Confusing Reading Pedagogy With Linguistic Theory

Martin & Rose (2007: 249):

In pedagogic terms what we are looking at here is scaffolding which has been carefully designed to ensure teachers support students as they move into academic discourse of this order. From the point of view of exchange structure what we are looking at is exchange complexing. Each exchange is designed to realise the goals of its Prepare, Focus, Identify, Highlight or Extend phase; and they are sequenced in relation to one another according to the Detailed Reading Cycle just outlined (see Figure 7.3).

Not all registers of dialogue have exchange complexing of this kind. But as a rule of thumb we can expect that the more institutionalised the discourse, the more likely it is to display exchange routines of this order. In some contexts these routines may be so conventionalised that we treat them as stages of a genre — as with Ventolas work on service encounters for example (or Sinclair and Coulthard’s 1975 work on classroom discourse for that matter).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the only registers of language "likely to display exchange routines of this order" are those that realise educational contexts in which this pedagogy is deployed.

A Problem With The Argument For A 'Move Complex'

Martin & Rose (2007: 244-5):

To begin, David prepares the class to read the first sentence by telling them what it means, paraphrasing it in terms they can all understand, and then reads it to them. He then prepares the students to identify one element of the sentence, its initial temporal circumstance, by giving them its transitivity category ‘when’ and telling them exactly where to find it (‘that sentence starts by telling us… '). The logical relation between the sentence and the two preparations is elaboration (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). Following Ventola (1987) we can treat this semantic triplet as a move complex, filling a single slot in exchange structure — two statements in other words functioning together as a K1 move. We'll highlight these move complexes by putting '=’ as a superscript before elaborating moves, and using dependency lines on the left, to group them with one another:

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, 'when' is not a transitivity category; 'temporal circumstance' is its transitivity function.

[2] To be clear, the logico-semantic relation of elaboration does not feature in Martin's logical semantics, because his system of CONJUNCTION is a rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's cohesive conjunction (textual grammar) as logical discourse semantics, and Halliday & Hasan (1976) did not yet use the general expansion systems of elaboration, extension and enhancement.

Moreover, the logical relation between "the sentence and its two preparations" is not elaboration. In the first move by the teacher, he projects a clause complex that is a more congruent rendering of the metaphorical clause in his second move. It is the projected more congruent clause complex that can be said to be an elaboration of the (unprojected) metaphorical clause.

In the third move by the teacher, he projects a clause (when they were rebelling) that encodes the function of the temporal circumstance of the second move (In the mid-1980s). Again, the relation between the two is a type of elaboration (intensive identity), but there is no elaborating relation between the two sentences.

These distinction are important because the notion of a move complex depends on there being a logico-semantic relation between the sentences as moves, which is not the case here.

Problems With The Exchange Structure NEGOTIATION System

Martin & Rose (2007: 240):

Expressed as a network of choices, we have a resource with three intersecting systems. One system is concerned with how the exchange is initiated — by the primary actor/knower or the secondary one, and if by the primary actor/knower whether the nuclear Al/Kl move is anticipated or directly enacted. Another system distinguishes between action and knowledge exchanges, and for action exchanges allows for negotiations in which goods can be proffered or services enacted immediately (in which case verbalising the A1 move is optional, and in a sense redundant) and negotiations in which some time will pass before the goods are proffered or the service enacted (in which case verbalising the A1 move as a promise is obligatory, and actually acting to fulfil the promise may not eventuate). Finally there is a system allowing for follow-up moves, first for the secondary actor/knower, and then, if they do make a move, for the primary actor/knower. These options are set out in Figure 7.2.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this system is inconsistent with the preceding exposition of exchange structure. For example, it presents the obligatory nuclear move (A1/K1) only as a potential option — though not even an option if the exchange is initiated by the secondary knower/actor. 

Moreover, the system does not allow exchanges that include both an optional anticipatory move and an obligatory nuclear move, since only one option can be chosen.

These shortcomings are partially masked by the inclusion of structure types, after the systemic features, none of which are valid realisations of the system selections.

Even more problematically, the network unintentionally (and incongruously) allows exchange structures of just a single move, which is optional, not obligatory, such as:

• dK1 [anticipate, knowledge, no follow up], and
• K2 [secondary, knowledge, no follow up].

The Problem With The Obligatory/Optional Move Distinction

Martin & Rose (2007: 239-40):

To complete the picture we can now allow for the possibility of follow-up moves by the secondary actor or knower (with 'f' standing for ‘follow up’):

And if they do follow up, then there is the possibility of a further follow-up move by the primary actor or knower:

We can sum up the various possibilities reviewed here using parentheses for optional moves. The structure potential for action exchanges is thus:

((dA1) ^ A2) ^ A1 ^ (A2f ^ (A2f))

And for information exchanges, we find the same possibilities:

((dK1) ^ K2) ^ K1 ^ (K2f ^ (K2f))

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on this model, the only obligatory move in the exchange between the waitress and Hendrik is said to be her A1 move Yes. All the other moves, including her offer Wine? and his metaphorical command Could I have a bottle of your best dry red? — which elicits her "obligatory" move — are mere optional extras.

Similarly, the only obligatory move in the exchange between Sannie and Llewelyn is said to be her K1 move Coetzee. All other moves, including her metaphorical command You'll never guess who's here and his question Who? — which elicits her "obligatory" move — are mere optional extras.

[2] Logically, these should read (dA1 ^) and (dK1 ^), not (dA1) ^ and (dK1) ^.

[3] Logically, these should read (^ A1f) and (^ K1f), not ^ (A2f) and ^ (K2f).

Problems With Analyses Using Anticipatory Moves (dA1 & dK1)

Martin & Rose (2007: 238):

A third possibility is for exchanges to be initiated by primary actors and knowers who anticipate proffering goods or performing a service by offering first to do so, or anticipate professing information by first alerting their addressee that it is coming. These anticipatory moves in a sense delay the exchange of goods-and-services and information, and so are referred to by Berry as dA1 and dK1 moves (with ‘d’ standing for ‘delay’):

These dK1^K2^K1 sequences can be used in conversation to re-affirm a proposition that needs to be foregrounded, for example as part of an argument amongst Daniel’s comrades about who betrayed him to the authorities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the exchange between the waitress and Hendrik involves two speech functions, offer and command, with the response to the offer ellipsed. A more congruent rendering of the exchange would be:

• Can I get you some wine? (Offer)
• Yes. (response: acceptance)
• Please bring a bottle of your best dry red. (Command)
• I will. (response: undertaking)

Similarly, the exchange between Sannie and Llewelyn also involves two speech functions, command and question, with the response to the command ellipsed. A more congruent rendering of the exchange would be:

• Guess who's here. (Command)
• Okay. (response: undertaking)
• Who's here? (Question)
• Coetzee is here. (response: answer)

Importantly, contrary to the authors' analysis, with the metaphor unpacked, the first move involves goods-&-services ('A'), not information ('K').

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137).

[2] To be clear, the exchange between Luke and Zako involves a rhetorical question: a question asked in order to create a dramatic effect or to make a point rather than to get an answer.

Problems With Obligatory Moves And With Primary vs Secondary Actor/Knowers

Martin & Rose (2007: 237-8):

We can interpret what is going on here as follows, drawing on work by Ventola (1987), who was in turn building on work by Berry (e.g. 1981). Minimally speaking, exchanges consist of one obligatory move. When negotiating goods-and-services, this is the move that proffers the goods or performs the service; when negotiating information, this is the move that authoritatively establishes the facts of the matter.

Berry refers to goods-and-services negotiations as action exchanges, and information exchanges as knowledge ones. And she refers to the person responsible for proffering goods or performing a service as the primary actor, and the person who has the authority to adjudicate information as the primary knower. On this basis, the waitress’s move below is nuclear A1 move, and Sannie’s is Kl:

Berry refers to the dialogue partner for primary actors as a secondary actor, who is the person who receives the goods or has the service performed for them; the secondary knower is the person who receives the information professed by the primary knower. Where exchanges are initiated by the secondary actor (requesting goods-and-services) or the secondary knower (requesting information), we find canonical two-part exchanges like the following:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the exchange of goods-&-services, the move that "proffers the goods" or "performs the service" is not the obligatory move, since these can be omitted in an exchange. These moves are responses to commands or offers, and responses are not obligatory. If there is an obligatory move in an exchange, it is the move that brings it into being, the initiating move.

[2] To be clear, this confuses semantics with context. Relations between interlocutors — primary vs secondary actor or knower — are a matter of tenor, the interpersonal dimension of context, the culture as a semiotic system. The moves they enact in an exchange are units in the interpersonal dimension of semantics, the language as a semiotic system.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Approach To 'Calls' As The Authors' Insight

Martin & Rose (2007: 235): 

As a rule of thumb we can include expletives and vocatives in other moves where possible, and treat them as independent moves only when there is nothing to append them to. So Sannie would be a vocative in the following command by her father:

Hendrik: Sannie, go with Father Dalton.

Sannie: - (goes)

But in the movie version of this exchange, Coetzee has been attacked and injured by Ernest, and in the ensuing chaos Hendrik has to first get Sannie’s attention before negotiating his demand for service:

Hendrik: Sannie.

Sannie: - What?

Hendrik: Go with Father Dalton.

Sannie: - (goes)

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. Yet again, Martin & Rose misrepresent Halliday's theorising as their own. Halliday (1994: 95):

Misunderstanding Metaphors Of Modality

Martin & Rose (2007: 235):

One variation on this principle to watch out for involves certain mental process clauses in first or second person present tense (I think..., I suppose.. ., do you reckon..., don't you suppose, etc.). These are actually modalities involving grammatical metaphor (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004).

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands metaphors of modality. As this concerns explicit subjective modality, it is only first person variants that function this way. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 687) explain, beginning with the example I don't believe that pudding ever will be cooked:

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does. The reason for regarding this as a metaphorical variant is that the proposition is not, in fact, ‘I think’; the proposition is ‘it is so’. This is shown clearly by the tag; if we tag the clause I think it’s going to rain we get 

I think it’s going to rain, isn’t it?

not I think it’s going to rain, don’t I?. In other words the clause is a variant of it’s probably going to rain (isn’t it?) and not a first-person equivalent of John thinks it’s going to rain, which does represent the proposition ‘John thinks’ (tag doesn’t he?). Thus in

You know || what’s happening tomorrow at five o’clock, don’t you?

the ‘mental’ clause you know was able to be tagged because it does not stand for a modality. It is the fact that mental clause is a modal clause and serves as mood Adjunct that explains the tag. If it was just an ordinary mental clause in a clause nexus of projection, I don’t believe should be able to be tagged. But since it has a metaphorical status and serves as mood Adjunct, it cannot be tagged. Instead, the Moodtag picks up the Mood element of the modalised proposition: that pudding probably never will ... will it?

Confusing Modal Responsibility With Moral Responsibility

Martin & Rose (2007: 234-5):

Technically speaking, what we are saying is that a move is a ranking clause, including any clauses embedded in it, and in addition any clauses dependent on it. So we can tag the main clauses in the examples below; they are negotiable. Coetzee makes others responsible for the torture facility, not his role in it:

And Sannie makes the village gossipmongers responsible, not her family:

The underlined clauses are not directly negotiable; to make them so would require an additional initiating move in which they are promoted from a subordinate to an arguable position.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Once again, Martin & Rose are misrepresenting Halliday's model of speech function as their own theoretical creation.

[2] To be clear, this confuses moral responsibility (for the torture facility) with modal responsibility (whether or not it is valid to state they had a facility outside Capetown…). 

[3] To be clear, the modal responsibility here is for the validity of the claim they'll say we're selling the house.

[4] To be clear, the projected clause we're selling the house can be challenged in a response move, as exemplified by But we're not (selling the house). Moreover, not only is this possible, it is more likely than a challenge to the projecting clause: But they won't say that.

In short, on the authors' model, the move But we're not (selling the house) would not be analysed as a responding move to they'll say we're selling the house, but would instead be analysed as a new initiating move.

The Authors' Definition Of A Response

Martin & Rose (2007: 232-3):

We can thus define a response as a move which:

(1) takes as given the experiential content of its initiating pair part

and

(2) accepts the general terms of its argument established by its Subject-Finite structure (i.e. its polarity/modality/temporality). …

But a response does not allow for changes to the nub of the argument (its Subject),  or to the content of what is being argued about in the rest of the clause. By definition, any move making changes of this kind would not be considered a response but a new initiating move.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, speech function is concerned with interpersonal meaning, not with experiential meaning. In the case of propositions, what is accepted or rejected in a response is the validity of what is predicated of the Subject (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 148, 151-2).

[2] To be clear, a responding move may accept or reject the validity of a proposition or proposal. 

[3] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 148):

From above, [the Subject] is that which carries the modal responsibility: that is, responsibility for the validity of what is being predicated (stated, questioned, commanded or offered) in the clause. … The notion of validity relates to the arguing of the case, if it is a proposition, or to the putting into effect if it is a proposal. The Subject is that element in which the particular kind of validity (according to the mood) is being invested.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Speech Function As The Authors' Creation

Martin & Rose (2007: 227):

In the previous section we proposed an inventory of 13 basic speech acts; we now need to think about how to distinguish them from one another when analysing conversation. One useful set of markers includes please, kindly, ta, thanks, thankyou, OK, alright, no worries, you're welcome, not a problem, which normally indicate moves concerning goods-and-services. Here Ernest pleads with Coetzee to stay and talk to his parents (until the comrades can get there to kill him):

And Hendrick orders wine for dinner with Coetzee and his family:

Where such markers are not present, we can check to see if they could have been (adding for example please to Hendrik’s command and alright to verbalise Sannie’s response to her father below):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Once again Martin & Rose are misrepresenting Halliday's major and minor speech functions (minus 'alarms') as their own creation.

[2] To be clear, the SFL way to identify speech functions in a text is to take the view 'from above' (the meaning being realised). This means using the semantic system of which they are instances. For example, in the case of major speech functions (realised by major clauses):

• if information is given, then it is a statement;
• if information is demanded, then it is a question;
• if goods-&-services are given, then it is an offer;
• if goods-&-services are demanded, then it is a command.

[3] To be clear, contrary to SFL Theory, here Martin & Rose advocate taking the view 'from below' (how meaning is realised) instead of the view 'from above' (the meaning being realised).

Misunderstanding Halliday's Moodtags And Misrepresenting Them As The Authors' Work

Martin & Rose (2007: 226):

Moves may also end with tag 'questions' (don’t you?, isn't he?, etc.) oriented to the addressee. These tags do not function as separate moves, but are better treated as explicit invitations to a listener to respond. Both of Sannie’s speech acts below would thus be treated as tagged statements (not as statements followed by questions). There is after all only one proposition being negotiated, not two:

 

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Yet again, Martin & Rose here present Halliday's work as if it were their own. Importantly, the tag doesn't just invite a response; it signals the type of response expected. Halliday (1985:69):

[2] This is misleading. While the first instance is a tagged declarative clause realising a statement, the second instance does not feature a Moodtag, and realises two speech functions, not one. To explain:

Firstly, a Moodtag reprises the Finite and Subject of a clause, so the (unmarked) Moodtag for you could have killed the man is couldn't you? not you know.

Secondly, there are two propositions

• the projected statement: you could have killed the man, and
• the projecting question: you know (realised metaphorically as a declarative clause),

each of which could be challenged in response.

Moreover, the projecting clause you know can itself be tagged by don't you?, further demonstrating that it is not a Moodtag but a proposition in its own right.

Vocatives

Martin & Rose (2007: 225-6):

Moves may contain names which specify who is expected to respond (vocatives). For analysis purposes we recommend not treating vocatives as distinct moves when they simply accompany a speech act, addressing its receiver. This would mean treating Ernest’s move addressing Coetzee below as a statement including the vocative you white piece of shit, and his father’s move as a command including the vocative Ernest:

So vocatives are only taken as separate speech acts when they function as a move on their own, in greeting or calling sequences, as illustrated above… .

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because this is simply the analysis that is consistent with SFL Theory, and yet Martin & Rose present it as their recommendation.

[2] To be clear, unknown to Martin & Rose, this an instance of interpersonal metaphor: a command realised by a declarative clause with Mood ellipsis:

[3] Trivially, these are moves in exchanges, not sequences. Sequences (of figures) are ideational, not interpersonal.