Misunderstanding Engagement, Dialogism And Heteroglossia And Misrepresenting Both Bakhtin And Kristeva

Martin & Rose (2007: 48-9):

The final region of appraisal we need to consider has to do with the source of attitudes: who are the evaluations coming from? … 

This potential for sourcing what is said was one of the factors that got the Russian linguist Bakhtin (1981) thinking about the dialogic nature of discourse, even in texts we traditionally think of as monologues. The French discourse analyst Kristeva introduced the term heteroglossia (‘different voices’) for this notion of multiple voicing in all kinds of discourse. Here we will use the term heterogloss where the source of an attitude is other than the writer, and monogloss (‘single voice’) where the source is simply the author.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misconstrues the system of ENGAGEMENT as merely the identification of the appraiser as either speaker (author) or someone else.  As the Appraisal website makes clear, the system of ENGAGEMENT encompasses:

Resources for positioning the speaker's/author's voice with respect to the various propositions and proposals conveyed by a text; meanings by which speakers either acknowledge or ignore the diversity of viewpoints put at risk by their utterances and negotiate an interpersonal space for their own positions within that diversity.

[2] This confuses dialogism (Bakhtin 1981) with dialogue between characters in a text.  From the glossary of The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin:

Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole — there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as grammarians, certain political figures and normative framers of "literary languages" do, seek in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism. 

[3] This is factually incorrect.  'Heteroglossia' is Bakhtin's term.  It was the term 'intertextuality' that Bulgarian-born Kristeva introduced. [Note that this is the second edition of Working With Discourse.]

[4] This misconstrues heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981) as the existence of more than one speaking character in a text.  According to the glossary of The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, heteroglossia is:

The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions — social, historical, meteorological, physiological — that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualisation as is possible of that locus where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic linguistics must always suppress.

[5] This is even inconsistent with the misunderstandings of engagement, dialogism and heteroglossia above, since the author of a text necessarily straddles both categories: as 'single voice' and as one of the 'different voices'.  In any case, as the Appraisal website makes clear:

A basic distinction, then, under engagement is that between meanings which acknowledge in some way the heteroglossic diversity associated with all utterances (the heteroglossic) and those which ignore that diversity (the monoglossic).

For some of Martin's misunderstandings and misapplications of Bakhtin, see here. 

Presenting Experiential Construals As Interpersonal Assessment

Martin & Rose (2007: 46-7):

As well as things, we can also sharpen or soften types of qualities, such as deep blue or bluish. Even categorical concepts like numbers can be pushed around in this way:

After about three years with the special forces

vs

After exactly three years with the special forces

Here’s another example of sharpened focus from Helena’s story:

was what we saw with our own eyes

Here own sharpens the category ‘our eyes’, i.e. ‘ours and no-one else’s’ - it’s definitely not hearsay. And here’s an example of softened focus:

not quite my first love

Tutu also sharpens focus a couple of times in his exposition, in order to be precise:

the very first time

precisely this point

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the previous confusion between interpersonal and experiential meaning. Again, if graduation is a system of appraisal, then 'focus' is concerned with the sharpening or softening of the attitudinal assessment that enacts intersubjective relations as interpersonal meaning.

[2] The distinction between about three years and exactly three years is not a distinction between grades of attitudinal appraisal.  That is, it is not a distinction between grades of interpersonal assessment in terms of affect (emotional), appreciation (e.g. æsthetic) or judgement (e.g. ethical).

[3] The co-text of this excerpt demonstrates that it is not an interpersonal assessment in terms of affect (emotional), appreciation (e.g. æsthetic) or judgement (e.g. ethical):

And all that we as loved ones knew...was what we saw with our own eyes.

[4] Moreover, this is a elementary misreading of the text:

Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. 'We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now.' We were ecstatic. We even celebrated. He and his friends would visit regularly. They even stayed over for long periods. Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless. Abruptly mutter the feared word 'trip' and drive off. I ... as a loved one ... knew no other life than that of worry, sleeplessness, anxiety about his safety and where they could be. We simply had to be satisfied with: 'What you don't know, can't hurt you,' And all that we as loved ones knew...was what we saw with our own eyes.

Experientially, this clause encodes the Value all that we as loved ones knew by reference to the Token all that we as loved ones knew:

and	all that we as loved ones knew	was	what we saw with our own eyes
	Identified Value	Process	Identifier Token

That is, it's not a question of "definitely not hearsay".  It's a matter of not being told what was going on — of having no other knowledge than what could be construed from perceptual experience.

[5] By way of contrast, this can indeed be interpreted as an instance of attitudinal appraisal, since it enacts an appreciation by rating one lover against another.

[6] Again, the co-texts of each of these excerpts demonstrate that neither is an interpersonal assessment in terms of affect (emotional), appreciation (e.g. æsthetic) or judgement (e.g. ethical):

Many of those in the security forces who have come forward had previously been regarded as respectable members of their communities. It was often the very first time that their communities and even sometimes their families heard that these people were, for instance, actually members of death squads or regular torturers of detainees in their custody.

Amnesty is not given to innocent people or to those who claim to be innocent. It was on precisely this point that amnesty was refused to the police officers who applied for it for their part in the death of Steve Biko.

Confusing Metafunctions: Graduation Focus

Martin & Rose (2007: 46):

Now let’s look briefly at the second dimension of graduation, focus — the sharpening and softening of experiential categories. What we’ve considered so far are resources for adjusting the volume of gradable items. By contrast, focus is about resources for making something that is inherently non-gradable gradable. For example, Helena introduces her second love as a policeman:

After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman.

Experientially, this sets him up as having one kind of job rather than another (tinker, tailor, soldier, spy etc.). Classifications of this kind are categorical distinctions — he was a policeman as opposed to something else. After his promotion, however, her second love describes himself as a real policeman, as if he hadn’t quite been one before:

We are real policemen now.

This in effect turns a categorical boundary between types of professions into a graded one, allowing for various degrees of ‘policeman-hood’. It implies that when Helena met him he was less of a policeman than after his promotion:

I met a kind of policeman
I met a policeman sort of

Grading resources of this kind doesn’t so much turn the volume up and down as sharpen and soften the boundaries between things. Real policeman sharpens the focus, a sort of policeman softens it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This blurs the distinction between interpersonal and experiential meaning.  To be clear, if graduation is a system of appraisal, then 'focus' is concerned with the sharpening or softening of the attitudinal assessment that enacts intersubjective relations as interpersonal meaning.

[2] The classification of Helena's second love as a policeman is made through cohesion, the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction.  This can be seen by looking at the realisation of "meaning beyond the clause":

After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman. Not quite my first love, but an exceptional person. Very special. Once again a bubbly, charming personality.  Humorous, grumpy, everything in its time and place.

The conflated Deictic/post-Deictic another makes cataphoric comparative reference to my first love, while policeman is lexically cohesive — through instantial equivalence (Hasan 1985/9: 82) — with my first love on the one hand, and with both an exceptional person and a bubbly, charming personality, on the other.

[3] This again blurs the distinction between interpersonal and experiential meaning.  The categorisation as a 'real policeman' is made by the attributive clause We are real policeman now, which construes class membership.  This is distinct from the interpersonal assessment enacted by the attitudinal Modifier real.

[4] This continues the confusion between interpersonal and experiential meaning.  In terms of appraisal, any implication of the statement is an interpersonal assessment of 'what he was before', not an experiential construal of 'what he was before'.

[5] Trivially, the examples of 'softening of focus' do not appear in the text, despite being presented in the same manner as the two genuine instances.

Misunderstanding Metaphor

Martin & Rose (2007: 45):

We’ve already considered Helena’s metaphors in relation to affect, but we can note here that they also have an amplifying effect:

ice cold in a sweltering night
dull like the dead
blood-curdling shrieks

These metaphors tell us how cold her second love was, how dull his eyes were, and how frightening his screams were.

Blogger Comments:

Helena's text:

He's pale, ice cold in a sweltering night - sopping wet with sweat. Eyes bewildered, but dull like the dead. And the shakes. The terrible convulsions and blood-curdling shrieks of fear and pain from the bottom of his soul.

[1] This confuses figurative language in general with metaphor in particular; see below.  That is, a hyponym is mistaken for its superordinate.

[2] Trivially, as figurative language, the use of ice in ice cold is hyperbole, not metaphor.  Its agnate cold as ice is simile, not metaphor.

[3] Trivially, as figurative language, the use of like the dead in dull like the dead is simile, not metaphor.

[4] Trivially, as figurative language, the use of blood-curdling in blood-curdling shrieks is auditory imagery, not metaphor.

However, this is an instance of (ideational) grammatical metaphor, since a semantic figure whose congruent wording would be a clause such as his shrieks curdled my blood is instead incongruently worded as (part of) a nominal group.