Misrepresenting Grammatical Structure As Lexical Relations

Martin & Rose (2007: 87-88):

Tutu uses contrasts frequently to mount his argument for reconciliation over retribution. For example, he uses an antonym in his Thesis to emphasise the significance of the debate:

So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the antonyms in this instance are frivolous and serious.  In SFL theory, the relation constitutes an example of lexical cohesion, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar.

Here Martin & Rose misrepresent the nominal groups a frivolous question and a very serious issue as lexical items and misinterpret the relation between them as construing experiential meaning.

The experiential meaning that the authors attribute to a lexical relation is actually construed by the ideational grammar as an extending replacive relation in a nominal group nexus realising an Attribute:

this	is	not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue
Carrier	Process: attributive	Attribute

not a frivolous question	but a very serious issue
1	+ 2

Moreover, unknown to Martin & Rose, Tutu here is using the rhetorical device known antithesis, wherein two opposite ideas are put together in a sentence to achieve a contrasting effect.

Contrasts Between Lexical Items Constructing Arguments And Interpretations

Martin & Rose (2007: 87):

Contrasts are also an important resource for constructing arguments and interpretations, in which one position or set of behaviours and qualities is preferred over another. Helena used contrasts between her lovers’ behaviour and qualities before and after their ‘operations’ to make her point about the damage that has been done to them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, mere contrastive relations between lexical items do not, of themselves, construct arguments and interpretations.  This can be demonstrated by isolating two contrastive lexical items, teacher and student.  The resource for constructing arguments and interpretations is the lexicogrammar that construes the semantics.

[2] To be clear, the differential assessment of 'one position or set of behaviours and qualities over another' is a stance, which is the concern of the interpersonal metafunction (the enactment of intersubjective relations as meaning) not the experiential metafunction (the construal of experience as meaning).  That is, Martin & Rose, having misinterpreted a textual system (lexical cohesion) as an experiential system (ideation), now add interpersonal meaning to the confusion.

The Claim That Contrasts Between Lexical Items Construct Classifying Taxonomies

Martin & Rose (2007: 87):

Contrasts are an important resource in many genres for constructing classifying taxonomies in which one class of phenomenon is distinguished from another. The following biology report first contrasts the converse roles of producers and consumers. Sub-types of consumers are then contrasted in a series as primary, secondary and tertiary:

We have seen that organisms in an ecosystem are first classified as producers or as consumers of chemical energy. Producers in ecosystems are typically photosynthetic organisms, such as plants, algae and cyanobacteria. These organisms build organic matter (food from simple inorganic substances by photosynthesis). Consumers in an ecosystem obtain their energy in the form of chemical energy present in their 'food'. All consumers [sic] depend directly or indirectly on producers for their supply of chemical energy. 

Organisms that eat the organic matter of producers or their products (seeds, fruits) are called primary consumers, for example, leaf-eating koalas (Phascoiarctos cinereus), and nectar-eating honey possums (Tarsipes rostratus). Organisms that eat primary consumers are known as secondary consumers. Wedge-tailed eagles that prey on wallabies are secondary consumers. Some organisms consume the organic matter of secondary consumers and are labelled tertiary consumers. Ghost bats (Macroderma gigas) capture a variety of prey, including small mammals. (Kinnear and Martin 2004: 38)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the grammar, not contrastive relations between lexical items, that constructs classifying taxonomies.  The reader can verify this by considering only the highlighted text in the absence of the grammatical structures in which they function.

In SFL theory, the inherent relation in lexis between the complementary antonyms producer and consumer is a resource of the textual metafunction, lexical cohesion, in creating the texture of a text.

[2] To be clear, the wordings primary consumers, secondary consumers and tertiary consumers are not lexical items, so the relations between them are not lexical relations.  Moreover, the sub-types of consumers — primary, secondary and tertiary — are construed grammatically through the Classifier function of the nominal group, and the identities of each are construed grammatically through the Token-Value relations of identifying clauses.

[3] To be clear, as sub-types, the Classifiers primary, secondary and tertiary constitute co-hyponyms of the Thing consumers.  See also the previous post on the notion of series (scales and cycles) as sub-types of "contrast".

Misunderstanding 'Opposite' As 'Contrast'

Martin & Rose (2007: 86-7):

Contrasts

Contrasts are elements that differ significantly in meaning. They include elements that are opposed in meaning, such as win-lose, happy-sad or married-single, and series of differing meanings such as hot-warm-tepid-cold. Opposed elements include antonyms and converses. Antonyms come in pairs, e.g.:

win - lose
married - single
quickly - slowly

Converses are associated with converse social roles or locations, e.g.:

victim - perpetrator
mother - son
give - receive
on top of - underneath
before - after

Series include scales and cycles. Scales have outermost poles of meaning, e.g.:

hot - warm - tepid - cold
pass - credit - distinction - high distinction
tutor - lecturer - senior lecturer - associate professor - professor

Cycles order items between two others, such as days of the week or years:

Sunday - Monday - Tuesday - Wednesday - Thursday - Friday - Saturday
2000 - 2001 - 2002 - 2003...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this definition does not sufficiently specify the relation under discussion, not least because, on the paradigmatic principle, meaning is contrast.  An example of elements that differ significantly in meaning but which do not fit the Martin & Rose category of 'contrast' is transubstantiation-truck.

[2] As previously noted, what Martin & Rose term "antonyms" are generally known in linguistics as complementary antonyms: opposite meanings that do not lie on a continuous spectrum.  However, their example 'quickly - slowly' is not a complementary antonym, but a graded antonym, what the authors term a scale.

[3] As previously noted, what Martin & Rose term "converses" are generally known in linguistics as relational antonyms: words that refer to a relationship from opposite points of view.  To be clear, prepositions are (closed-class) grammatical items, not lexical items.

[4] As previously noted, what Martin & Rose term "scales" are generally known in linguistics as gradable antonyms: pairs of words with opposite meanings where the two meanings lie on a continuous spectrum.  The authors' examples are not pairs, and except for the polar opposites hot and cold, not opposites.

[5] To be clear, what Martin & Rose term "cycles" do not feature opposites.  Days of the week can be interpreted as co-meronyms of 'week' and co-hyponyms of 'day', but Sunday is not the opposite of Saturday, for example.  Moreover, the names of years are neither opposites — the year 2001 is not the opposite of 2003 — nor a cycle, since, although history often repeats itself, the year 2001 is not expected to return in the foreseeable future.

Misrepresenting Synonymy And Attitude

Martin & Rose (2007: 86):

Synonyms
Synonyms are different lexical items that share similar experiential meanings. For example Tutu uses the synonyms public hearing and open session, which denote the same kind of event. Synonyms are often used by writers to avoid repetition. The meanings of synonyms also usually differ in some way, such as the contexts in which they are typically used. For example public hearing may be used in a general context, and most of us will recognise the kind of event it denotes, whereas open session may refer to various kinds of events - not just court hearings. Furthermore synonyms may also differ in the attitude they express. So public and open are neutral in attitude, whereas other synonyms for these items that express a stronger attitude could be exposed or naked.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As already explained, in contradiction of Martin & Rose's model of taxonomic relations, synonyms do not constitute taxonomies, since the relation between items, in each case, is one of elaborating identity, rather than elaborating attribution (hyponymic taxonomy) — the general sense of 'taxonomy' — or composition (meronymic taxonomy).

[2] To be clear, synonyms are words that have similar meaning, whether ideational, interpersonal or textual.  For example, lastly and finally can both realise similar textual meaning as conjunctive Adjuncts, and sadly and unfortunately can both realise similar interpersonal meaning as comment Adjuncts.

The reason Martin & Rose have singled out experiential meaning here is because they have misunderstood the textual function of synonymy in lexical cohesion as experiential discourse semantics.

[3] To be clear, the system of ATTITUDE is concerned with interpersonal assessment.  The words public, open, exposed or naked only realise features of the ATTITUDE system if they are used to make an assessment in terms of AFFECT, APPRECIATION or JUDGEMENT, and the relative intensity of the attitudinal assessment depends on both context and co-text.  Merely construing experience as public, open, exposed or naked does not necessarily constitute an interpersonal enactment of an assessment, as demonstrated by:

• public toilets
• open sandwich
• exposed rocks
• naked eye.

Interpersonal Enactment By Means Of Textual Lexicogrammar Misunderstood As Experiential Semantics

Martin & Rose (2007: 85): 

By means of this classification Tutu advocates an approach to justice that draws on implicitly positive evaluations, which he contrasts with implicitly negative evaluations. As in the contrasting attributes of Helena’s lovers, before and after their ‘operations’, taxonomic relations interact with resources of appraisal to categorise the world and evaluate the categories we construe. However, in Tutu’s philosophical argument the categories are not people and their qualities, but institutional abstractions, including legal systems, principles of justice, and moral behaviours.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This blurs the distinction between metafunctions.  To be clear, construing experiential categories is not the means of enacting interpersonal assessments.

[2] As previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose's notion of taxonomic relations

• mistakes lexical cohesion, a resource of the textual metafunction, for experiential (discourse) semantics,
• mistakes grammatical structures for lexical items, and
• mistakes the functions of grammar for relations between "lexical items".

[3] To be clear, 'philosophical' means

• relating or devoted to the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence.
• having or showing a calm attitude towards disappointments or difficulties.

The Claim That Attributive Relations Are Construed By Lexical Relations

Martin & Rose (2007: 85):

Retributive justice includes the two attributes retribution and punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator; The three attributes of the spirit of ubuntu are the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances and the restoration of broken relationships. The four attributes of restorative justice are healing, forgiveness, reconciliation and the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community. These types of legal systems and their attributes are set out in Figure 3.9.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that these attributive relations are construed by relations between lexical items, rather than through grammar.  Even ignoring the fact that the items involved are grammatical structures rather than lexical items, the claim can be invalidated merely by removing all of Tutu's text apart from these "lexical items", and inviting the reader to identify, from what remains, how these attributive relations are construed:

Further, retributive justice — In which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator - is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. 

Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.

This is what comes from mistaking the textual relations of lexical cohesion for experiential semantics.

[2] There are many inconsistencies in this taxonomy, not least the confusion of hyponymy (types) with meronymy (components).  Some can be identified to give the general flavour:

1. The superordinate of the entire taxonomy is not a superordinate, but a term for its hyponyms (kinds of justice).
2. Impersonal state and traditional African jurisprudence are both construed as types (or parts?) of kinds of justice.
3. Retributive justice is construed as a type (or part?) of impersonal state.
4. The spirit of ubuntu [i.e. 'the essence of being human'] is construed as a type (or part?) of traditional African jurisprudence.
5. The synonyms retribution and punishment are construed as different types (or parts?) of retributive justice.
6. Healing of breaches, redressing of imbalances and restoration of broken relationships are construed as types (or parts?) of the spirit of ubuntu [i.e. 'the essence of being human'].

On Relations Between "Lexical Items" Construing Two Contrasting Types Of Legal System

Martin & Rose (2007: 84-5):

These [lexical] relations construe two contrasting types of legal systems. In one an impersonal state hands down retributive justice; the other is traditional African jurisprudence, based on the pre-colonial spirit of ubuntu, and advocated by Tutu for contemporary restorative justice.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, the elements being related here are not lexical items but grammatical units, nominal groups, in which sometimes the Deictic is included, and sometimes not.  The one exception, punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator, is a misanalysis in which a clause circumstance with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator is mistaken for a nominal group Qualifier.  On the other hand, as already pointed out, the relations that Martin & Rose claim to obtain between such "lexical items" do not survive close scrutiny; see also [3] and [4] below.

[2] To be clear, even if the elements involved were lexical items, and the relations between them accurately identified, such relations between lexical items could not construe two contrasting types of legal system.  The construal of experience is achieved through the ideational grammar — clause transitivity and clause relations — in realising ideational meaning.  In SFL theory, relations between lexical items are a resource of the textual metafunction in the creation of texture through lexical cohesion.

[3] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between an impersonal state and retributive justice as one of meronymy (part-whole) — meronymy being a relation of extension.  Here, however, contradicting that analysis, they construe an impersonal state as the external cause (Agent) of the process of handing down retributive justice (Medium) — cause being a relation of enhancement.

[4] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between the spirit of ubuntu and restorative justice as hyponymic — restorative justice is a type of the spirit of ubuntu — and the relation between these and traditional African jurisprudence as meronymic — restorative justice, and so also its superordinate the spirit of ubuntu, are part of traditional African jurisprudence.

Here, though, Martin & Rose interpret the whole (traditional African jurisprudence) as

• based on one of its parts (the spirit of ubuntu) and 
• advocated by Tutu for another of its parts (restorative justice).

If this does not appear immediately nonsensical, substitute other part-whole relations, such that the whole (a tree) is based on one of its parts (a leaf) and advocated for another of its parts (a branch).

Misconstruing 'opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence' As A Lexical Item

Martin & Rose (2007: 84):

Tutu contrasts retributive justice with restorative justice, completing his case that justice is being done when amnesty is given. He explicitly states that restorative justice is part of African jurisprudence, so implying that retributive justice is non-African (i.e. Western). Table 3.3 gives the lexical strings in this stage.

 

Blogger Comments:

In addition to misrepresenting the relations of lexical cohesion as experiential semantics, Table 3.3 includes two types of misunderstanding:

1. what constitutes a lexical item, and
2. the nature of the relation between them.

The wordings that are falsely presented as lexical items (see previous post) are:

• an impersonal state
• retributive justice
• punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• traditional African jurisprudence
• restorative justice (2)
• the spirit of ubuntu
• healing of breaches
• redressing of imbalances
• restoration of broken relationships
• opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence
• a far more personal approach
• the offence
• something that has happened to people
• rupture in relationships

Because these are not lexical items, the lexical relations said to obtain between them are problematic, to say the least. The wordings that are claimed to be meronymic (x is a part of a) are:

• an impersonal state — retributive justice
• traditional African jurisprudence — restorative justice
• restorative justice — healing / forgiveness / reconciliation
• something that has happened to people — rupture in relationships

The wordings that are claimed to be hyponymic (x is a type of a) are:

• retributive justice — punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• restorative justice — the spirit of ubuntu
• the spirit of ubuntu — healing of breaches / redressing of imbalances / restoration of broken relationships / opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence
• opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence — a far more personal approach
• a far more personal approach — restorative justice
• the offence — something that has happened to people