Let’s now see how Tutu uses conjunction to organise his exposition, in Figure 4.11.
In contrast to Helena’s story, all the connections between stages and phases of the exposition are internal. We have rendered the relation between the Thesis and the first Argument as internal succession (firstly), and the following Arguments are explicitly added to each other (also, Further). Within each Argument, the grounds expect its conclusion (Thus).
Blogger Comments:
[1] This rendering is invalid, not least because there is not even an implicit temporal relation between the two clauses. But it is also invalid because the word inserted by Martin & Rose to mark the temporal relation back to the preceding text, firstly, never marks a conjunctive relation to the preceding text. In correlatives such as first…next, it is the second term that marks the relation back to the preceding text; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 613-4).
[2] The insertion of that is by Martin & Rose to mark a relation of comparison is invalid on at least two grounds. Firstly, any implicit relation is indeterminate. For example, the implicit relation here could be more reasonably rendered by on the contrary, given the contrasting predications in the two propositions (the only form of justice vs another kind of justice).
Secondly, if the implicit relation were validly rendered by that is, in SFL Theory, it would mark elaboration (apposition: expository), not comparison; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3).
[3] Here Martin & Rose misunderstand the nature of Tutu's argument. The first and second instances of thus in this text mean 'in this way' and therefore mark a relation of manner, not consequence. Interestingly, the metaphorical notion of 'grounds expecting a conclusion' assigns a mental process to each of the premisses of an argument.
[2] The insertion of that is by Martin & Rose to mark a relation of comparison is invalid on at least two grounds. Firstly, any implicit relation is indeterminate. For example, the implicit relation here could be more reasonably rendered by on the contrary, given the contrasting predications in the two propositions (the only form of justice vs another kind of justice).
Secondly, if the implicit relation were validly rendered by that is, in SFL Theory, it would mark elaboration (apposition: expository), not comparison; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3).
[3] Here Martin & Rose misunderstand the nature of Tutu's argument. The first and second instances of thus in this text mean 'in this way' and therefore mark a relation of manner, not consequence. Interestingly, the metaphorical notion of 'grounds expecting a conclusion' assigns a mental process to each of the premisses of an argument.
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