On Judgement: Esteem, Sanction & Normality

Martin & Rose (2007: 67-8):

Judgement can be thought of as the institutionalisation of feeling, in the context of proposals (norms about how people should and shouldn’t behave). Like affect, it has a positive and negative dimension corresponding to positive and negative judgements about behaviour. Media research reported in Iedema et al. (1994) has suggested dividing judgements into two major groups, social esteem and social sanction. Social esteem involves admiration and criticism, typically without legal implications; if you have difficulties in this area you may need a therapist. Social sanction on the other hand involves praise, and condemnation, often with legal implications; if you have problems in this area you may need a lawyer. Judgements of esteem have to do with normality (how unusual someone is), capacity (how capable they are) and tenacity (how resolute they are); judgements of sanction have to do with veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Contrary to the claim, the opposition 'admiration and criticism' versus 'praise and condemnation' does not characterise the distinction between social esteem and social sanction.  For example, a person can be

• praised for their cleverness (esteem, not sanction),
• condemned for their cowardice (esteem, not sanction),
• admired for their honesty (sanction, not esteem), or
• criticised for their immorality (sanction, not esteem).

[2] The term 'normality' is problematic in this context, because, unlike the terms 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety', it does not refer to a scale of gradable values, but to a midpoint on all scales.  That is, it is not only possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'capacity', 'tenacity', veracity' and 'propriety' (judgement), but it is also possible to assess 'normality' on any of the scales of 'reaction', 'composition' and 'valuation' (appreciation).  This is likely to result in confusion, even between judgement and appreciation, in text analysis.

The assessment of 'normality' itself, as positive or negative, is another matter.

Confusing Affect And Graduation

Martin & Rose (2007: 66-7):

Feelings can be experienced as emotional dispositions, such as sad or happy, or they may appear as surges of behaviour, such as crying and laughing. Each group of emotions is set out in Table 2.8, including examples of both dispositions and surges. Each group includes both positive and negative feelings, with examples that express three degrees of intensity. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the use of emotion to appraise — interpersonal enactments — not with emotion as a construal of experience.  The distinction is one of metafunction.

[2] This again confuses the system of GRADUATION ('intensity') with what is purported to be a system of ATTITUDE.

Misconstruing Ascriptions Of Emotion As Appraisals By Reference To Emotion

Martin & Rose (2007: 65-6):

(6) Finally we can group emotions into three major sets having to do with un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. For example:

in/security             the boy was anxious/confident

dis/satisfaction      the boy was fed up/absorbed

un/happiness         the boy was sad/happy

Blogger Comments:

This again confuses the construal of emotions with appraisal by reference to emotions (affect).  None of the three propositions exemplifies affect, since none enacts an appraisal by reference to emotion.  Neither the boy nor the author is making an appraisal.  The author is merely attributing qualities of emotion to the boy.  Genuine examples would be:

in/security                 the boy was anxious/confident about the result
dis/satisfaction          the boy was fed up with/absorbed in the computer game
un/happiness             the boy was sad/happy that his teacher had died

Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Behavioural Surges Of Mental Desideration

Martin & Rose (2007: 65):

(5) Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather than realis).

realis      the boy liked the present
irrealis   the boy wanted the present 

Irrealis affect seems always to be directed at some external agency, and so can be outlined as in Table 2.7 (setting aside parameter 3 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the distinction between emotive (liked) and desiderative (wanted) mental processes.  (The ir/realis distinction is not an interpersonal distinction.)

[2] This is manifestly untrue in terms of both agency, as demonstrated by the authors' own example: the boy wanted the present, and externality, as demonstrated by the boy wanted to feel safe.

[3] There are two main theoretical inconsistencies in Table 2.7.

In presenting behavioural processes manifesting emotion (tremble, shudder, cower) as behavioural surges of desideration (fear), and qualities of emotion as dispositions of desideration, it confuses 'fear' as emotion with 'fear' as desideration.

In presenting verbal processes (suggest, request, implore) as behavioural surges of desideration (desire), it confuses verbal processes with mental processes.  To be clear, affect is the interpersonal enactment of an appraisal by reference to emotion.