The Argument For Epithet As Less Central ("Nuclear") In The Nominal Group

Martin & Rose (2007: 96-7):

Third, people and things may also be described with qualities, that function in the nominal group as an Epithet:

 

The Epithet is less central in a nominal group; structurally it is further from the Thing than the Classifier.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Martin & Rose switch their criterion for nominal group nuclearity from lexis ("unified lexical element"), in the case of Classifier, to the syntagmatic axis (structural distance from Thing), in the case of Epithet.

As well as creating theoretical inconsistency — two different criteria for the one scale of relatedness — this demonstrates that the authors do not understand the sense in which elements of nominal group structure are central or otherwise.

The Argument For Classifier As Central In The Nominal Group

Martin & Rose (2007: 96):

Lexically, we are concerned with five functional elements of nominal groups. First, in Halliday’s model, the central function of a nominal group is called the Thing. The lexical noun that realises a Thing is a class of person or thing, such as girl, man, window, bed. Second, the Thing may be sub-classified by an item functioning as Classifier. Classifier and Thing together form a unified lexical element:

Blogger Comments:

Here again Martin & Rose confuse the two distinct notions of 'word', lexical item and grammatical rank unit, and use the confusion to justify their claim that Classifier, along with Thing, is 'central' to the nominal group, without identifying the sense in which they are 'central'.

To be clear, the claim that Classifier is 'central' to the nominal group rests on the claim that the grammatical structure Classifier^Thing forms a "unified lexical element". The argument is therefore invalidated by any Classifier^Thing structure that does not form "a unified lexical element", such as plastic warthog.

Lexical items composed of more than one word are also sometimes called lexical chunks, gambits, lexical phrases, lexical units, lexicalised stems, or speech formulae. The term polyword listemes is also sometimes used.

Confusing Composition With Realisation

Martin & Rose (2007: 96):

Nuclear relations below the clause
Below the clause, processes, participants and circumstances are themselves made up of groups of words, including lexical items. In Halliday’s 1994/2004 model, clause, group and word are different ranks in the grammar; a clause is realised by a configuration of word groups, each of which is realised by a configuration of words. As with the clause, nuclear relations also pertain between lexical words in groups. To describe these relations, we need to distinguish two kinds of word groups — nominal groups that realise things and people, and verbal groups that realise processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin & Rose confuse composition (the rank scale) with realisation (the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction).  In terms of composition, the rank unit, clause, is made up of units of the lower rank, groups and phrases.  In terms of realisation, clause functions, such as Process, are realised by forms, in this case, the verbal group.

In terms of expansion relations, composition is a type of extension, whereas realisation is a type of elaboration.  In terms of symbolic abstraction, the composition of the rank scale is of one level of abstraction, form, whereas realisation relates two distinct levels of abstraction, in this case, function and form.

[2] Here, as throughout this chapter, Martin & Rose confuse two distinct notions of 'word': 'word' as grammatical rank unit and 'word' as lexical item.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568):

The folk notion of the “word” is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

[3] Here again Martin & Rose confuse composition (the rank scale) with realisation (the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction).  In SFL theory, a clause is composed of groups (± phrases), each of which is composed of words.  Moreover, each is composed of syntagms of lower rank forms, not configurations, since it is functions, not forms, that are configured.

[4] To be clear, Martin & Rose have not identified what it is that is scaled from nuclear to peripheral in groups, nor the basis on which it is nuclear or peripheral.  Without a clear statement of the underlying principles involved, this is merely an empty exercise in relabelling.

[5] It will be seen, in the discussion of verbal groups, that Martin & Rose mistake elements of clause structure, circumstantial Adjuncts, for elements of verbal group structure.

The Discourse Semantic System Of Nuclear Relations In The Clause

Martin & Rose (2007: 95-6):

These four degrees of nuclearity are then set out as a system in Figure 3.13.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this entire discussion of nuclear relations confuses degrees of nuclearity of clause elements with the clause elements being related by degrees, and rebrands the grammatical confusion as Martin's  discourse semantics.

Moreover, the terminology, which uses synonyms for different degrees on the scale, names the model in terms of one of the intermediate degrees on the scale, the nucleus, instead of the central element to which all are said to be related.

[2] Contrary to SFL principles, this experiential system at the level of discourse semantics has no entry condition and no realisation statements that specify either discourse semantic structures or grammatical realisations.

More importantly, it presents the degrees of nuclearity as alternatives, such that only one can be chosen.  That is, the "discourse semantic" choices are clauses with either a central element or a nuclear element or a marginal element or a peripheral element.

Moreover, for each of these four options, only one clause function can be selected:

• either Process or Range, but not both, or
• either Medium or Range, but not both, or
• either Agent or Beneficiary, but not both, or
• either inner or outer circumstance, but not both.

This severely restricts the range of clauses that can be instantiated at the level of discourse semantics, to say the least.

In short, in Figure 3.13, Martin & Rose misrepresent a hyponymic taxonomy of their misunderstood theoretical categories as a system network that constitutes the discourse semantic choices available to language users.

Four Degrees Of Nuclearity In The Clause Schematised

Martin & Rose (2007: 95):

For our analyses of nuclear relations in clauses, we can distinguish four degrees of nuclearity: centre, nucleus, margin and periphery, schematised in Figure 3.12. The centre of the clause is occupied by the Process, and it may also include a Range:process, class or part, e.g. do a dance, be an Englishman, have the guts. The nucleus includes the Medium and any Range:entity, quality or possession. The margin includes Agents and Beneficiaries. And the periphery is occupied by Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the preceding 17 posts, this model is invalidated by all of the misunderstandings of SFL theory on which is based.  Moreover, it is a model of wording within the clause, not "meaning beyond the clause" (the gloss of discourse semantics in the title of this publication).

By way of contrast, a theoretically coherent model, based on the same intellectual source, Halliday's model of ergativity, and additionally organised in terms of the relations of expansion and projection, was provided in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

[2] Trivially, this form of representation first appears in Cléirigh (1998: 346-8), where it is used to model clause and group structure as a scalar field.

The Argument For 'Inner' Circumstances

Martin & Rose (2007: 95):

In contrast, Circumstances of Role, Means, Matter and Accompaniment are alternative ways of involving people and things involved [sic] in the activity. They are like participants and so are relatively nuclear: 

 

These inner Circumstances could be expressed as participants: I was a farm girl, we loved ones knew, a few lines end my story, our own eyes saw, his offence injured the victims, we said marriage, his safety worried me.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, all circumstances are "alternative ways of involving people and things" in the Process, so this criterion does not distinguish inner circumstances from outer circumstances.  Moreover, the authors' inventory falls short of the full range of inner circumstances in the original model; Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175):

[2] To be clear, what is omitted from the authors' misunderstanding of Halliday's theory of clause transitivity  — and their rebranding of it as Martin's discourse semantics — is the fact that none of these inner circumstances is related to the Process/Medium Nucleus of the clause in the same way.  As Table 4(10) sets out:

• Rôle is related by expansion: elaboration (=),
• Manner: means is related by expansion: enhancement (x),
• Matter is related by projection ('), and
• Accompaniment is related by expansion: extension (+).

The Argument For 'Outer' Circumstances

Martin & Rose (2007: 94):

Finally, associated with a process are various kinds of Circumstances that vary in their degree of involvement in it. Circumstances of Place, Time and Cause do not participate in the activity, but are more peripherally associated with it: 

 

As they are peripheral to the process, we can call these 'outer Circumstances'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, by convention, the term 'circumstance' is not capitalised in SFL theory, because it is a class of element rather than an element of function structure (like Location or Cause).

[2] To be clear, no circumstances participate in the Process; that is what makes them circumstances rather than participants.

[3] To be clear, the theoretical term for 'activity' here is 'Process'.  As previously demonstrated, the theoretical valeur of authors' term varies from instance to instance.

[4] To be clear, all circumstances are peripheral to the process, so peripherality does not distinguish outer circumstances from inner circumstances.

Moreover, because Martin & Rose do not understand the principles underlying source of "their" ideas, they misrepresent an inner circumstance (Location: directional), to a special unit,  as an outer circumstance. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175):

Misunderstanding Halliday's Transitivity Model Of The Clause To Rebrand The Ergative Model As Discourse Semantics

Martin & Rose (2007: 94):

The other two kinds of inner Range are a class or part of the Medium. Again the process is one of ‘being' or ‘having', that relates the class or part to the Medium:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this is a bare assertion: no argument is provided as to why these "kinds of Range" are to be regarded as inner.  The source of the author's ideas — e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174) — makes no distinction between inner and outer Range.  Any change to that model needs to be supported by valid argument.

[2] To be clear, here again, Martin & Rose confuse Halliday's particularised transitive model (Attribute of intensive and possessive relational clauses) with Halliday's generalised ergative model (Range), and use the former to elaborate the latter as their means of rebranding of Halliday's grammar as Martin's discourse semantics (nuclear relations).

Moreover, the authors misunderstand Halliday's particularised model. On the one hand, all attributive clauses construe class membership — not just intensive clauses (those labelled 'class' above).  On the other hand, in SFL theory, the 'class vs part' distinction that the authors use to subcategorise the Range is actually the intensive vs possessive distinction of relational clauses, which, in these instances is realised through the Process.

Using The Transitive Model To Rebrand The Ergative Model

Martin & Rose (2007: 94):

In addition there are three kinds of Range that are central to the Process, that we can call ‘inner Ranges'. The first is where the lexical process is very general, such as do, have, go, play and so on, and the Range specifies the type of process, such as do a dance, have a bath, play tennis. Dancing, bathing and tennis are of course actually activities, but they can be realised as nouns that combine with general processes. These are known as Range:process.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is merely a bare assertion, since no argument is provided as to why these kinds of Range are central to the Process.  As an argument, it is one instance of the logical fallacy known as Proof By Assertion.  Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 348):

[2] Here again Martin & Rose misconstrue a grammatical category ('Process') as lexical.

[3] To be clear, here again, Martin & Rose confuse Halliday's particularised transitive model (Scope: process of material clauses) with Halliday's generalised ergative model (Range), and use the former to elaborate the latter as their means of rebranding of Halliday's grammar as Martin's discourse semantics (nuclear relations).

do	a dance
have	a bath
play	tennis
Process:	Range
material	Scope: process

Using (Misanalysed) Transitivity To Misunderstand (Rebranded) Ergativity

Martin & Rose (2007: 94):

Another two kinds of Range are a quality or a possession of the Medium.  In this case the process is one of ‘being' or ‘having’, that relates the quality or a possession to the Medium:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin & Rose confuse Halliday's particularised transitive model (attributive Processes) with Halliday's generalised ergative model, and use the former to elaborate the latter as their means of rebranding of Halliday's grammar as Martin's discourse semantics (nuclear relations).

[2] To be clear, 'quality' and 'possession' are the authors' rebrandings of Halliday's Attributes of intensive vs possessive clauses.

[3] To be clear, here Martin & Rose analyse the clause I was torn to pieces as attributive:

I	was	torn to pieces
Medium	Process	Range
Carrier	relational	Attribute

However, the Process, in this metaphorical clause, is was torn not was.  This is demonstrated by the agnate clauses:

• I was torn to pieces by the news.
• The news tore me to pieces.

On this basis, the metaphorical clause is material, with to pieces serving as Range (resultative Attribute):

I	was torn	to pieces	(by the news)
Medium	Process:	Range	Agent
Goal	material	resultative Attribute	Actor

Cf the material clause:

I	was shattered	(by the news)
Medium	Process:	Agent
Goal	material	Actor

as metaphorical for the mental clause:

I	was traumatised	(by the news)
Medium	Process:	Agent
Senser	mental	Phenomenon