhancement)

Martin & Rose (2007: 137):

What of difference? As we saw for lexical contrasts in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), differences are either oppositions or converses. We can oppose ideas using rather, by contrast, on the other hand:

This is not a frivolous question,
rather it is a very serious issue.
To this point we have looked at clauses and their elements from the perspective of discourse. Grammarians, on the other hand, look at elements of clauses from the perspective of the grammar

Conversely is used to reverse two aspects of a message. In this example Malinowski interprets texts from the perspective of social contexts, whereas we suggest that contexts can only be interpreted as they are manifested in texts:

Malinowski interpreted the social contexts of interaction as stratified into two levels, 'context of situation' and 'context of culture', and considered that a text (which he called an 'utterance') could be understood only in relation to both these levels.

Conversely, we could say that speakers' cultures are manifested in each situation in which they interact, and that each interactional situation is manifested verbally as unfolding text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This not true. In Section 3.2, converses were construed as a subtype of oppositions, a subtype of contrast (Figure 3.6, p81).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, rather typically marks replacive variation (extension), whereas by contrast and on the other hand mark adversative addition (extension), in cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued these two distinct relations as one subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not extension, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relations as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, conversely also typically marks adversative addition (extension) in cohesive conjunction (textual); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued different markers of one relation (adversative addition) as two distinct subclasses (oppose vs converse) of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not extension, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relations as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[4] To be clear, Malinowski's model of context has become part of the theoretical architecture of SFL, with the important qualification that 'context of situation' and 'context of culture' are not levels, but opposite poles on the cline of instantiation at one level (the context plane). On this model, language realises culture (potential pole) and text realises situation (instance pole).

Because realisation is an identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction, either level can be used to identify the other:

• language/text (Token) is decoded by reference to culture/situation (Value), and/or
• culture/situation (Value) is encoded by reference to language/text (Token).

Malinowski's notion of 'understanding a text in relation to context' corresponds to the decoding option above.

[5] To be clear, the authors' notion that "contexts can only be interpreted as they are manifested in texts" corresponds to the encoding option above. However, this does not accurately characterise what was said in the quoted text; see [6] and [7].

Note also that the authors' interpretation of context as "manifested in texts" involves modelling context as (types of) texts, genre and register, thereby incongruously conflating two distinct levels of symbolic abstraction: context and language.

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, culture is instantiated in situation, not "manifested" in it. Instantiation is a theoretical attributive relation, whereas manifestation is a non-theoretical identifying relation.

[7] To be clear, this confuses two theoretical dimensions at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation: stratification (situation realised as text) and logogenesis (unfolding text). In SFL Theory, the unfolding of a situation is realised by the unfolding of a text. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim explicated in [5], this does not single out the encoding option, above.

Mistaking Comment Adjuncts For Conjunctive Adjuncts Of Comparison

Martin & Rose (136-7):

Likewise indeed means ‘even more than expected’, while at least means ‘less than expected’. Tutu argues that losing the right to sue is a higher than expected price to pay:

... the victim loses the right to sue for civil damages in compensation from the perpetrator.
That is indeed a high price to ask the victims to pay...

Helena claims that her men are victims of spiritual murder, and that being unable to rest is less than they should expect:

Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder.
At least a murder victim rests.

An example from the spoken mode is the following (from Forgiveness), in which Zako counters Luke’s expectant question:

Luke: You believe this shit?
Zako: Actually I do.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this instance, at the very least, indeed does not mean 'even more than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'even more than expected', it would mean the same as:

That is even a high price to ask a victim to pay. 

In terms of interpersonal meaning, indeed here serves as a factual comment Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191), meaning the same as:

That is, as a matter of fact, a high price to ask a victim to pay.

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, indeed marks a relation of verifactive clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613).

[2] To be clear, at least does not mean 'less than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'less than expected', it would mean the same as:

A murder victim merely rests.

In terms of interpersonal meaning, at least here might be interpreted as serving as a comment Adjunct of desirability (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191).

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, at least can mark a relation of corrective clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613). However, this is not the case in this instance, since, if it did, it would mean the same as:

Or rather, a murder victim rests.

The conjunctive relation is this instance, which is not marked by at least, is implicit cause:

Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder
(because) At least a murder victim rests. 

[3] To be clear, in this instance, at the very least, actually does not mean 'less than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'less than expected', it would mean the same as:

I merely do. 

In terms of interpersonal meaning, actually here serves as a factual comment Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191), meaning the same as:

As a matter of fact, I do.

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, actually marks a relation of verifactive clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613).

Misconstruing Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Comparison And Misunderstanding The Ideational Content Of The Illustrative Text

 Martin & Rose (2007: 136): 

Expectancy may also be adjusted with in fact, indeed, at least. By repeatedly narrowing the conditions for a public hearing, Tutu leads us to expect that public hearings almost never occur. But he then counters this expectation by saying what happens in fact:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing

where the offence is a gross violation of human rights - defined as an abduction, killing, torture or severe ill-treatment

unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice

(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights.

It is this strategy of leading us to expect one thing, and then countering it with ‘reality’, that enables Tutu to make his conclusion seem natural, simply by using Thus:

Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator.

We don’t mean to imply that we think Tutu’s conclusion is wrong. Rather he has argued it effectively by pre-empting any objections and countering them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse the textual function of in fact and indeed (cohesive conjunction) with one of their two interpersonal functions (modal assessment) and misconstrue the type of expansion relation, verifactive clarification (elaboration), as a subclass of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 189-91, 613).  Moreover, this confusion of textual and interpersonal grammar is misconstrued as logical, in terms of metafunction, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

With regard to the multifunctionality of these items, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 614-5) explain:

Certain items that serve as ‘elaborating’ conjunctions that are ‘internal’ only in orientation may also serve as modal adverbs (e.g. actually, in fact, indeed, as a matter of fact), functioning either as mood Adjuncts of intensity or as comment Adjuncts of factuality.

With regard to the interpersonal function of these items, 'expectancy' is a feature of mood Adjuncts of intensity (counter-expectancy: exceeding), whereas the example provided, in fact, actually serves as a comment Adjunct (unqualified: factual).

[2] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue an item (at least) that marks corrective clarification (elaboration) as one that marks a subclass of comparison (enhancement). Moreover, this misconstrual of the textual grammar (cohesive conjunction) is itself misconstrued as logical, in terms of metafunction, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose completely misunderstand the ideational content of the illustrative text.  There is no repeated narrowing down of the conditions for a public hearing, and no implication that they almost never occur, and so, no countering of this false impression.

Instead, the gist is, to paraphrase: the Act stipulates that gross violations of human rights must be dealt with publicly, unless doing so would bring about a miscarriage of justice, and Tutu confirms that virtually all important cases have indeed been dealt with publicly.

Misconstruing Subclasses Of Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Subclasses Of Comparison (Enhancement)

Martin & Rose (2007: 135-6):

However there are many other variations on internal similarity, including reformulating, exemplifying, generalising and specifying. Ideas may be reformulated with that is, i.e. In this book we often state something in commonsense terms, and then reformulate it more technically:

Attitudes have to do with evaluating things, people's character and their feelings.
Such evaluations can be more or less intense,
that is they may be more or less amplified.

Exemplification uses for example, for instance, e.g. to rework a general statement with a specific instance. Here Tutu gives an example of a condition under which an application would not be heard in public:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice
(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

But exemplifying is just one way of reworking a statement as more specific or more general. Other related conjunctions include in general, in particular, in short. Here are some examples from this book:

Attitudinal lexis plays a very important role in Helena's narrative,
as it does in general across story genres. 

Layers of New develop the point of a text,
in particular they focus on expanding the ideational meanings around a text's field

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'reformulating' is the subclass of appositive elaboration known as exposition: 'in other words' 'P i.e. Q' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 397-8, 542).  Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'exemplifying' is the subclass of appositive elaboration known as exemplification: 'for example' 'P e.g. Q' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 397-8, 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'generalising' is not a subclass of any subclass of expansion, and is not a feature of either clause complexing (logical lexicogrammar) or cohesive conjunction (textual lexicogrammar). Instead, in general functions interpersonally as a comment Adjunct of validity in the system of modal assessment; see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 129-32).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'specifying' is the subclass of clarifying elaboration known as particularising (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' in short marks the subclass of clarifying elaboration known as summative (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

∞

Again, in misunderstanding these relations and rebranding them as discourse semantic, Martin & Rose have created incongruent relations between semantics and grammar, even in the absence of grammatical metaphor, thereby undermining the model. 

Misconstruing Elaboration And Modal Assessment As Comparison

Martin & Rose (2007: 135):

Internal comparison provides a rich set of resources for written text, enabling writers to compare and contrast positions and evidence, rephrase, exemplify, generalise and specify. One kind of internal similarity is to simply say that two ideas are the same in some way, using similarly or again:

Relations of class to member can be used cohesively between messages
…
Again part-whole relations can be used cohesively between messages

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the meaning of the expansion relation of comparison is N is like M (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 411).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are subclasses of elaboration, not comparison (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 411). Specifically:

• 'rephrase' is a rebranding of expository apposition;
• 'exemplify' is exemplifying apposition; and
• 'specify' is a rebranding of particularising clarification.

By misunderstanding these relations and rebranding them as Martin's discourse semantics, Martin & Rose create incongruent relations between semantics (comparison) and lexicogrammar (elaboration), thereby undermining the distinction between congruent and incongruent (metaphorical) grammatical realisation of semantic features.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, generalising is not a subclass of comparison (or any other subclass of expansion). The adverb generally functions interpersonally, not logically (or textually), serving as a modal Adjunct of validity, not a conjunctive Adjunct of comparison; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 130).

Note that no argument is provided to support these "re-interpretations" of Halliday's theory.

Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Addition

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

Options for internal addition are summed up in Figure 4.5. 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, only the features whose entry condition is 'developing' constitute genuine subclasses of addition.  Of the features whose entry condition is 'staging', 'framing' is a rebranding of Halliday's continuity, and 'sidetracking' is a rebranding of two distinct subclasses of Halliday's clarification (elaboration).  See the two preceding posts.

Misconstruing Distractive And Dismissive Clarification (Elaboration) As Addition (Extension)

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

And there are other common items that are used to add a ‘sidetrack’ to the flow of discourse — anyway, anyhow, incidentally, by the way. Here’s a couple of examples from an anecdote about language teaching and language knowledge:

A teacher was confused about which of affect and effect was the noun or verb (it's affect verb, effect noun by the way, except for one formal meaning of effect 'succeed in causing to happen'), or was perhaps unable to recognise the noun or verb in the sentence he was policing. He marked the student wrong, suggesting affect for effect or vice versa (I can't recall which). Anyhow, as it turned out, the student had been right; the teacher got it wrong. (Martin (2000), Grammar meets Genre).

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose misconstrue two distinct subclasses of elaboration — dismissive (anyway) and distractive (incidentally, by the way) clarification — as one subclass of extension (addition), and rebrand Halliday's textual grammatical system (cohesive conjunction) as Martin's logical discourse semantic system. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 613):

Misconstruing Continuity As Additive Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

There is also a set of conjunctions that are commonly used in spoken discourse to add new stages to what is being said — now, well, alright, okay. Here is an example from Chapter 7:

Luke: You know I missed you two fuckers.
Llewelyn: Sorry I can't say the same Luke.
Zuko: Yeah me too.
Luke: Well fuck you, man.

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose mistake continuatives for conjunctions, and mistake the system of continuity for the system of additive conjunction.  In additive conjunction, a conjunction serves to mark a cohesive relation of addition — X and Y — between portions of text. In the system of continuity, on the other hand, a continuative cohesively marks a move in dialogue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 107):

A continuative is one of a small set of words that signal a move in the discourse: a response, in dialogue, or a new move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing. The usual continuatives are yes no well oh now. See Halliday & Hasan (1976: Chapter 5).

Misunderstanding Internal Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 133):

The roles of internal conjunction in logically organising discourse have become particularly elaborated in the written mode, building on older spoken ways of meaning. For this reason, internal conjunction includes the same four logical types as we have seen for external conjunctions. Furthermore many of the items that express internal relations are the same as external conjunctions, such as also, thus, but other internal conjunctions are quite different. The basic options are outlined in Table 4.5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, internal conjunction is not concerned with logically organising discourse. Instead, conjunction, whether internal or external, is a textual system of the lexicogrammar, through which cohesive relations are established between portions of text. This is distinct from the logical system of clause complexing, through which structural relations are established between clause in clause complexes.

The distinction between external and internal conjunction is the distinction between linking representations of experience and linking interpersonal exchanges.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 611):

Relations between representations of segments of experience are called external relations, and conjunctions marking such relations are called external conjunctions. … Relations linking text segments in their interpersonal guise are called internal relations – internal to the text as a speech event, and conjunctions marking such relations are called internal conjunctions.

[2] To be clear, Table 4.5 foreshadows some of the misunderstandings to appear in this discussion. For example:

• the conjunctive Adjunct for instance marks exemplifying apposition (a subclass of elaboration), not comparison (a subclass of enhancement);
• the conjunctive Adjunct on the other hand marks adversative addition (a subclass of extension), not comparison (a subclass of enhancement); and
• the speech-functional comment Adjunct admittedly functions interpersonally, not logically (or textually); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 191).

The Full System For External Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 132-3):

The full system for external conjunction is displayed in Table 4.4.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, this is not a system, but a hyponymic taxonomy presented as a table.

[2] As previously demonstrated, the authors' system of external conjunction is a confusion of two distinct grammatical systems, clause complexing (logical metafunction) and cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction) rebranded as a discourse semantic system of the logical metafunction.

Because the original intellectual source of this model is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), the logical relations are not organised into the three main subclasses of expansion (elaboration, extension and enhancement), and all subclasses of elaboration and projection are entirely absent from the author's model.  This latter fact is a particularly serious deficiency, since, not only does the model fail to account for the semantics of elaboration and projection, but it disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which elaboration and projection are featured.

Moreover, as previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose misunderstand each of the seven types of conjunction — see the previous 20 posts — and this has the effect of differentiating their rebranded model from its intellectual source, thereby creating the false impression of original thought.

Summary Of The Problems With The System Of External Consequence

Martin & Rose (2007: 132):

Options for external consequence, including expectant and concessive cause means, purpose and condition, are shown in Figure 4.4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, in terms of SFL Theory, the authors' system of external consequence comprises a subclass of manner (means), two subclasses of cause (reason and purpose) and condition, all misunderstood, to varying degrees, and rebranded as discourse semantics (instead of grammar). Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 477-8):

[2] As previously demonstrated, the oppositions 'expectant' vs 'concessive' and 'desire' vs 'fear' derive from misunderstandings of the logical relations involved.  See the previous posts:

• Confusing Ideational 'Cause' With Interpersonal 'Modulation'
• Misconstruing Concessive Condition As Concessive Cause
• Confusing Concessive 'But' With Adversative 'But' And Using Ambiguous 'However' To Disambiguate The Two
• Confusing Ideational 'Means' With Interpersonal 'Ability' And With Ideational 'Cause'
• Misunderstanding Concessive Condition As Concessive Means
• Misunderstanding Purpose And Confusing It With (± Concessive) Condition
• Misunderstanding Condition

[3] To be clear, even in its own terms, this is a poorly conceived network, since it features the same system (expectant vs concessive) four times, instead of once with four disjunctive ('or') entry conditions.

Confusing Condition With Cause

Martin & Rose (2007: 131-2):

Other conjunctions that realise condition include if ..then, provided that, so long as:

If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled,
then I would have done the same. 

I would have done the same
provided that there was no risk to my relaxed and comfortable way of life.

These are all conditions under which an event may happen. On the other hand, unless introduces conditions that close off the possibility of an event happening:

... the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice

With concessive condition, an effect won’t occur even if a condition is met:

I would not have done the same
even if I had known the truth

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the primary clauses ('consequents') of conditional clause complexes are not limited to "events that happen", as demonstrated by:

• If it quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, unless marks negative condition: if not P then Q (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 477), and the primary clauses of negative conditions are not limited to "events that happen", as demonstrated by:

• Unless it quacks like a duck, it probably isn't a duck.

[3] To be clear, the meaning of concessive condition is if P then contrary to expectation Q.

[4] To be clear, the use of 'effect' here, along with the notion of events happening (or not) after a condition is met, betrays the authors' misconstrual of condition as a type of cause. 

Conditional statements are not statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order.

Misunderstanding Condition

Martin & Rose (2007: 131):

Condition is the relation between an outcome and the conditions under which it may occur, as we saw in Helena’s story:

I would have done the same
had I been denied everything.
If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled with legislation.
If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it.

With condition the relevant modal meaning is probability. Helena considers it likely that she would join the struggle under sufficient conditions; and the more oppressive the conditions, the more likely she would have been to do the same.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the secondary clause of a conditional relation need not be an outcome nor an occurrence.  For example, consider the following clause complex:

• If the next turn-off is to Nimbin, then we're on the right road.

In this instance, we're on the right road is neither an outcome of the next turn-off is to Nimbin nor an occurrence (a material happening).

[2] To be clear, this is demonstrably untrue, as demonstrated by any and all conditional relations that involve other types of modality:

• If you use the toilet, you must flush it afterwards (obligation)
• If you're going to the shops, I'd like to come with you (inclination)
• If Jim says so, David usually agrees (usuality)

[3] To be clear, the probability in Helena's clause complex is expressed in the modal Finite would, not in the conditional relation between the clauses.

[4] To be clear, this is pure supposition on the part of Martin & Rose.

Misunderstanding Purpose And Confusing It With (± Concessive) Condition

Martin & Rose (2007: 130-1):

Whereas cause obligates an effect to follow, with purpose the relevant modal meaning is inclination. We take an action because we desire an outcome. As with by for expressing means, the hypotactic conjunction to is a common way of expressing purpose:

To make an informed recommendation,
the RRC committee will use the following two information instruments.

Other conjunctions that realise purpose include so that, in case:

The RRC committee will use the following two information instruments
so that it can make an informed recommendation,

These purpose conjunctions (in order) to, so as, indicate that the outcome is desired. But there is another kind of purpose where the outcome is feared — using lest or for fear of:

the RRC committee will use the following two information instruments
lest it make an uninformed recommendation.

With concessive desire, an action is performed without the effect occurring:

The RRC committee used two information instruments,
without being able to make an informed recommendation. 

The RRC committee used two information instruments,
even so they could not make an informed recommendation.

As fear is already a negative option, there is no concessive alternative.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue the clause complexing relation of purpose:

• because intention Q so action P

as the desire for, or fear of, the result ("outcome", 'effect") of a cause.

[2] To be clear, in case can mark a relation of cause: reason or condition, but not purpose. Cf

• He trained hard in order to get into the team (purpose)
• He trained hard in case he got into the team (condition)

[3] To be clear, these are not instances of purpose, but of concessive condition:

• if P then contrary to expectation Q

• if The RRC committee used two information instruments then contrary to expectation they could not make an informed recommendation

Misunderstanding Concessive Condition As Concessive Means

Martin & Rose (2007: 130):

With concessive means, one event is unable to happen, in spite of enough having been done to enable it:

Even by confessing
he didn't get amnesty 

National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted
even by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

And but can also be used for concessive means:

He confessed
but he didn't get amnesty.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation obtaining in all three examples is that of concessive condition (if P then contrary to expectation Q).  

In the first two clause complexes, the dependent clause is non-finite, and even by realises the same meaning as despite. The concessive condition relation can be made more explicit by substituting agnate finite clauses:

• Even though he confessed, he didn't get amnesty.

• National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted even though the Commission establishes as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

That is:

• if he confessed then contrary to expectation he didn't get amnesty

• if the Commission establishes as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights then contrary to expectation National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted.

In the above cases, the authors' error derives from taking the preposition by (the view from below) as criterial instead of the meaning being realised (the view from above).

The final clause is the paratactic agnate of the first clause complex, and so is again:

• if he confessed then contrary to expectation he didn't get amnesty

[2] To be clear, the logical relation between clauses is distinct from the interpersonal notion of ability.  Examples where ability is a feature of the relevant clause are:

• Even by confessing he wasn't able to get amnesty, and
• He confessed but wasn't able to get amnesty.

Confusing Ideational 'Means' With Interpersonal 'Ability' And With Ideational 'Cause'

Martin & Rose (2007: 129-30):

While causes explain why an effect happens, the relation of means explains how something happens, typically with by:

He expected to get amnesty

by confessing. 

The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation
by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

Here the Commission intends to use establishing as complete a picture as possible as the means to promote national unity and reconciliation. Whereas cause obligates an effect to follow, the relevant meaning here is ability. Tutu’s argument is that by establishing a complete picture, the Commission will be able to promote unity and reconciliation.

The hypotactic conjunction by is perhaps the most common way we express means. Other conjunctions of means include thus, by this means:

He expected amnesty.
Thus he confessed. 

As complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights will be established.
By this means the Commission will promote national unity and reconciliation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, along with 'comparison', 'means' is a subtype of manner. As a logico-semantic relation its meaning is N is via/ by means of M.

[2] To be clear, unknown to Martin & Rose, the logical relation in this instance obtains not between ranking clauses, but between two rank-shifted clauses in a complex serving as clause participant:

The objectives of the Commission	shall be	[[[ to promote national unity and reconciliation || by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights ]]]
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

The clause encodes the objectives of the Commission by reference to promoting national unity and reconciliation through the stated means.

[3] To be clear, this again confuses ideational meaning (cause and means) with interpersonal meaning (obligation and ability). Obligating someone to obey the law doesn't cause them to obey the law, as the law courts demonstrate.  Having the ability to play chess is distinct from the means of doing so, as those without chess sets demonstrate.

In this instance, on the one hand, Tutu isn't making an argument; he is setting out the objectives of the Commission. On the other hand, he isn't making claims about its ability; he is identifying its objectives and the means of achieving them (see [2]).

[4] To be clear, the cohesive relation here is cause (because P so result Q):

• because he expected amnesty so result he confessed.

In this instance, thus has the meaning of 'therefore' and signals a causal relation, rather than the meaning of 'in this way' that would signal a relation of means.

Confusing Concessive 'But' With Adversative 'But' And Using Ambiguous 'However' To Disambiguate The Two

Martin & Rose (2007: 129):

But the most common realisation of concessive cause is but:

He tried to hide his wild consuming fear,
but I saw it 

I can't handle the man anymore!
But I can't get out

However but can also realise comparison:difference, which can be confusing. We can test whether the relation is concession by trying to substitute but with hypotactic or concessive conjunctions that we know realise consequential meanings, such as although however:

Although he tried to hide his wild consuming fear,

I saw it. 

I can't handle the man anymore!
However I can't get out.

If we substitute conjunctions that realise contrast, they don’t make as much sense (*I can’t handle the man anymore! In contrast I can’t get out. *Whereas he tried to hide his wild consuming fear, I saw it).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation in this instance is concessive condition, not concessive cause.  Its meaning is if P then contrary to expectation Q:

• if he tried to hide his wild consuming fear then contrary to expectation I saw it

That is, Martin & Rose have misunderstood Halliday's concessive condition as concessive cause, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical system of clause complexing as Martin's discourse semantic system of conjunction.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation in this instance is adversative addition, not concessive cause. Its meaning is X and conversely Y:

• I can’t handle the man anymore and conversely I can’t get out

Compare a concessive misinterpretation:

• * if I can’t handle the man anymore then contrary to expectation I can’t get out

That is, Martin & Rose have misunderstood Halliday's adversative addition as concessive cause, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's textual grammatical system of cohesive conjunction as Martin's logical discourse semantic system of conjunction.

[3] As previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose misunderstand Halliday's adversative addition (extension) as a type of comparison (enhancement), variously labelled as different/difference or contrast.

[4] To be clear, the conjunctive Adjunct however, like but, can mark either relation, and so is no guide to disambiguation.  Moreover, in this example, it marks adversative addition ("comparison: difference/contrast"), not concessive condition ("concessive cause") — the opposite of the authors' claim.

[5] To be clear, this is the opposite of what is true.  The relation here is adversative addition (see [2]), which can be rendered cohesively as:

• I can’t handle the man anymore! On the other hand, I can’t get out.

Misconstruing Concessive Condition As Concessive Cause

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

In the introduction to this chapter we saw that ordinary conjunctions such as then can signal counterexpectancy in certain contexts. But for consequential conjunctions this is a regular option, so that specific sets of conjunctions realise each type of counterexpectant consequence. These are known as concessive conjunctions. … Concessive cause is realised by although, even though, even if, but, however.

For example Helena’s marriage failed all because she married for the wrong reasons, but it could have failed even though she married for the right reasons:

An extremely short marriage to someone else failed
even though I married for the right reasons.

Helena’s first love was popular with the Afrikaners even if he was an Englishman; in a more tolerant South Africa he might have been popular because he was an Englishman:

Because he was an Englishman,
he was popular with all the 'Boer' Afrikaners.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the relation of concessive condition (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 478) in the grammatical system of clause complexing, misunderstood as concessive cause, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

The meaning of cause (reason) is

• 'because P so result Q', 

whereas the meaning of concessive condition is

• 'if P then contrary to expectation Q'.

Conditional statements are not statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of An extremely short marriage to someone else failed all because I married for the wrong reasons is

• because I married for the wrong reasons so an extremely short marriage to someone else failed

whereas the meaning of An extremely short marriage to someone else failed even though I married for the right reasons is

• if I married for the right reasons then contrary to expectation an extremely short marriage to someone else failed.

[3] To be clear, liking someone because of their nationality or ethnic identity is not tolerance, but racial discrimination. Cf Because he was an Aryan, he was popular with the National Socialist Germans; Because she was not Aryan, she was not popular with the National Socialist Germans.

Confusing Metafunctions And Rebranding Halliday's Grammar As Martin's Discourse Semantics

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

Because functions in hypotactic relations; the corresponding paratactic conjunction is so, and cohesive conjunctions include therefore, consequently:

I married to forget,
so my first marriage failed. 

I married to forget.
Consequently my first marriage failed.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these are simply grammatical relations — originally devised by Halliday (± Hasan) — that are rebranded here as Martin's logical discourse semantic relations (after Martin 1992).

In SFL Theory, hypotactic and paratactic relations of cause obtain structurally been clauses in a clause nexus, and realise a feature of the logical system of clause complexing.

The above cohesive relation of cause, on the other hand, obtains non-structurally between clause simplexes, and realises a feature of the textual system of cohesive conjunction.

Confusing Ideational 'Cause' With Interpersonal 'Modulation'

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

When Helena’s first marriage failed, she explained why it failed, using all because:

An extremely short marriage to someone else failed
all because I married to forget.

The conjunction because means that one event obligates another to happen, as cause and effect. By saying all because, Helena makes this obligatory relation even stronger, i.e. there was only one reason - I married to forget. In other words, cause modulates the relations between one event and the next, and like other such modal meanings (described in Chapter 2 , section 2 .2 ) it is gradable; for example, she could also have weakened the causal relation with partly because. This is an important principle, particularly in science writing, where the strength of causal relations is carefully evaluated.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Here Martin & Rose confuse metafunctions: ideational causation with interpersonal modality (modulation: obligation).  The type of cause here involves the logical relation 'because P, so result Q'. Obligation, on the other hand, is the scale between 'do!' and 'don't!': graded from 'required' to 'supposed' to 'allowed'.

[2] This misunderstands cause. To be clear, cause is not gradable: either X is construed as a cause of Y, or it isn't. The variable here is not the relative strength of a causal relation, but whether a result has a single cause (all because) or multiple causes (partly because).