Misconstruing Modal Assessment As Internal Consequence [1]

Martin & Rose (2007: 139-40):

Another kind of internal consequence is to justify an argument, using after all:

On the face of it, we might argue that the evaluation in Helena's story comes from Helena.
She's the narrator after all.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors have misconstrued the function of conjunctive relations as justifying an argument. In SFL Theory, a conjunctive relation is a relation of expansion between spans of text.

[2] To be clear, after all does not mark any conjunctive relation, let alone one of consequence; the meaning here is not that realised by She's the narrator consequently.

In SFL Theory, this instance of after all functions interpersonally, not logically (or textually), as a asseverative propositional comment Adjunct enacting the modal assessment 'obvious'; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 190-1). The meaning here is generally that also realised by She's the narrator obviously.

Misconstruing Continuity As Internal Consequence

Martin & Rose (2007: 139):

In the spoken mode, so is commonly used for internal consequence:

Landlady: So, you're off. (on entering room)

Coetzee: — Yes.

Landlady: — Well I hope you enjoyed your stay. Did you get what you wanted from the Grootbooms?

Coetzee: — Yes.

Landlady: — So, what is your connection with that family? Really?

Coetzee: — Good-bye. Their son Daniel didn't die in a car hijacking. He was a freedom fighter and I killed him. At the time I was in the police force. But it was murder.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, neither instance of so marks a logical relation of consequence. This can be demonstrated by substituting the 'consequence' marker consequently for the continuative so:

Consequently, you're off.

Consequently, what is your connection with that family? 

To be clear, conjunctive relations obtain to preceding text, and the absence of such for the first instance suggests that the authors have little grasp of the original model they are rebranding as their own.  In SFL Theory, each instance of so is a continuative. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 107):

A continuative is one of a small set of words that signal a move in the discourse: a response, in dialogue, or a new move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing. The usual continuatives are yes no well oh now. See Halliday & Hasan (1976: Chapter 5).

Misconstruing Means (And Clarification) As Internal Consequence

Marin & Rose (2007: 139):

Internal consequence is concerned with drawing conclusions from arguments, and countering them. We have already seen how Tutu uses Thus to signal a conclusion for each of his Arguments:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing ...
Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation 

…amnesty is only given to those who plead guilty ...
Thus the process in fact encourages accountability 

…there is another kind of justice, restorative justice,
Thus we would claim that... justice, is being served

Conjunctions such as thus, consequently, in conclusion signal that a conclusion is being drawn. By this means the conclusion is construed as the expected outcome of the argument that has been presented.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is that conjunction is a discourse semantic system of logical relations. As such, it is not concerned with "drawing conclusions from arguments and countering them"; see further below.

[2] To be clear, thus typically functions like thereby (manner: means) rather than therefore (cause-condition).  In the first two examples, the conjunctive relation is manner: means, as can be demonstrated by the fact that replacing thus with by such means still realises the same meaning. The third example, in contrast, realises cause-condition (consequently).

[3] To be clear, in conclusion typically marks a conjunctive relation of summative clarification (elaboration) rather than a consequential relation (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 613).  Here Martin & Rose confuse 'conclusion' in the sense of a logical inference (cause: result) with 'conclusion' in the sense of a summing up (clarification: summative).

[4] To be clear, two of these three examples did not present the result ("conclusion"/"outcome") of reasons ("argument'), and none of the three included wording that construed the 'means' or 'result' clause as expected.  Any "expectation" here could only be that of a reader, in hindsight.

Problems With The System Of Internal Time

Martin & Rose (2007: 139):

Options for internal time are summed up in Figure 4.7.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the feature 'ordering' conflates the distinction between 'following' and 'preceding', and the feature 'terminating' is a rebranding of 'conclusive'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612):

No argument was provided for the terms and distinction 'adjacent' vs 'interrupted', and no example was provided for the (mistaken) claim that still marks an internal relation of temporal simultaneity. See the two preceding posts for details.

Misrepresenting The Conjunctive Relation Of Internal Simultaneity

Martin & Rose (2007: 138):

But it is also possible to say that an argument, or piece of evidence, is simultaneous with another, using still or at the same time. The following example is from a report about our literacy work:

Significant increases in student achievement have been measured…the average improvement in reading and writing was 2.5 levels… 

At the same time, teachers have noted a range of student learning outcomes that are more difficult to measure, like an increased level of student engagement in their learning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, still does not relate interpersonal wordings as simultaneous in time.  When still functions conjunctively, the expansion relation realised is most likely to be concessive condition (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4). When still expresses time, it functions interpersonally as a mood Adjunct of temporality (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 187-9).

[2] To be clear, this instance of at the same time does not relate interpersonal wordings as simultaneous in time. The relation here is another instance of concessive condition, realising the same meaning as nevertheless or even so.

This again demonstrates the misunderstandings that can arise by giving priority to the view from below, the expression, instead of the view from above, the meaning being realised.

Misconstruing Conditional 'Then' As Temporal 'Then'

Martin & Rose (2007: 138):

In the spoken mode, internal time may also be used to sequence arguments. In the following example (from Forgiveness), Llewelyn’s first proposition is dismissed so he asks for a second:

Llewelyn:      I say maybe it was you who gave the cops Daniel's name.

Luke:             - Are you fucking berserk?

Llewelyn:      - Then who did?

These are all examples of internal succession - they order the steps in the text’s internal logic as first, second, next and so on.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, internal conjunction creates textual cohesion by relating portions of language in their interpersonal guise.  In the case of temporal relations, this means relating one to another as 'following', 'simultaneous', 'preceding' or 'conclusive'; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-4).

In the example provided, there is no temporal relation between propositions. The Then of the final clause marks a conditional relation with dependent clause ellipsis, along the lines of:

If you didn't, then who did?

This again demonstrates the misunderstandings that can arise by giving priority to the view from below, in this case the conjunction then, instead of the view from above, the meaning being realised.

Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Comparison

Martin & Rose (2007: 137):

Options for internal comparison are summed up in Figure 4.6.

 

Blogger Comments:

As demonstrated in the previous five posts, the authors' system of internal comparison is a confusion of genuine comparison ('similar: compare'), various subtypes of elaboration ('similar: reformulate') — confused with subtypes of modal assessment in the exposition — and various types of extension ('different'), all of which are Halliday's grammatical systems of cohesive conjunction (textual) and clause complexing (logical), not distinguished, and rebranded as Martin's logical discourse semantic systems.

A further consequence of misunderstanding grammatical systems and misrepresenting them as discourse semantic systems is that it creates an incongruent relation ("interstratal tension") between semantics and grammar even in the absence of grammatical metaphor, thereby undermining the notion of grammatical metaphor as an incongruent relation between strata.

Misconstruing Subtypes Of Variation And Addition (Extension) As Subtypes Of Comparison (Enhancement)

Martin & Rose (2007: 137):

What of difference? As we saw for lexical contrasts in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), differences are either oppositions or converses. We can oppose ideas using rather, by contrast, on the other hand:

This is not a frivolous question,
rather it is a very serious issue.
To this point we have looked at clauses and their elements from the perspective of discourse. Grammarians, on the other hand, look at elements of clauses from the perspective of the grammar

Conversely is used to reverse two aspects of a message. In this example Malinowski interprets texts from the perspective of social contexts, whereas we suggest that contexts can only be interpreted as they are manifested in texts:

Malinowski interpreted the social contexts of interaction as stratified into two levels, 'context of situation' and 'context of culture', and considered that a text (which he called an 'utterance') could be understood only in relation to both these levels.

Conversely, we could say that speakers' cultures are manifested in each situation in which they interact, and that each interactional situation is manifested verbally as unfolding text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This not true. In Section 3.2, converses were construed as a subtype of oppositions, a subtype of contrast (Figure 3.6, p81).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, rather typically marks replacive variation (extension), whereas by contrast and on the other hand mark adversative addition (extension), in cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued these two distinct relations as one subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not extension, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relations as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, conversely also typically marks adversative addition (extension) in cohesive conjunction (textual); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 612-3). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued different markers of one relation (adversative addition) as two distinct subclasses (oppose vs converse) of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not extension, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relations as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[4] To be clear, Malinowski's model of context has become part of the theoretical architecture of SFL, with the important qualification that 'context of situation' and 'context of culture' are not levels, but opposite poles on the cline of instantiation at one level (the context plane). On this model, language realises culture (potential pole) and text realises situation (instance pole).

Because realisation is an identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction, either level can be used to identify the other:

• language/text (Token) is decoded by reference to culture/situation (Value), and/or
• culture/situation (Value) is encoded by reference to language/text (Token).

Malinowski's notion of 'understanding a text in relation to context' corresponds to the decoding option above.

[5] To be clear, the authors' notion that "contexts can only be interpreted as they are manifested in texts" corresponds to the encoding option above. However, this does not accurately characterise what was said in the quoted text; see [6] and [7].

Note also that the authors' interpretation of context as "manifested in texts" involves modelling context as (types of) texts, genre and register, thereby incongruously conflating two distinct levels of symbolic abstraction: context and language.

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, culture is instantiated in situation, not "manifested" in it. Instantiation is a theoretical attributive relation, whereas manifestation is a non-theoretical identifying relation.

[7] To be clear, this confuses two theoretical dimensions at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation: stratification (situation realised as text) and logogenesis (unfolding text). In SFL Theory, the unfolding of a situation is realised by the unfolding of a text. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim explicated in [5], this does not single out the encoding option, above.

Mistaking Comment Adjuncts For Conjunctive Adjuncts Of Comparison

Martin & Rose (136-7):

Likewise indeed means ‘even more than expected’, while at least means ‘less than expected’. Tutu argues that losing the right to sue is a higher than expected price to pay:

... the victim loses the right to sue for civil damages in compensation from the perpetrator.
That is indeed a high price to ask the victims to pay...

Helena claims that her men are victims of spiritual murder, and that being unable to rest is less than they should expect:

Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder.
At least a murder victim rests.

An example from the spoken mode is the following (from Forgiveness), in which Zako counters Luke’s expectant question:

Luke: You believe this shit?
Zako: Actually I do.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this instance, at the very least, indeed does not mean 'even more than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'even more than expected', it would mean the same as:

That is even a high price to ask a victim to pay. 

In terms of interpersonal meaning, indeed here serves as a factual comment Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191), meaning the same as:

That is, as a matter of fact, a high price to ask a victim to pay.

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, indeed marks a relation of verifactive clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613).

[2] To be clear, at least does not mean 'less than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'less than expected', it would mean the same as:

A murder victim merely rests.

In terms of interpersonal meaning, at least here might be interpreted as serving as a comment Adjunct of desirability (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191).

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, at least can mark a relation of corrective clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613). However, this is not the case in this instance, since, if it did, it would mean the same as:

Or rather, a murder victim rests.

The conjunctive relation is this instance, which is not marked by at least, is implicit cause:

Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder
(because) At least a murder victim rests. 

[3] To be clear, in this instance, at the very least, actually does not mean 'less than expected' — which, in any case, is the interpersonal meaning of a subclass of mood Adjuncts of intensity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188-9), not the textual (or "logical") meaning of a conjunctive relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 612-4).  If it did mean 'less than expected', it would mean the same as:

I merely do. 

In terms of interpersonal meaning, actually here serves as a factual comment Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 191), meaning the same as:

As a matter of fact, I do.

In terms of textual meaning, rebranded by Martin & Rose as logical, actually marks a relation of verifactive clarification (elaboration), which the authors misconstrue as a subtype of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 613).

Misconstruing Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Comparison And Misunderstanding The Ideational Content Of The Illustrative Text

 Martin & Rose (2007: 136): 

Expectancy may also be adjusted with in fact, indeed, at least. By repeatedly narrowing the conditions for a public hearing, Tutu leads us to expect that public hearings almost never occur. But he then counters this expectation by saying what happens in fact:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing

where the offence is a gross violation of human rights - defined as an abduction, killing, torture or severe ill-treatment

unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice

(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights.

It is this strategy of leading us to expect one thing, and then countering it with ‘reality’, that enables Tutu to make his conclusion seem natural, simply by using Thus:

Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator.

We don’t mean to imply that we think Tutu’s conclusion is wrong. Rather he has argued it effectively by pre-empting any objections and countering them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse the textual function of in fact and indeed (cohesive conjunction) with one of their two interpersonal functions (modal assessment) and misconstrue the type of expansion relation, verifactive clarification (elaboration), as a subclass of comparison (enhancement); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 189-91, 613).  Moreover, this confusion of textual and interpersonal grammar is misconstrued as logical, in terms of metafunction, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

With regard to the multifunctionality of these items, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 614-5) explain:

Certain items that serve as ‘elaborating’ conjunctions that are ‘internal’ only in orientation may also serve as modal adverbs (e.g. actually, in fact, indeed, as a matter of fact), functioning either as mood Adjuncts of intensity or as comment Adjuncts of factuality.

With regard to the interpersonal function of these items, 'expectancy' is a feature of mood Adjuncts of intensity (counter-expectancy: exceeding), whereas the example provided, in fact, actually serves as a comment Adjunct (unqualified: factual).

[2] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misconstrue an item (at least) that marks corrective clarification (elaboration) as one that marks a subclass of comparison (enhancement). Moreover, this misconstrual of the textual grammar (cohesive conjunction) is itself misconstrued as logical, in terms of metafunction, and rebranded as discourse semantics.

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose completely misunderstand the ideational content of the illustrative text.  There is no repeated narrowing down of the conditions for a public hearing, and no implication that they almost never occur, and so, no countering of this false impression.

Instead, the gist is, to paraphrase: the Act stipulates that gross violations of human rights must be dealt with publicly, unless doing so would bring about a miscarriage of justice, and Tutu confirms that virtually all important cases have indeed been dealt with publicly.

Misconstruing Subclasses Of Elaboration (And Modal Assessment) As Subclasses Of Comparison (Enhancement)

Martin & Rose (2007: 135-6):

However there are many other variations on internal similarity, including reformulating, exemplifying, generalising and specifying. Ideas may be reformulated with that is, i.e. In this book we often state something in commonsense terms, and then reformulate it more technically:

Attitudes have to do with evaluating things, people's character and their feelings.
Such evaluations can be more or less intense,
that is they may be more or less amplified.

Exemplification uses for example, for instance, e.g. to rework a general statement with a specific instance. Here Tutu gives an example of a condition under which an application would not be heard in public:

The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing
unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice
(for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session).

But exemplifying is just one way of reworking a statement as more specific or more general. Other related conjunctions include in general, in particular, in short. Here are some examples from this book:

Attitudinal lexis plays a very important role in Helena's narrative,
as it does in general across story genres. 

Layers of New develop the point of a text,
in particular they focus on expanding the ideational meanings around a text's field

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'reformulating' is the subclass of appositive elaboration known as exposition: 'in other words' 'P i.e. Q' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 397-8, 542).  Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'exemplifying' is the subclass of appositive elaboration known as exemplification: 'for example' 'P e.g. Q' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 397-8, 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'generalising' is not a subclass of any subclass of expansion, and is not a feature of either clause complexing (logical lexicogrammar) or cohesive conjunction (textual lexicogrammar). Instead, in general functions interpersonally as a comment Adjunct of validity in the system of modal assessment; see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 129-32).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' 'specifying' is the subclass of clarifying elaboration known as particularising (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the authors' in short marks the subclass of clarifying elaboration known as summative (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542). Here Martin & Rose have misconstrued this relation as a subclass of comparison, which, in SFL Theory, is a subclass of enhancement, not elaboration, and rebranded their misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical relation as Martin's discourse semantic relation.

∞

Again, in misunderstanding these relations and rebranding them as discourse semantic, Martin & Rose have created incongruent relations between semantics and grammar, even in the absence of grammatical metaphor, thereby undermining the model. 

Misconstruing Elaboration And Modal Assessment As Comparison

Martin & Rose (2007: 135):

Internal comparison provides a rich set of resources for written text, enabling writers to compare and contrast positions and evidence, rephrase, exemplify, generalise and specify. One kind of internal similarity is to simply say that two ideas are the same in some way, using similarly or again:

Relations of class to member can be used cohesively between messages
…
Again part-whole relations can be used cohesively between messages

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the meaning of the expansion relation of comparison is N is like M (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 411).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are subclasses of elaboration, not comparison (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 411). Specifically:

• 'rephrase' is a rebranding of expository apposition;
• 'exemplify' is exemplifying apposition; and
• 'specify' is a rebranding of particularising clarification.

By misunderstanding these relations and rebranding them as Martin's discourse semantics, Martin & Rose create incongruent relations between semantics (comparison) and lexicogrammar (elaboration), thereby undermining the distinction between congruent and incongruent (metaphorical) grammatical realisation of semantic features.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, generalising is not a subclass of comparison (or any other subclass of expansion). The adverb generally functions interpersonally, not logically (or textually), serving as a modal Adjunct of validity, not a conjunctive Adjunct of comparison; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 130).

Note that no argument is provided to support these "re-interpretations" of Halliday's theory.

Theoretical Inconsistencies In The System Of Internal Addition

Martin & Rose (2007: 134):

Options for internal addition are summed up in Figure 4.5. 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, only the features whose entry condition is 'developing' constitute genuine subclasses of addition.  Of the features whose entry condition is 'staging', 'framing' is a rebranding of Halliday's continuity, and 'sidetracking' is a rebranding of two distinct subclasses of Halliday's clarification (elaboration).  See the two preceding posts.