Misunderstanding The Mode Distinction Between Monologue And Dialogue

Martin & Rose (2007: 301-2):

Even where a response is not expected, as in prayers and various forms of public address, an interlocutor may be invoked as in Helena’s quoted prayer for example:

And both Mandela and Lingiari exhort an audience in their speeches, without giving up the floor:

Written discourse can also imitate dialogue, for rhetorical effect, as when Tutu asks a question, then answers it himself; or when Mandela replaces a mistaken proposition with its contradiction:

For something virtually monologic we probably need to turn to the Act, where propositions and proposals are enacted as performed. There is no right of reply:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the mode distinction between monologue and dialogue is the distinction between a text being created by one speaker and a text being created by more than one speaker. Each of these texts is a monologue, in terms of mode, because each is created by one speaker, namely: Helena, Lingiari, Mandela, Tutu and Mandela respectively.

[2] To be clear, these examples misrepresent the original texts by placing the speakers (material order) in the texts they project (semiotic order), as if they were characters in a play, further demonstrating the inability of Martin & Rose to distinguish different orders of experience.

[3] To be clear, since 'enact' and 'perform' are synonyms, this is, at best, a tautology.

[4] To be clear, a 'right of reply' is irrelevant to the mode distinction between monologue (single-authored text) and dialogue (multi-authored text). In this instance, what is true is that, in terms of Hasan's original model, the graphic channel does not afford process sharing; see previous post.

Misunderstanding "The Complementary Monologue Through Dialogue Cline"

Martin & Rose (2007: 300-1):

The other dimension of mode analysis we need to consider here is the complementary monologue through dialogue cline. This scale is sensitive to the effects of various technologies of communication on the kind of interactivity that is facilitated in spoken vs written discourse, and across a range of electronic channels such as short wave radio, intercom, telephone, fax, e-mail, chat rooms, websites, radio, audio tape, CD/MD, television, DVD/VCD, video and film. The key material factors here have to do with whether interlocutors can hear and see one another (aural and visual feedback) and the imminence of a response (immediate or delayed).

Obviously our written data is not ideal for illustrating this cline here. But technologies facilitate textures; they don’t absolutely determine them. And in any case a technology such as writing affords various degrees of interactivity along the continuum. There’s the possibility of writing dialogue for one thing (scripts of various kinds) and projection can always be used to import dialogue, as it was in Mandela’s exemplum for the imagined repartee:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, yet again, the unacknowledged source here is Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

[2] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse context (the mode distinction between monologue and dialogue) with language (dialogue and projection in texts).

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose misrepresent the Mandela text (p259) as a script, for the purposes of their argument:

Misunderstanding The Cline From 'Language In Action' To 'Language In Reflection'

Martin & Rose (2007: 300):

This range of mode variation is sometimes discussed as a cline from language in action to language as reflection. We’ve been able to illustrate the middle and reflective end of this continuum here, since our written genres ranged along this part of the scale. For texts in which language plays a smaller role in what is going on we’d need to look at spoken language accompanying activity, for example [a] running commentary on a sporting event or parade, or pushing further, the things people manage to say when most of their directed consciousness is taken up with intense physical activity (playing sport, hard physical labour, rock climbing, dancing and so on). Here, for example, is an exchange in which a teacher directs a learner without naming any of the things or places he is acting on, so that the activity is not interpretable without being there (see Rose 2001a and b, 2006a for this exchange in the original Pitjantjatjara):

Learner: Here?

Teacher: - No, this is no good. It's over there. Dig on the far side.

Learner: - Here?

Teacher: - Yes, there.

Teacher: - See there?

Learner: -Aha!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the unacknowledged source here is Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

There is an important variable here, of course, that we have already referred to as the cline from 'language in reflection' to 'language in action'. In situations of the ‘language in action’ kind, where the discourse is a relatively minor component of the total activity, the grammar and the semantics are obviously less constructive of the whole than in a ‘reflection’ context …

This, in turn, derives from Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58), whose mode system, language rôle, distinguishes between language as 'constitutive' and language as 'ancillary'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, language as reflection refers to the ideational metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 29-30):

At the same time, whenever we use language there is always something else going on. While construing, language is always also enacting: enacting our personal and social relationships with the other people around us. The clause of the grammar is not only a figure, representing some process – some doing or happening, saying or sensing, being or having – together with its various participants and circumstances; it is also a proposition, or a proposal, whereby we inform or question, give an order or make an offer, and express our appraisal of and attitude towards whoever we are addressing and what we are talking about. This kind of meaning is more active: if the ideational function of the grammar is ‘language as reflection’, this is ‘language as action’. We call it the interpersonal metafunction, to suggest that it is both interactive and personal.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In this discussion, Martin & Rose have only presented texts whose rhetorical mode is at "the reflective end of this continuum". As previous posts have demonstrated, in discussing mode, which they misconstrue as a system of register, Martin & Rose have repeatedly confused the material environment of text production with the ideational meaning of the text.

[4] To be clear, this misunderstands the notion of 'language in action'/'language as ancillary'. A running commentary on a sporting event or parade is 'language in reflection/'language as constitutive', since the language of the commentator is not ancillary to the sporting event or parade, given that these activities unfold independently of — and are not constructed by — the language of the commentator. Instead, the language of the commentator is used to reflect on these activities. Once again, Martin & Rose have confused the material environment experienced by the speaker with the ideational meaning of the text projected by the speaker. As previously observed, Martin & Rose have enormous difficulty in distinguishing different orders of experience: the material domain of speakers (phenomena) versus the semiotic domain that speakers project in texts (metaphenomena).

[5] To be clear, this is only valid in instances where language contributes the unfolding of the activity. For example, consider the case of two people conversing while dancing. If the language of the dancers is the issuing of dance-step instructions by a teacher to a beginner, then the language can be said to play an ancillary rôle ('language in action') in the unfolding of the activity of dancing. 

However, if the language of the dancers is a discussion of recent political events, then the language plays neither an ancillary rôle ('language in action') nor a constitutive rôle ('language in reflection') in the unfolding of the activity of dancing. Instead, their language is constitutive ('language in reflection') of the unfolding of an activity other than dancing: a discussion of recent political events.

[6] To be clear, this is indeed a valid illustration of 'language in action'/'language as ancillary'.

Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor

Martin & Rose (2007: 299-300):

Once this step into ideational metaphor is taken then the entire world of uncommon sense discourse is opened up including all of humanities, social science and science and their applications as bureaucracy and technology. The power of this discourse is not simply to generalise across experience, but to organise it and reflect on it at a high level of abstraction which can be instantiated in variable ways, sometimes with a view to enabling behaviours:

ACT — To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or outside the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: the authors' discussion of ideational metaphor has been limited to elemental metaphor, largely processes realised as things. Moreover, their model of discourse semantics undermines the study of metaphor, since it does not provide the means — e.g. semantic units: sequence, figure, element — of contrasting congruent vs metaphorical grammatical realisations, which is itself necessary for unpacking metaphor.

[1] To be clear, one of the unacknowledged sources here is Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible. At the same time, there are also textual and interpersonal consequences of this metaphorical realignment in the grammar: ideational metaphor can be a powerful textual resource for managing the creation of text, creating new mappings between the ideational and textual quanta of information; and it can also be a powerful interpersonal resource for organising the ongoing negotiation of meaning, creating new mappings between the ideational and interpersonal propositions/proposals.

[2] This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not "generalise across experience". Ideational metaphor is the reconstrual of the meanings of congruent mode, with the result that lexicogrammatical choices construe two meanings at once: that of both the metaphorical and congruent realisations.

[3] This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not organise experience; it "reorganises" the meanings construed of experience in congruent mode.

[4]  This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, semantically, metaphorical meanings are of a lower level of symbolic abstraction (Token) than their congruent counterparts (Value). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 289):

[5]  This misunderstands ideational metaphor. To be clear, ideational metaphor does not involve a "higher level of abstraction which can be instantiated in variable ways". As potential, ideational metaphor is an incongruent relation between semantic and grammatical choices. Variable instantiations of ideational metaphor are instances of different incongruent relations between semantic and grammatical choices.

[6] The notion of ideational metaphor "enabling behaviours" is a puzzling one, given that

• Martin & Rose are concerned with processes realised as things,
• none of their highlighted words realise behavioural processes, and
• 9 of the 14 highlighted words — nature, causes, extent, rights, period, constitution, Republic, fate, whereabouts — do not even realise processes.

Problems With The Authors' Example Of Grammatical Metaphor Untying A Text From A Situation

 Martin & Rose (2007: 299):

Note for example how Mandela reconstrues aircraft roaring over the Union buildings as symbols (a display and a demonstration) of precision, force and loyalty; in doing so he reworks evaluation of the event through affect and appreciation (in awe as a spectacular array ... in perfect formation ...), into evaluation through judgement (capacity, tenacity and propriety: pinpoint precision and military force, loyalty to democracy ... freely and fairly elected ...). 

The transformation enables the evaluation he wants for this event of the day:

A few moments later we all lifted our eyes in awe as a spectacular array of South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared in perfect formation over the Union Buildings. It was not only a display of pinpoint precision and military force, but a demonstration of the military's loyalty to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is purported to be an example of the use of grammatical metaphor to untie a text from a situation — as part of a discussion of the contextual system of mode. (See the previous post for some of the theoretical misunderstandings behind this nonsensical notion.)

It can be seen that the 'situation' here is ideational semantics within Mandela's text, rather than the material setting in which Mandela wrote his text — which was one of the authors' previous uses of the term 'situation'. In other words, Martin & Rose have trouble distinguishing different orders of experience: the phenomenal order of speakers/writers projecting language, and the metaphenomenal order of the language that speakers/writers project.

[2] To be clear, these evaluations, which are irrelevant to the issues being discussed, do not require the use of ideational metaphor, since they can also be made with less metaphorical construals, such as:

A few moments later we all looked up and felt awe as South African jets, helicopters and troop carriers roared over the Union Buildings in a spectacular, perfectly formed array. This not only displayed that the military could fly absolutely precisely and how forceful it is, but also demonstrated that they are loyal to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected.

Problems With The Authors' Notion That Grammatical Metaphor Unties Texts From Situations

Martin & Rose (2007: 299, 332n):

Taking this a step further, the key resource which unties texts from situations is grammatical metaphor because of its power to reconstrue activities as things and thus break the iconic connections between linguistic and material activity.¹ This transforms social action into another realm of discourse in which abstractions enter into relations of various kinds with one another.

¹ By iconic we mean matching relations between the world as we perceive it and ideation, i.e. between people and things as nouns, actions as verbs and so on.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: This is purportedly a discussion of mode, the textual dimension of context — 'culture' in SFL Theory, but misunderstood as 'register' by Martin ± Rose. In SFL Theory, 'situation' is the term for an instance of culture, but since Martin & Rose have replaced culture (field, tenor, mode) with register, and regard 'text' as an instance of their context, the term 'situation' can not mean an instance of context. In the preceding posts, Martin & Rose have used 'situation' to mean, on the one hand, the material environment of the speech/writing event, and on the other hand, the ideational meaning of the text, which they usually confuse with field instead. It is against this background of complicated theoretical misunderstandings — along the dimensions of stratification, instantiation and orders of experience — that the untangling of the confusions in the excerpt above is attempted below.

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the notion that a text can be "untied" from a situation is nonsensical, because it is the text that construes the situation.

[2] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is not a "non-iconic" relation between "linguistic and material activity", but an incongruent relation — within language — between semantics and grammar. Moreover, this characterisation reduces grammatical metaphor to ideational metaphor, and reduces ideational metaphor to elemental metaphor (processes incongruently realised as things). Importantly, grammatical metaphor is semantically junctional. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243):

When this happens, it is a signal that a phenomenon of this other kind — quality, or process — is being treated as if it was a thing. The grammar has constructed an imaginary or fictitious object, called shakiness, by transcategorising the quality shaky; similarly by transcategorising the process develop it has created a pseudo-thing called development. What is the status of such fictitious objects or pseudo-things? Unlike the other elements, which lose their original status in being transcategorised (for example, shaker is no longer a process, even though it derives from shake), these elements do not; shakiness is still a quality, development is still a process — only they have been construed into things. They are thus a fusion, or 'junction', of two semantic elemental categories: shakiness is a 'quality thing', development is a 'process thing'. All such junctional elements involve grammatical metaphor.

[3] To be clear, as explained above, this is a nonsensical claim. Elemental ideational grammatical metaphor does not "transform social action" into anything. Instead, it reconstrues the congruent model of experience into a metaphorical model which is further removed from everyday experience. Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, "the world as we perceive it" is the construal of experience as ideational meaning. In these terms, the authors' nonsensical claim becomes:

• By iconic we mean matching relations between ideational meaning and ideation

where 'ideation' is Martin's discourse semantic system, which, as demonstrated here, is his misunderstanding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexical cohesion (textual lexicogrammar) rebranded as his experiential semantics.

[5] To be clear, the relation here is the stratal relation within language between meaning (people, things, actions) and grammatical form (nouns, verbs). As such, it does not exemplify a relation between "the world as we perceive it" and Martin's experiential discourse semantic system of ideation.

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Texts "Freeing Themselves From Situations"

Martin & Rose (2007: 299):

Beyond this we have texts which free themselves from situations by generalising across them, as with Mandela’s generalised exemplum about the experiences of an indefinite number of South African families:

It was as simple and yet as incomprehensible as the moment a small child asks her father, 'Why can you not be with us?' And the father must utter the terrible words: 'There are other children like you, a great many of them .…' and then one's voice trails off.

Blogger Comments:

Here the challenge for a theoretically-informed reader is to determine what Martin & Rose mean by 'situation' in this instance, given that

1. in SFL Theory, 'situation' is an instance of culture (context), which is realised by an instance of language (text), but
2. Martin & Rose have replaced culture with register and genre (varieties of language), and
3. Martin & Rose regard text, not situation, as an instance of context.

However, despite this discussion ostensibly being concerned with the contextual system of mode, 'situations' here refers to the ideational meaning within Mandela's text — situations in South Africa — which Martin & Rose claim that Mandela "generalises across". (More usually the authors confuse ideational meaning with field.)

However, this claim just adds to the multiple levels of confusion here. Mandela does not "generalise across situations" in South Africa. Instead, he provides a specific scenario that illustrates the general "situation".

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Context-Independency

Martin & Rose (2007: 298-9):

Mandela’s construction of his childhood on the other hand is not context dependent in this way. Everything presumed is provided for in the co-text. We know what’s going on simply by reading, not by being there:

I was born free — free in every way that I could know. Free to run in the fields near my mother's hut, free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls. As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because Martin & Rose misconstrue context as register, the unwitting claim here is that Mandela's text is not dependent on register. The reason why this is nonsensical is that, on the authors' stratified model, register is construed by the language that realises it; but see [2].

[2] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, what Martin & Rose actually mean by 'context dependent' is that the resolution of exophoric reference requires a reader's access to the material setting of the speech event. If this is applied consistently to Mandela's text, then 'context dependency' would mean that the resolution of exophoric reference requires a reader's access to the material setting in which Mandela wrote his text.

However, by 'context' in this instance, the authors do not mean the material setting in which the text was written, but the ideational meaning of the text: Mandela's construal of his own childhood, thereby adding yet another dimension of misunderstanding to their exposition of mode. This is the confusion that pervades the work of Martin & Rose: misconstruing the ideational meaning of language as the ideational dimension of context (field); see [3].

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, this nicely exemplifies the authors' confusion of field ('what's going on') — Mandela writing about his childhood — with the ideational meaning of his text (what we learn from reading it).

Problems With The Authors' Notion Of Context-Dependency

Martin & Rose (2007: 298):

Let’s start with the orientation to goings on. In Vincent Lingiari’s speech (Lingiari 1986), for example, there are several exophoric references to people, places and things which are materially present at the hand-over ceremony: chains initiated by the important white men (Whites), us (Aboriginals), this land, today and arguably here (if not taken as anaphoric to this land). Texts of this kind can be characterised as context dependent, since we can’t process the participant identification without information from the situation (things we see from being there or that we read through images later on):

The important White men are giving us this land ceremonially, ceremonially they are giving it to us. It belonged to the Whites, but today it is in the hands of us Aboriginals all around here. Let us live happily together as mates, let us not make it hard for each other.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Martin & Rose, 'orientation to goings on' (orientation to field) is a system of mode, which is the textual dimension of their register. In SFL Theory, however, mode is a system of culture not register, and 'orientation to field' corresponds to the authors' model of genre, not register; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 34):

(iii) rhetorical mode: the orientation of the text towards field (e.g. informative, didactic, explanatory, explicatory) or tenor (e.g. persuasive, exhortatory, hortatory, polemic);

[2] To be clear, exophoric references in a text relate second-order experience (the metaphenomenal domain of language) to first-order experience (the phenomenal domain within which speakers project language). 

Context, on the other hand, whether understood as culture (SFL Theory) or misunderstood as register (Martin & Rose), is second-order experience, since it is construed by language. 

That is, here Martin & Rose confuse two distinct orders of experience: the phenomenal domain of speakers, with the metaphenomenal domain (context) that is realised in language. This is a very serious misunderstanding indeed.

[3] To be clear, since Martin & Rose misconstrue context as register, their unwitting claim here is that such texts are register-dependent, despite the fact that they model language as the realisation of register.

[4] To be clear, the authors' reason for unwittingly claiming that such texts are register-dependent is that the resolution of exophoric reference depends on the first-order material setting of the text, which they misconstrue as the second-order semiotic situation, even though they have previously replaced this SFL model of context with their register.

In short, these complex multidimensional misunderstandings arise because Martin & Rose confuse three different meanings of context:

• context as register (their model),
• context as culture construed by language (SFL Theory), and
• context as material setting of the speech event.

Misunderstanding Mode (And Field)

Martin & Rose (2007: 298):

Let’s explore each of these variables a little here, beginning with mode. One important variable in mode is the amount of work language is doing in relation to what is going on, that is to what degree it simply accompanies a field of activity or constructs its own field. And a complementary dimension of mode is the cline of monologue through dialogue, its orientation to interaction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Cf Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):

The MODE is the function of the text in the event, including therefore both the channel taken by the language — spoken or written, extempore or prepared — and its genre, or rhetorical mode, as narrative, didactic, persuasive, 'phatic communion', and so on.

To be clear, what Halliday & Hasan regard as the textual dimension of the cultural context, mode, Martin & Rose regard as the textual dimension of their register, despite the fact that the categories of rhetorical mode correspond to their genre. That is, the authors' model is not only inconsistent with SFL Theory, it is inconsistent in its own terms.

[2] To be clear, the unacknowledged source here is Hasan's distinction between constitutive and ancillary LANGUAGE RÔLE. Halliday & Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

The third variable, mode, can also be described under at least three different sub-headings. First, there is the question of the LANGUAGE RÔLE — whether it is constitutive or ancillary. These categories should not be seen as sharply distinct but rather as two end-points of a continuum.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Social action and language do not construct their own fields. Halliday, in Halliday & Hasan (1989 [1985]: 58):

The FIELD OF DISCOURSE refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action  that is taking place: what is it that the participants are engaged in, in which language figures as some essential component?

[4] To be clear, 'the cline of monologue through dialogue' is the continuum from one person speaking (or writing) the text to at least two people speaking (or writing) the text. A midpoint on this cline would be one and a half people speaking (or writing) the text.

The Authors' Notion Of Register As A Resource For Generalising Across Genres

Martin & Rose (2007: 297-8):

As far as genre is concerned we can think of field, tenor and mode as resources for generalising across genres from the differentiated perspectives of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. 

In other words, taking tenor as an example, we need to take account of recurrent patterns of domination and deference as we move from one genre to another; we don’t want to have to stop and describe the same thing over and over again each time. 

Similarly for mode, the move from more concrete to more abstract metaphorical discourse takes place in explanations, expositions, historical recounts and reports (as we have seen); register allows us to generalise these shifts in abstraction as a resource that can be deployed in many genres.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is neither warranted by, nor consistent with, the authors' own model. Martin & Rose model their register (field, tenor and mode) and their genre as two levels of symbolic abstraction (strata) related by realisation. To understand the absurdity of the claim that a lower stratum generalises across a higher stratum, it is only necessary to consider other strata, such as phonology and lexicogrammar, where the claim would be that phonology "generalises across lexicogrammars".

The theoretical inconsistencies of the claim become multidimensional when considered in terms of SFL Theory, where

• 'context' refers to the culture — not varieties of language — as a semiotic system,
• 'register' and 'genre' (text type) refer to varieties of language, not context, and to different perspectives on the same point on the cline of instantiation, with 'register' the view from the system pole, and 'text type' the view from the instance pole.

[2] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the interpersonal dimension of context, tenor, with the interpersonal meanings of language ("recurrent patterns of domination and deference") that realise a given set of tenor features.

[3] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, any "recurrent patterns" of meaning across text types (genres) are modelled as a move up the cline of instantiation from text type towards the system pole, since these are patterns of instantiation that are common to different text types.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses the textual dimension of context, mode, with the language ("abstract metaphorical discourse") that realises a given set of mode features.

[5] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, "the move" that "takes place" — "shift in abstraction" — is a change in the pattern of instantiation during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[6] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, these are modelled in terms of mode, whereas for Martin & Rose, they are categories (purposes) of genre. Given that the authors treat mode as a dimension of register, treating them as genre creates a theoretical inconsistency within their own model.

[7] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, the potential ("resource") of moving from instantiating congruent wordings to instantiating metaphorical wordings during the logogenesis of text is a property of the language system itself.

On this basis, in terms of SFL Theory, the notion that register "allows us to generalise" this process "as a resource that can be deployed in many genres" is, at best, nonsensical.

Confusing Context With Register (And Mode With Genre)

Martin & Rose (2007: 296-7):

Alongside genre, the main construct used by functional linguists to model context is known as register. In SFL, register analysis is organised by metafunction into field, tenor and mode. The dimension concerned with relationships between interactants is known as tenor; that concerned with their social activity is known as field; and that concerned with the role of language is known as mode. Halliday has characterised these three dimensions of a situation as follows:

Field refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action that is taking place: what it is that the participants are engaged in, in which language figures as some essential component.

Tenor refers to who is taking part, to the nature of the participants, their statuses and roles: what kinds of role relationship obtain, including permanent and temporary relationships of one kind or another, both the types of speech roles they are taking on in the dialogue and the whole duster of socially significant relationships in which they are involved.

Mode refers to what part language is playing, what it is that the participants are expecting language to do for them in the situation: the symbolic organisation of the text, the status that it has, and its function in the context. (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 12)

As language realises its social contexts, so each dimension of a social context is realised by a particular metafunction of language, as follows:

Taken together the tenor, field and mode of a situation constitute the register of a text. As its register varies, so too do the kinds of meanings we find in a text. Because they vary systematically, we will refer to tenor, field and mode as register variables. This model of language in social context is illustrated in Figure 9.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed. In SFL Theory, register is not a means of modelling context. Register is a functional variety of language, modelled as a point of sub-potential variation on the cline of instantiation from language system to language instance. 

Context, on the other hand, is the culture modelled as a semiotic system that is realised in language. Field, tenor and mode are the metafunctional dimensions of context, but not of register. Different configurations of field, tenor and mode features (Hasan) are realised by different registers of language.

This misunderstanding occurs in Martin (1992), and proliferates through the subsequent publications of Martin, his one-time students, and the less theoretically competent members of the SFL community.

[2] This is misleading, because, in the case of mode, Martin & Rose have selectively omitted the section of the quote that contradicts their model. Cf Halliday & Hasan (1985: 12):

The MODE of discourse refers to what part language is playing, what it is that the participants are expecting language to do for them in the situation: the symbolic organisation of the text, the status that it has, and its function in the context, including the channel (is it spoken or written or some combination of the two?) and also the rhetorical mode, what is being achieved by the text in terms of such categories as persuasive, expository, didactic, and the like.

That is, in SFL Theory, what Martin & Rose model as the purpose of a genre is modelled as a system of mode, the textual dimension of the culture as semiotic system.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. What is true is that SFL Theory maps the metafunctional dimensions of language — ideational, interpersonal and textual — onto the stratum of context as field, tenor and mode, respectively. What is not true is that each metafunctional dimension of context is simply realised by its metafunctional counterpart in language. For example, the cultural field of science is realised by interpersonal propositions as much as it is realised by ideational sequences of figures, and their structural elements are given various textual statuses in terms of theme and information.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Moreover, it is a misunderstanding of Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):

The linguistic features which are typically associated with a configuration of situational features — field, mode and tenor — constitute a REGISTER.

That is, it is not the contextual features of field, tenor and mode that constitute a register, but the features of language that are typically associated with a configuration of them.

In SFL Theory, the field, tenor and mode (features) of a situation characterise the instance of context (situation) that is realised by an instance of language: (text). Here again, Martin & Rose confuse different planes: context vs language, and different points on the cline of instantiation, in this case: register vs text.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, field, tenor and mode are not register variables; they are the dimensions of the culture, whereas registers are functional sub-potentials of language.

The Self-Contradiction In Martin's Model Of Genre

Martin & Rose (2007: 296):

Throughout this book the main theoretical construct we have used to get a handle on context is genre. And for the most part we spent time on just five of these – exemplum, exposition, act, recount and report. That’s a very small window on culture, even if as linguists we try to model culture as a system of genres. But it’s a start, and one that suits functional linguistics and has served it well in its negotiations with social theory over the past twenty years.

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To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'genre' (Hasan) is synonymous with 'text type' (Halliday), and 'text type' is the view of 'register' from the perspective of the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, in contradistinction to 'culture', which refers to the context that language realises, at the system pole of the cline of instantiation:

That is, in locating genre at the level of context, Martin's model is inconsistent with SFL Theory in terms of two dimensions: stratification and instantiation. Moreover, in modelling a variety of language (genre) as context— instead of language — Martin's model is self-contradictory even in its own terms.

Cf Martin & Rose (2007: 8):

We use the term genre in this book to refer to different types of texts that enact various types of social contexts.