Misconstruing Distractive And Dismissive Clarification (Elaboration) As Addition (Extension)

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

And there are other common items that are used to add a ‘sidetrack’ to the flow of discourse — anyway, anyhow, incidentally, by the way. Here’s a couple of examples from an anecdote about language teaching and language knowledge:

A teacher was confused about which of affect and effect was the noun or verb (it's affect verb, effect noun by the way, except for one formal meaning of effect 'succeed in causing to happen'), or was perhaps unable to recognise the noun or verb in the sentence he was policing. He marked the student wrong, suggesting affect for effect or vice versa (I can't recall which). Anyhow, as it turned out, the student had been right; the teacher got it wrong. (Martin (2000), Grammar meets Genre).

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose misconstrue two distinct subclasses of elaboration — dismissive (anyway) and distractive (incidentally, by the way) clarification — as one subclass of extension (addition), and rebrand Halliday's textual grammatical system (cohesive conjunction) as Martin's logical discourse semantic system. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 613):

Misconstruing Continuity As Additive Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

There is also a set of conjunctions that are commonly used in spoken discourse to add new stages to what is being said — now, well, alright, okay. Here is an example from Chapter 7:

Luke: You know I missed you two fuckers.
Llewelyn: Sorry I can't say the same Luke.
Zuko: Yeah me too.
Luke: Well fuck you, man.

Blogger Comments:

Here Martin & Rose mistake continuatives for conjunctions, and mistake the system of continuity for the system of additive conjunction.  In additive conjunction, a conjunction serves to mark a cohesive relation of addition — X and Y — between portions of text. In the system of continuity, on the other hand, a continuative cohesively marks a move in dialogue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 107):

A continuative is one of a small set of words that signal a move in the discourse: a response, in dialogue, or a new move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing. The usual continuatives are yes no well oh now. See Halliday & Hasan (1976: Chapter 5).

Misunderstanding Internal Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 133):

The roles of internal conjunction in logically organising discourse have become particularly elaborated in the written mode, building on older spoken ways of meaning. For this reason, internal conjunction includes the same four logical types as we have seen for external conjunctions. Furthermore many of the items that express internal relations are the same as external conjunctions, such as also, thus, but other internal conjunctions are quite different. The basic options are outlined in Table 4.5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, internal conjunction is not concerned with logically organising discourse. Instead, conjunction, whether internal or external, is a textual system of the lexicogrammar, through which cohesive relations are established between portions of text. This is distinct from the logical system of clause complexing, through which structural relations are established between clause in clause complexes.

The distinction between external and internal conjunction is the distinction between linking representations of experience and linking interpersonal exchanges.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 611):

Relations between representations of segments of experience are called external relations, and conjunctions marking such relations are called external conjunctions. … Relations linking text segments in their interpersonal guise are called internal relations – internal to the text as a speech event, and conjunctions marking such relations are called internal conjunctions.

[2] To be clear, Table 4.5 foreshadows some of the misunderstandings to appear in this discussion. For example:

• the conjunctive Adjunct for instance marks exemplifying apposition (a subclass of elaboration), not comparison (a subclass of enhancement);
• the conjunctive Adjunct on the other hand marks adversative addition (a subclass of extension), not comparison (a subclass of enhancement); and
• the speech-functional comment Adjunct admittedly functions interpersonally, not logically (or textually); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 191).

The Full System For External Conjunction

Martin & Rose (2007: 132-3):

The full system for external conjunction is displayed in Table 4.4.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, this is not a system, but a hyponymic taxonomy presented as a table.

[2] As previously demonstrated, the authors' system of external conjunction is a confusion of two distinct grammatical systems, clause complexing (logical metafunction) and cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction) rebranded as a discourse semantic system of the logical metafunction.

Because the original intellectual source of this model is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), the logical relations are not organised into the three main subclasses of expansion (elaboration, extension and enhancement), and all subclasses of elaboration and projection are entirely absent from the author's model.  This latter fact is a particularly serious deficiency, since, not only does the model fail to account for the semantics of elaboration and projection, but it disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which elaboration and projection are featured.

Moreover, as previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose misunderstand each of the seven types of conjunction — see the previous 20 posts — and this has the effect of differentiating their rebranded model from its intellectual source, thereby creating the false impression of original thought.

Summary Of The Problems With The System Of External Consequence

Martin & Rose (2007: 132):

Options for external consequence, including expectant and concessive cause means, purpose and condition, are shown in Figure 4.4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, in terms of SFL Theory, the authors' system of external consequence comprises a subclass of manner (means), two subclasses of cause (reason and purpose) and condition, all misunderstood, to varying degrees, and rebranded as discourse semantics (instead of grammar). Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 477-8):

[2] As previously demonstrated, the oppositions 'expectant' vs 'concessive' and 'desire' vs 'fear' derive from misunderstandings of the logical relations involved.  See the previous posts:

• Confusing Ideational 'Cause' With Interpersonal 'Modulation'
• Misconstruing Concessive Condition As Concessive Cause
• Confusing Concessive 'But' With Adversative 'But' And Using Ambiguous 'However' To Disambiguate The Two
• Confusing Ideational 'Means' With Interpersonal 'Ability' And With Ideational 'Cause'
• Misunderstanding Concessive Condition As Concessive Means
• Misunderstanding Purpose And Confusing It With (± Concessive) Condition
• Misunderstanding Condition

[3] To be clear, even in its own terms, this is a poorly conceived network, since it features the same system (expectant vs concessive) four times, instead of once with four disjunctive ('or') entry conditions.

Confusing Condition With Cause

Martin & Rose (2007: 131-2):

Other conjunctions that realise condition include if ..then, provided that, so long as:

If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled,
then I would have done the same. 

I would have done the same
provided that there was no risk to my relaxed and comfortable way of life.

These are all conditions under which an event may happen. On the other hand, unless introduces conditions that close off the possibility of an event happening:

... the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice

With concessive condition, an effect won’t occur even if a condition is met:

I would not have done the same
even if I had known the truth

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the primary clauses ('consequents') of conditional clause complexes are not limited to "events that happen", as demonstrated by:

• If it quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, unless marks negative condition: if not P then Q (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 477), and the primary clauses of negative conditions are not limited to "events that happen", as demonstrated by:

• Unless it quacks like a duck, it probably isn't a duck.

[3] To be clear, the meaning of concessive condition is if P then contrary to expectation Q.

[4] To be clear, the use of 'effect' here, along with the notion of events happening (or not) after a condition is met, betrays the authors' misconstrual of condition as a type of cause. 

Conditional statements are not statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order.

Misunderstanding Condition

Martin & Rose (2007: 131):

Condition is the relation between an outcome and the conditions under which it may occur, as we saw in Helena’s story:

I would have done the same
had I been denied everything.
If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled with legislation.
If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it.

With condition the relevant modal meaning is probability. Helena considers it likely that she would join the struggle under sufficient conditions; and the more oppressive the conditions, the more likely she would have been to do the same.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the secondary clause of a conditional relation need not be an outcome nor an occurrence.  For example, consider the following clause complex:

• If the next turn-off is to Nimbin, then we're on the right road.

In this instance, we're on the right road is neither an outcome of the next turn-off is to Nimbin nor an occurrence (a material happening).

[2] To be clear, this is demonstrably untrue, as demonstrated by any and all conditional relations that involve other types of modality:

• If you use the toilet, you must flush it afterwards (obligation)
• If you're going to the shops, I'd like to come with you (inclination)
• If Jim says so, David usually agrees (usuality)

[3] To be clear, the probability in Helena's clause complex is expressed in the modal Finite would, not in the conditional relation between the clauses.

[4] To be clear, this is pure supposition on the part of Martin & Rose.

Misunderstanding Purpose And Confusing It With (± Concessive) Condition

Martin & Rose (2007: 130-1):

Whereas cause obligates an effect to follow, with purpose the relevant modal meaning is inclination. We take an action because we desire an outcome. As with by for expressing means, the hypotactic conjunction to is a common way of expressing purpose:

To make an informed recommendation,
the RRC committee will use the following two information instruments.

Other conjunctions that realise purpose include so that, in case:

The RRC committee will use the following two information instruments
so that it can make an informed recommendation,

These purpose conjunctions (in order) to, so as, indicate that the outcome is desired. But there is another kind of purpose where the outcome is feared — using lest or for fear of:

the RRC committee will use the following two information instruments
lest it make an uninformed recommendation.

With concessive desire, an action is performed without the effect occurring:

The RRC committee used two information instruments,
without being able to make an informed recommendation. 

The RRC committee used two information instruments,
even so they could not make an informed recommendation.

As fear is already a negative option, there is no concessive alternative.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue the clause complexing relation of purpose:

• because intention Q so action P

as the desire for, or fear of, the result ("outcome", 'effect") of a cause.

[2] To be clear, in case can mark a relation of cause: reason or condition, but not purpose. Cf

• He trained hard in order to get into the team (purpose)
• He trained hard in case he got into the team (condition)

[3] To be clear, these are not instances of purpose, but of concessive condition:

• if P then contrary to expectation Q

• if The RRC committee used two information instruments then contrary to expectation they could not make an informed recommendation

Misunderstanding Concessive Condition As Concessive Means

Martin & Rose (2007: 130):

With concessive means, one event is unable to happen, in spite of enough having been done to enable it:

Even by confessing
he didn't get amnesty 

National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted
even by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

And but can also be used for concessive means:

He confessed
but he didn't get amnesty.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation obtaining in all three examples is that of concessive condition (if P then contrary to expectation Q).  

In the first two clause complexes, the dependent clause is non-finite, and even by realises the same meaning as despite. The concessive condition relation can be made more explicit by substituting agnate finite clauses:

• Even though he confessed, he didn't get amnesty.

• National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted even though the Commission establishes as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

That is:

• if he confessed then contrary to expectation he didn't get amnesty

• if the Commission establishes as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights then contrary to expectation National unity and reconciliation may still not be promoted.

In the above cases, the authors' error derives from taking the preposition by (the view from below) as criterial instead of the meaning being realised (the view from above).

The final clause is the paratactic agnate of the first clause complex, and so is again:

• if he confessed then contrary to expectation he didn't get amnesty

[2] To be clear, the logical relation between clauses is distinct from the interpersonal notion of ability.  Examples where ability is a feature of the relevant clause are:

• Even by confessing he wasn't able to get amnesty, and
• He confessed but wasn't able to get amnesty.

Confusing Ideational 'Means' With Interpersonal 'Ability' And With Ideational 'Cause'

Martin & Rose (2007: 129-30):

While causes explain why an effect happens, the relation of means explains how something happens, typically with by:

He expected to get amnesty

by confessing. 

The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation
by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights.

Here the Commission intends to use establishing as complete a picture as possible as the means to promote national unity and reconciliation. Whereas cause obligates an effect to follow, the relevant meaning here is ability. Tutu’s argument is that by establishing a complete picture, the Commission will be able to promote unity and reconciliation.

The hypotactic conjunction by is perhaps the most common way we express means. Other conjunctions of means include thus, by this means:

He expected amnesty.
Thus he confessed. 

As complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights will be established.
By this means the Commission will promote national unity and reconciliation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, along with 'comparison', 'means' is a subtype of manner. As a logico-semantic relation its meaning is N is via/ by means of M.

[2] To be clear, unknown to Martin & Rose, the logical relation in this instance obtains not between ranking clauses, but between two rank-shifted clauses in a complex serving as clause participant:

The objectives of the Commission	shall be	[[[ to promote national unity and reconciliation || by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights ]]]
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

The clause encodes the objectives of the Commission by reference to promoting national unity and reconciliation through the stated means.

[3] To be clear, this again confuses ideational meaning (cause and means) with interpersonal meaning (obligation and ability). Obligating someone to obey the law doesn't cause them to obey the law, as the law courts demonstrate.  Having the ability to play chess is distinct from the means of doing so, as those without chess sets demonstrate.

In this instance, on the one hand, Tutu isn't making an argument; he is setting out the objectives of the Commission. On the other hand, he isn't making claims about its ability; he is identifying its objectives and the means of achieving them (see [2]).

[4] To be clear, the cohesive relation here is cause (because P so result Q):

• because he expected amnesty so result he confessed.

In this instance, thus has the meaning of 'therefore' and signals a causal relation, rather than the meaning of 'in this way' that would signal a relation of means.

Confusing Concessive 'But' With Adversative 'But' And Using Ambiguous 'However' To Disambiguate The Two

Martin & Rose (2007: 129):

But the most common realisation of concessive cause is but:

He tried to hide his wild consuming fear,
but I saw it 

I can't handle the man anymore!
But I can't get out

However but can also realise comparison:difference, which can be confusing. We can test whether the relation is concession by trying to substitute but with hypotactic or concessive conjunctions that we know realise consequential meanings, such as although however:

Although he tried to hide his wild consuming fear,

I saw it. 

I can't handle the man anymore!
However I can't get out.

If we substitute conjunctions that realise contrast, they don’t make as much sense (*I can’t handle the man anymore! In contrast I can’t get out. *Whereas he tried to hide his wild consuming fear, I saw it).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation in this instance is concessive condition, not concessive cause.  Its meaning is if P then contrary to expectation Q:

• if he tried to hide his wild consuming fear then contrary to expectation I saw it

That is, Martin & Rose have misunderstood Halliday's concessive condition as concessive cause, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical system of clause complexing as Martin's discourse semantic system of conjunction.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation in this instance is adversative addition, not concessive cause. Its meaning is X and conversely Y:

• I can’t handle the man anymore and conversely I can’t get out

Compare a concessive misinterpretation:

• * if I can’t handle the man anymore then contrary to expectation I can’t get out

That is, Martin & Rose have misunderstood Halliday's adversative addition as concessive cause, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's textual grammatical system of cohesive conjunction as Martin's logical discourse semantic system of conjunction.

[3] As previously demonstrated, Martin & Rose misunderstand Halliday's adversative addition (extension) as a type of comparison (enhancement), variously labelled as different/difference or contrast.

[4] To be clear, the conjunctive Adjunct however, like but, can mark either relation, and so is no guide to disambiguation.  Moreover, in this example, it marks adversative addition ("comparison: difference/contrast"), not concessive condition ("concessive cause") — the opposite of the authors' claim.

[5] To be clear, this is the opposite of what is true.  The relation here is adversative addition (see [2]), which can be rendered cohesively as:

• I can’t handle the man anymore! On the other hand, I can’t get out.

Misconstruing Concessive Condition As Concessive Cause

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

In the introduction to this chapter we saw that ordinary conjunctions such as then can signal counterexpectancy in certain contexts. But for consequential conjunctions this is a regular option, so that specific sets of conjunctions realise each type of counterexpectant consequence. These are known as concessive conjunctions. … Concessive cause is realised by although, even though, even if, but, however.

For example Helena’s marriage failed all because she married for the wrong reasons, but it could have failed even though she married for the right reasons:

An extremely short marriage to someone else failed
even though I married for the right reasons.

Helena’s first love was popular with the Afrikaners even if he was an Englishman; in a more tolerant South Africa he might have been popular because he was an Englishman:

Because he was an Englishman,
he was popular with all the 'Boer' Afrikaners.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the relation of concessive condition (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 478) in the grammatical system of clause complexing, misunderstood as concessive cause, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

The meaning of cause (reason) is

• 'because P so result Q', 

whereas the meaning of concessive condition is

• 'if P then contrary to expectation Q'.

Conditional statements are not statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of An extremely short marriage to someone else failed all because I married for the wrong reasons is

• because I married for the wrong reasons so an extremely short marriage to someone else failed

whereas the meaning of An extremely short marriage to someone else failed even though I married for the right reasons is

• if I married for the right reasons then contrary to expectation an extremely short marriage to someone else failed.

[3] To be clear, liking someone because of their nationality or ethnic identity is not tolerance, but racial discrimination. Cf Because he was an Aryan, he was popular with the National Socialist Germans; Because she was not Aryan, she was not popular with the National Socialist Germans.

Confusing Metafunctions And Rebranding Halliday's Grammar As Martin's Discourse Semantics

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

Because functions in hypotactic relations; the corresponding paratactic conjunction is so, and cohesive conjunctions include therefore, consequently:

I married to forget,
so my first marriage failed. 

I married to forget.
Consequently my first marriage failed.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these are simply grammatical relations — originally devised by Halliday (± Hasan) — that are rebranded here as Martin's logical discourse semantic relations (after Martin 1992).

In SFL Theory, hypotactic and paratactic relations of cause obtain structurally been clauses in a clause nexus, and realise a feature of the logical system of clause complexing.

The above cohesive relation of cause, on the other hand, obtains non-structurally between clause simplexes, and realises a feature of the textual system of cohesive conjunction.

Confusing Ideational 'Cause' With Interpersonal 'Modulation'

Martin & Rose (2007: 128):

When Helena’s first marriage failed, she explained why it failed, using all because:

An extremely short marriage to someone else failed
all because I married to forget.

The conjunction because means that one event obligates another to happen, as cause and effect. By saying all because, Helena makes this obligatory relation even stronger, i.e. there was only one reason - I married to forget. In other words, cause modulates the relations between one event and the next, and like other such modal meanings (described in Chapter 2 , section 2 .2 ) it is gradable; for example, she could also have weakened the causal relation with partly because. This is an important principle, particularly in science writing, where the strength of causal relations is carefully evaluated.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Here Martin & Rose confuse metafunctions: ideational causation with interpersonal modality (modulation: obligation).  The type of cause here involves the logical relation 'because P, so result Q'. Obligation, on the other hand, is the scale between 'do!' and 'don't!': graded from 'required' to 'supposed' to 'allowed'.

[2] This misunderstands cause. To be clear, cause is not gradable: either X is construed as a cause of Y, or it isn't. The variable here is not the relative strength of a causal relation, but whether a result has a single cause (all because) or multiple causes (partly because).