The Claim That Attributive Relations Are Construed By Lexical Relations

Martin & Rose (2007: 85):

Retributive justice includes the two attributes retribution and punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator; The three attributes of the spirit of ubuntu are the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances and the restoration of broken relationships. The four attributes of restorative justice are healing, forgiveness, reconciliation and the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community. These types of legal systems and their attributes are set out in Figure 3.9.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that these attributive relations are construed by relations between lexical items, rather than through grammar.  Even ignoring the fact that the items involved are grammatical structures rather than lexical items, the claim can be invalidated merely by removing all of Tutu's text apart from these "lexical items", and inviting the reader to identify, from what remains, how these attributive relations are construed:

Further, retributive justice — In which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator - is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. 

Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.

This is what comes from mistaking the textual relations of lexical cohesion for experiential semantics.

[2] There are many inconsistencies in this taxonomy, not least the confusion of hyponymy (types) with meronymy (components).  Some can be identified to give the general flavour:

1. The superordinate of the entire taxonomy is not a superordinate, but a term for its hyponyms (kinds of justice).
2. Impersonal state and traditional African jurisprudence are both construed as types (or parts?) of kinds of justice.
3. Retributive justice is construed as a type (or part?) of impersonal state.
4. The spirit of ubuntu [i.e. 'the essence of being human'] is construed as a type (or part?) of traditional African jurisprudence.
5. The synonyms retribution and punishment are construed as different types (or parts?) of retributive justice.
6. Healing of breaches, redressing of imbalances and restoration of broken relationships are construed as types (or parts?) of the spirit of ubuntu [i.e. 'the essence of being human'].

On Relations Between "Lexical Items" Construing Two Contrasting Types Of Legal System

Martin & Rose (2007: 84-5):

These [lexical] relations construe two contrasting types of legal systems. In one an impersonal state hands down retributive justice; the other is traditional African jurisprudence, based on the pre-colonial spirit of ubuntu, and advocated by Tutu for contemporary restorative justice.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, the elements being related here are not lexical items but grammatical units, nominal groups, in which sometimes the Deictic is included, and sometimes not.  The one exception, punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator, is a misanalysis in which a clause circumstance with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator is mistaken for a nominal group Qualifier.  On the other hand, as already pointed out, the relations that Martin & Rose claim to obtain between such "lexical items" do not survive close scrutiny; see also [3] and [4] below.

[2] To be clear, even if the elements involved were lexical items, and the relations between them accurately identified, such relations between lexical items could not construe two contrasting types of legal system.  The construal of experience is achieved through the ideational grammar — clause transitivity and clause relations — in realising ideational meaning.  In SFL theory, relations between lexical items are a resource of the textual metafunction in the creation of texture through lexical cohesion.

[3] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between an impersonal state and retributive justice as one of meronymy (part-whole) — meronymy being a relation of extension.  Here, however, contradicting that analysis, they construe an impersonal state as the external cause (Agent) of the process of handing down retributive justice (Medium) — cause being a relation of enhancement.

[4] In Table 3.3, Martin & Rose interpret the relation between the spirit of ubuntu and restorative justice as hyponymic — restorative justice is a type of the spirit of ubuntu — and the relation between these and traditional African jurisprudence as meronymic — restorative justice, and so also its superordinate the spirit of ubuntu, are part of traditional African jurisprudence.

Here, though, Martin & Rose interpret the whole (traditional African jurisprudence) as

• based on one of its parts (the spirit of ubuntu) and 
• advocated by Tutu for another of its parts (restorative justice).

If this does not appear immediately nonsensical, substitute other part-whole relations, such that the whole (a tree) is based on one of its parts (a leaf) and advocated for another of its parts (a branch).

Misconstruing 'opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence' As A Lexical Item

Martin & Rose (2007: 84):

Tutu contrasts retributive justice with restorative justice, completing his case that justice is being done when amnesty is given. He explicitly states that restorative justice is part of African jurisprudence, so implying that retributive justice is non-African (i.e. Western). Table 3.3 gives the lexical strings in this stage.

 

Blogger Comments:

In addition to misrepresenting the relations of lexical cohesion as experiential semantics, Table 3.3 includes two types of misunderstanding:

1. what constitutes a lexical item, and
2. the nature of the relation between them.

The wordings that are falsely presented as lexical items (see previous post) are:

• an impersonal state
• retributive justice
• punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• traditional African jurisprudence
• restorative justice (2)
• the spirit of ubuntu
• healing of breaches
• redressing of imbalances
• restoration of broken relationships
• opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence
• a far more personal approach
• the offence
• something that has happened to people
• rupture in relationships

Because these are not lexical items, the lexical relations said to obtain between them are problematic, to say the least. The wordings that are claimed to be meronymic (x is a part of a) are:

• an impersonal state — retributive justice
• traditional African jurisprudence — restorative justice
• restorative justice — healing / forgiveness / reconciliation
• something that has happened to people — rupture in relationships

The wordings that are claimed to be hyponymic (x is a type of a) are:

• retributive justice — punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• restorative justice — the spirit of ubuntu
• the spirit of ubuntu — healing of breaches / redressing of imbalances / restoration of broken relationships / opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence
• opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (the perpetrator) has injured by his or her offence — a far more personal approach
• a far more personal approach — restorative justice
• the offence — something that has happened to people

Misunderstanding Hyponymy And Misrepresenting Grammatical Relations As Lexical

Martin & Rose (2007: 83-4):

In his third Argument stage, Tutu constructs a model of 'kinds of justice’. He does this by explicitly naming the superordinate class as form of justice or kind of justice, and explicitly contrasting sub-types, with not the only form and another kind:

Further, retributive justice -- In which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator - is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships.
Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin & Rose misunderstand the principle of hyponymy, since not the only form is not a hyponym (sub-type) of form of justice, just as another kind is not a hyponym of kind of justice.  The superordinate here is 'justice', and 'form/kinds of justice' are its hyponyms.

[2] It is instructive to consider what Martin & Rose deem to be lexical items:

• retributive justice
• an impersonal state
• punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• form of justice
• kind of justice
• restorative justice
• traditional African jurisprudence
• the spirit of ubuntu
• healing of breaches
• redressing of imbalances
• restoration of broken relationships
• kind of justice
• rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator
• opportunity to be reintegrated into the community
• a far more personal approach
• the offence
• something that has happened to people
• rupture in relationships
• restorative justice

As can be seen, most of these "lexical items" are nominal groups in which the Deictic is sometimes included and sometimes not.  That is, the meanings that Martin & Rose are concerned with are realised in the relations of grammatical structure, not in relations between lexical items:

• Deictic: an, the, a
• Extended Numerative (variety): form, kind
• Epithet: impersonal, far more personal
• Classifier: retributive, restorative, traditional African 
• Thing: justice, state, jurisprudence, spirit, healing, redressing, restoration, opportunity, approach, offence, something, rupture
• Qualifier (embedded prepositional phrase): of Ubuntu, of breaches, of imbalances, of broken relationships, in relationships
• Qualifier (embedded clause): to be reintegrated into the community, that has happened to people

Another two "lexical items":

• punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
• rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator

involve grammatical relations within the clause:

In which	an impersonal state	hands down	punishment	with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator
Location	Actor	Process: material	Scope	Manner

This kind of justice	seeks to rehabilitate	both the victim and the perpetrator
Actor	Process: material	Goal

These last two examples also demonstrate that Martin & Rose have difficulty identifying constituency in the texts they analyse.