On Relations Between "Lexical Items" Construing Two Contrasting Types Of Legal System

Martin & Rose (2007: 84-5):

These [lexical] relations construe two contrasting types of legal systems. In one an impersonal state hands down retributive justice; the other is traditional African jurisprudence, based on the pre-colonial spirit of ubuntu, and advocated by Tutu for contemporary restorative justice.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, the elements being related here are not lexical items but grammatical units, nominal groups, in which sometimes the Deictic is included, and sometimes not.  The one exception, punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator, is a misanalysis in which a clause circumstance with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator is mistaken for a nominal group Qualifier.  On the other hand, as already pointed out, the relations that Martin & Rose claim to obtain between such "lexical items" do not survive close scrutiny; see also [3] and [4] below.

[2] To be clear, even if the elements involved were lexical items, and the relations between them accurately identified, such relations between lexical items could not construe two contrasting types of legal system.  The construal of experience is achieved through the ideational grammar — clause transitivity and clause relations — in realising ideational meaning.  In SFL theory, relations between lexical items are a resource of the textual metafunction in the creation of texture through lexical cohesion.

[3] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between an impersonal state and retributive justice as one of meronymy (part-whole) — meronymy being a relation of extension.  Here, however, contradicting that analysis, they construe an impersonal state as the external cause (Agent) of the process of handing down retributive justice (Medium) — cause being a relation of enhancement.

[4] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between the spirit of ubuntu and restorative justice as hyponymic — restorative justice is a type of the spirit of ubuntu — and the relation between these and traditional African jurisprudence as meronymic — restorative justice, and so also its superordinate the spirit of ubuntu, are part of traditional African jurisprudence.

Here, though, Martin & Rose interpret the whole (traditional African jurisprudence) as

• based on one of its parts (the spirit of ubuntu) and 
• advocated by Tutu for another of its parts (restorative justice).

If this does not appear immediately nonsensical, substitute other part-whole relations, such that the whole (a tree) is based on one of its parts (a leaf) and advocated for another of its parts (a branch).