Confusing Ideational 'Means' With Interpersonal 'Ability' And With Ideational 'Cause'

Martin & Rose (2007: 129-30):

While causes explain why an effect happens, the relation of means explains how something happens, typically with by:

He expected to get amnesty

by confessing. 

The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation
by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

Here the Commission intends to use establishing as complete a picture as possible as the means to promote national unity and reconciliation. Whereas cause obligates an effect to follow, the relevant meaning here is ability. Tutu’s argument is that by establishing a complete picture, the Commission will be able to promote unity and reconciliation.

The hypotactic conjunction by is perhaps the most common way we express means. Other conjunctions of means include thus, by this means:

He expected amnesty.
Thus he confessed. 

As complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights will be established.
By this means the Commission will promote national unity and reconciliation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, along with 'comparison', 'means' is a subtype of manner. As a logico-semantic relation its meaning is N is via/ by means of M.

[2] To be clear, unknown to Martin & Rose, the logical relation in this instance obtains not between ranking clauses, but between two rank-shifted clauses in a complex serving as clause participant:

The objectives of the Commission	shall be	[[[ to promote national unity and reconciliation || by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights ]]]
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

The clause encodes the objectives of the Commission by reference to promoting national unity and reconciliation through the stated means.

[3] To be clear, this again confuses ideational meaning (cause and means) with interpersonal meaning (obligation and ability). Obligating someone to obey the law doesn't cause them to obey the law, as the law courts demonstrate.  Having the ability to play chess is distinct from the means of doing so, as those without chess sets demonstrate.

In this instance, on the one hand, Tutu isn't making an argument; he is setting out the objectives of the Commission. On the other hand, he isn't making claims about its ability; he is identifying its objectives and the means of achieving them (see [2]).

[4] To be clear, the cohesive relation here is cause (because P so result Q):

• because he expected amnesty so result he confessed.

In this instance, thus has the meaning of 'therefore' and signals a causal relation, rather than the meaning of 'in this way' that would signal a relation of means.